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Abstract 
This work examines the scope of non-practicing entity behavior and whether the debate on 
remedies can lead to changes that encourage the goals behind a patent system.  Innovation is 
often the stated goal but the significance of innovation commercialization is often ignored.  
Furthermore, there has been an increase in business models that involve alternate means of 
monetizing patents, not all of which were contemplated in the purpose of the patent system.  
Using the goals of the patent system as a backdrop, this work provides an overview of the impact 
of remedies available to courts in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States on patent 
systems.  The courts have the tools in each jurisdiction to grant remedies appropriate to the 
infringement.  However, systemic limitations in each patent system often prevent the courts from 
reviewing disputes.   
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Introduction 
Growing economic reliance on intellectual property development and use has led to a 
significant rise in patent applications, patent grants, and patent litigation.  Increases in patent 
grants have led to more patents in the marketplace, not all of which can be used to put the 
underlying innovation into practice.  Each patent comes with rights conferred by the grant, 
regardless of the patent owner’s use of the underlying innovation.  The combination of strong 
patent rights and increased patenting volume has encouraged business practices that exploit the 
rights that come with a patent rather than use the underlying innovation.  Instead of using patents 
to create goods and services for consumers, a variety of businesses have begun to actively use 
patents to not only obtain licensing revenues but also to employ strategies that may actually be 
anti-competitive.  The non-practicing entity has become a hotly debated concern in jurisdictions 
where intellectual property is becoming a significant economic driver.  Some scholars have 
begun to see non-practicing entities (NPEs) as a concern because of a perceived negative impact 
on innovation, on the pricing of goods and services, on investment, and even on invention 
marketing.  There is a perception that current efforts to encourage the intellectual economy are 
creating regimes that encourage business models that prize patent accumulation and rent-seeking 
rather than invention or invention marketing.   
Non-practicing entities are not something new, but in light of increasing business 
development relying on patented innovation non-practice, a debate has started over the merits of 
the current system in encouraging innovation versus patent accumulation and rent-seeking.  This 
has been fuelled by what is perceived to be exorbitant court awards to non-practicing companies 
at the expense of companies that are actually producing goods.  A debate has ensued between 
groups that see nothing wrong with current strategic use of patents and those that see it as 
detrimental to the goals of a patent system.  NPEs, and a subset known as patent trolls, are at the 
heart of the debate over the proper functioning of patent systems. 
NPEs have been a particular concern in the U.S., where the specter of the patent troll has 
raised debate about the workings of the entire patent system.  The volume of patents issued has 
increased dramatically over the past twenty years, leading to innovation.  However, this has also 
led to creative patent drafting and a robust trade in patents as a commodity, separate from the 
underlying innovation.  Troll success has also encouraged companies to come up with new 
business models that defend against troll practices, and also to find new ways to exploit the 
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patent system.  As trolling has become more sophisticated and specialized, large companies have 
not only created defensive systems to combat this behavior but they have also created their own 
business models that emulate and expand on trolling behavior.  Offensive and defensive tactics 
have exploited areas of the patent system that were previously little used, developed, or even 
considered.   
A patent system exists to encourage innovation.  It has always been held that the strong 
property rights that come with a patent, particularly the right to exclude, would encourage 
innovation and benefit society.  But it seems that there has been an inadvertent consequence 
where rent-seeking has increased at the expense of commercialization.  The proliferation of 
patents has led to the creation of markets, market-makers, auctions, and a general increase in 
patent trade.  Commercialization has always been assumed as part of the “innovation” goal but 
commoditization and trade are not the same as invention commercialization.  While patent trade 
has increased, that does not mean that the innovations represented by the patents are being put 
into use; nor does it mean that the rights granted by a patent have been used to increase general 
social benefits.  The legal system has been used effectively in both offensive and defensive 
situations to obtain nuisance settlements or questionable remedies.  These dispute resolutions 
potentially disrupt society and border on punitive, rather than compensatory.  Thus the grant of 
strong property rights in a patent has led to a robust patent trade and licensing regime. However 
the innovation supposedly stemming from the increase in patenting and increased rights is 
questionable.  These strong property rights have led to a significant patent trade through 
auctions, cross-licensing, and aggressive enforcement; yet the questionable public benefit of 
strong rights has raised only limited discussion.   
In the U.S., there has been a recent focus on limiting remedies available to NPEs.  
Scholars, commentators, and practitioners have been debating the merits of establishing a 
remedy system that treats different entities differently when granting relief for patent 
infringement.  The U.S. debate has moved to other jurisdictions but the debate has been on the 
merits of U.S. approaches rather than an analysis of business practices within these other 
jurisdictions.  Rather than learning from the U.S. experience and being proactive, other 
jurisdictions have remained silent on the operation of NPEs within their borders.  
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This work will look at patent infringement remedies in the U.S., Canada and the United 
Kingdom.
1
  Through a comparison of patent infringement remedies and approaches in these three 
common law jurisdictions, this work will detail the benefits of flexibility when courts are settling 
disputes that involve at least one non-practicing entity.  All three have very similar approaches to 
patent law and property law but with sufficient distinctions to warrant examining the merits of 
these differences in relation to NPEs.  Since economic considerations are part of the 
examination, comparing Canadian, U.K., and U.S. approaches to remedies is an attempt to gauge 
the success that NPEs have had in establishing their business models in small, medium, and large 
economies.  Much of the scholarly work related to non-practicing entities has come from the 
U.S.  This work will examine some of the issues that exist in the three patent systems that courts 
either face or may face.  While NPE business models may be prevalent throughout the U.S., that 
does not mean that these businesses will not expand into other markets to take advantage of the 
world-wide embrace of increasing intellectual property protection.  There are already indications 
that NPEs are tailoring business methods to take advantage of the laws of different jurisdictions.   
This work will first review approaches taken by scholars to patent infringement remedies, 
particularly economic analysis of legal remedies and the impact these remedies have in relation 
to the goals of the patent system.  The economic debate has centered on whether a property-
based or a liability based remedy system provides greater incentive and results that more 
accurately reflect market-oriented compensation.  The debate also touches on the impact of 
patent trolls and how best to limit their impact on the patent system, or whether it is even 
desirable to limit trolling. 
The second part of this work is intended to establish a starting point for analysis by 
illustrating the theoretical debates over idealized remedy regimes in comparison to the existing 
legal framework for patent remedies.  It starts by determining what a patent system is designed to 
achieve.  Patents have been deemed property but because of their intangible nature they differ 
from physical property.  Starting with an initial definition of property, ideological approaches to 
property are placed next to the laws established by all three jurisdictions to determine the extent 
of property rights that exist in a patent under their respective laws.  Once the extent of property 
                                                          
1
 Since the vast majority of patent infringement cases take place in London, this work will look at English courts 
(including England and Wales).  Within the United Kingdom, Scottish and Northern Irish courts are the only other 
courts that can hear patent disputes.  While they are competent to handle patent issues, very few cases come 
before the Scottish or Northern Irish courts. Therefore they are not considered in this work.  The term England or 
English courts are heavily used and have been used interchangeably with U.K. or U.K. courts.    
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rights that come with a patent are defined, the remedies available to patent owners when there is 
a transgression of those rights are reviewed.  Remedies fall under either property rules or liability 
rules and through this grouping, the remedies available in all three jurisdictions are reviewed.   
Current remedies are well tailored to dealing with patent infringement and courts have 
considerable flexibility in applying these remedies to balance the demands of the patent owner 
with the goals of the patent system. 
The third part of this work examines various NPE business models and how the system 
encourages these models under its current structure.  Trolls have been vilified by a significant 
group of commentators and it is only natural to start by determining which patent holders fall 
under that term.  In light of the emergence of patent trolls, inventor motivations to obtain a patent 
are reviewed.  Based on empirical data, it appears that the patent system provides very different 
encouragement than what is theoretically intended.  While marketing is a goal of the patent 
system, inventors often have several reasons for getting a patent only one of which is marketing 
the underlying innovation, and it is often not the primary reason.  This is followed by an 
examination of what is meant by patent “practice” and the difficulties that exist in 
commercializing or marketing a patent.  In light of the varying motivations inventors have to 
obtain a patent and the difficulties that exist in commercializing a patented invention, the 
business methods of patent trolls are examined.  It appears that trolling practices have 
encouraged other aggressive patent use tactics that have received far less scrutiny. These tactics 
may even be deemed “legitimate” practice.  It also appears that trolls provide a benefit to a 
segment of inventors, and may also provide services which encourage certain patent system 
goals while thwarting others.  Other NPEs have embraced business strategies which encourage 
patent accumulation but do little to encourage commercialization or follow-on innovation, and 
these practices may even hamper competition.  Despite concerns over patent trolls, their business 
models have found a niche within the current system.  Concern over trolling practices outside the 
U.S. is muted but there are indications that NPEs have made attempts to enter the Canadian and 
the U.K. markets. 
The fourth section examines the flexible remedy approach, highlighting some of the 
benefits while pointing out the limitations of both extreme and one-size-fits-all approaches.  It 
starts by reviewing the flexible approach to injunction awards illustrated by the U.S. Supreme 
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Court in eBay v. MercExchange.
2
  Despite a strong leaning towards property remedies in all 
three jurisdictions, the respective courts all have powers to provide fact-dependent remedies.  
Powers to grant flexible remedies is followed by a review of the feasibility and accuracy of court 
calculated damages under a liability theory rather than a property theory.  The section also 
examines the benefits as well as the limitations of property remedies and analyzes the debate 
among scholars as to whether property remedies lead to overcompensation, under-compensation, 
or something else.  
Part four further considers the limitations on court powers in upholding the goals of a 
patent system. It reflects, as well, on other ways the patent system encourages NPEs.  NPEs take 
advantage of several gaps in the patent remedy system, and their practices rely on these gaps to 
obtain revenues.  Current economic analysis when it comes to NPEs focuses on a specific goal 
rather than all the goals of a patent system, and it fails to differentiate among the motivations of 
the patent seekers.  In order to accurately perform an analysis of the system, scholars should start 
with an accurate accounting of its goals, followed by an examination of various business models 
and motivations to patent.  Courts have considerable powers when granting and tailoring 
remedies to meet the goals of the patent system while appropriately compensating patent owners.  
A flexible approach to remedies that incorporates all these factors will best determine the 
appropriate compensation for a patent owner, in light of the rights held and the harm inflicted.     
In summary, courts have considerable powers to grant appropriate remedies.  Under 
current patent laws, there are gaps that will encourage certain business models that may be 
different from what was intended when the patent regime was established.  While it appears that 
patent trolls and other forms of NPEs have created business models that are likely to remain for 
the foreseeable future, such patent owners do not necessarily have to receive the same 
compensation or same remedy as would a patent holder who is successfully embodying the goals 
of the patent system.  Despite the powers available to the courts, there are systemic issues which 
cannot be addressed through legal remedies and which require serious scrutiny if the goals of the 
patent systems are to be achieved.  
  
                                                          
2
 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
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Chapter One 
Literature Review 
The following literature review is an examination of the patent infringement remedies 
available to a non-practicing patent holder.  The literature is from the United States where a 
particular non-practicing entity, known as the “patent troll”, has been the subject of significant 
concern when it comes to the proper functioning of the patent system.  The material covers three 
areas.  The first part will provide a very brief overview of the varying reasons for the existence 
of a patent system, including the objectives and goals sought in establishing one.  Next, patent 
trolls, their business models, and the impact that these entities have on the patent system are 
considered.  Remedies are often intertwined with any discussion on patent trolls.  The third part 
of this literature review will focus on infringement remedies. Scholars have divided patent 
remedies into what are termed property rules and liability rules.  This section examines the 
spectrum between pure property and pure liability rules.  While no one seems to call for either 
spectrum extreme, several approaches to remedies are reviewed.  Robert Merges calls for strong 
property rules with some flexibility. Roger Blair and Thomas Cotter prefer strong property rules 
but with greater accuracy for damage calculations.  Peter Menell recognizes the property aspects 
of patents but concludes that there are sufficient differences between intellectual and real 
property to warrant a more flexible approach to patents.  Finally, Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro 
call for damages in lieu of injunctions when non-practicing entities are involved.     
Purpose of a Patent System 
Before examining the impact that changes to infringement remedies can have on the 
patent system, the objectives for establishing a patent system need to be clear; and those 
objectives, as understood by the commentators, should be articulated.  According to Robert 
Merges, Peter Menell, Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro, the purpose in creating a patent regime is 
to foster innovation.
3
  Roger Blair and Thomas Cotter expand upon this statement by indicating 
that a patent system should maximize social values by subtracting social costs from social 
benefits.
4
  The social benefits are to encourage discovery and dissemination of new ideas.
5
  The 
                                                          
3
 Robert Merges, The Trouble With Trolls, 24 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1583, 1589 (2009); Peter S. Menell, The Property 
Rights Movement’s Embrace of Intellectual Property: True Love or Doomed Relationship?, 34 Ecology L. Q. 713, 722 
(2007); Mark A. Lemley and Carl Shapiro, The Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking: Reply to John Golden, 85 Tex. L. 
Rev. 2163, 2173 (2007). 
4
 Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 1, 44,45 (2001). 
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social costs are: 1) the “systemic costs of processing, enforcing, and maintaining patent rights”; 
2) the potential of existing patents to inhibit invention, by raising the cost of follow-on 
inventions; 3) duplicated efforts by multiple inventors; and 4) the existence of “deadweight” 
losses arising from patent monopoly rights.
6
  The social benefit of giving exclusive rights to a 
patentee should outweigh the social costs and any existing patent system should do this better 
than any alternate schemes.
7
  
The purpose of a patent system is not just to encourage innovation for the sake of 
innovation but to foster innovation which will benefit society.  Few of the authors go into detail 
about the purpose for having a patent system; however the social considerations indicated by 
Blair and Cotter cover both a broader purpose and a greater number of stake holders in a patent 
system than those indicated by the other authors.       
An inventor receives a patent in exchange for public disclosure of the invention.  
Innovation is embodied through the patent requirements. In addition to disclosure, elements such 
as non-obviousness and utility must also be satisfied before a patent can be granted to the 
inventor.
8
  The incentive is derived from a form of property right in the patent, giving the 
inventor certain privileges.
 9
  These privileges include the right to exclude others from making, 
importing, using, or selling the invention.  Merges focuses on factors that encourage innovation 
but ignores any social costs.  Blair and Cotter examine the risks that exist for the inventor when 
embarking on the innovation process, and concede that there must be a sufficiently high 
inducement to offset the risks.
10
  However, they also note that protections to one stakeholder 
must be balanced against the social costs that arise if incentives actually stunt innovation and 
result in extreme monopolistic pricing that affects consumers.  
The Non-Practicing Entity (Patent Trolls) 
There is a particular group of non-practicing entities, known as patent trolls, that have 
been accused of abusing the patent monopoly and acting contrary to the goals of the patent 
system.  Robert Merges writes that, while patent trolls are acting within the law, their actions are 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
5
 Id., at 45. 
6
 Id. at 46.  
7
 Id.  
8
 Merges, Supra note 3, at 1589. 
9
 Id. at 1588-89. 
10
 Blair & Cotter, Supra note 4, at 48. 
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detrimental to innovation and the patent system as a whole.  Timo Fischer and Joachim Henkel 
performed an empirical study of several firms that they considered to be patent trolls.  They, too, 
deem any benefits provided by patent trolls be outweighed by their detriments.  However, 
Fischer and Henkel also concede that patent trolls have an effective business model and they are 
likely to retain their niche within the patent system. 
Robert Merges defines a patent troll as entity that engages “in inefficient, socially 
wasteful patent transactions.”11  Trolls often refer to themselves as market makers, indicating 
that they provide a beneficial function within the patent system.  In this case, market-making is 
considered a function where an entity purchases an undervalued patent to market it to other firms 
who are unaware of its existence.  Merges indicates that this is a false definition used by patent 
trolls to give legitimacy to their actions.
12
  In his estimation, there is no social value to these 
actions and they only serve to encourage litigation.  Trolls are often middlemen in a transaction. 
They purchase a patent from one entity and then find entities already using the patented 
invention, from which they can extract a royalty payment in exchange for continued use of the 
patented invention.  They use the threat of litigation to obtain payments from entities that already 
practice the patent.  While trolls like to be referred to as market-makers or middlemen, they do 
not create markets that facilitate patent trade, nor are they necessarily resellers of patents. They 
are merely seekers of royalties.  This raises the question whether there is something wrong with 
finding value in something overlooked by others?    
Merges believes that these transactions do not contribute to the innovation process and 
actually impede innovation through “rent-seeking” behavior that often rises to the level of 
blackmail.  Rent-seeking occurs when a property owner does not exploit the owned property, 
leaving others to use it in exchange for a fee.
13
  Thus, the owner “rents” the property to others to 
use and exploit.  In the patent world, this behavior occurs when an inventor receives a patent for 
his/her invention but does not practice that invention, instead exacting payments from others who 
already use and exploit the invention.  The patent in this case, does not encourage innovation for 
social benefit, but merely as an instrument for collecting rents.
14
  Merges considers this a 
                                                          
11
 Merges, Supra note 3, at 1588.  
12
 Id., at 1599-1600.  
13
 Id., at 1587-88. 
14
 Id., at 1587. 
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strategic use of gaps in the laws where the patent holder uses the threat of litigation to procure 
payments from a manufacturer or socially productive entity.
15
  This behavior is becoming more 
extreme as it becomes a regular strategic maneuver.  
Increases in rent-seeking actually discourage innovation.  With complex technologies, a 
troll that obtains a patent for a relatively minor part can threaten the already producing 
technological manufacturer with an injunction unless the manufacturer consents to pay a 
substantial royalty.
16
 
Propertization provides a significant incentive for inventors to innovate.  However, the 
growing treatment of patents as property, independent of the underlying innovation, has also led 
to increased rent-seeking behavior.  While rent-seeking is not necessarily bad, if it is combined 
with transactions that diminish and suppress innovation then it may be a detriment to society. 
17
  
Nonetheless, Merges contends that the use of property law theory for patents is still preferable 
despite its potential to encourage rent-seeking.  Increased innovation is the goal of the patent 
system and this incentive is necessary despite increased rent-seeking.  Merges cites Adam Smith, 
calling for a distinction between productive and unproductive transactions where self-interest 
should be tempered by ‘“ethical virtues such as justice and prudence.”’18 
Merges also posits that people who argue that trolls are performing a genuine market-
making function, by acting as middlemen to transactions between sellers and buyers, ignore the 
impact of such transactions.  These middlemen, unlike those in other industries where they help 
to develop and market, or facilitate commercialization, do not perform their own research and 
development, nor do they add to the existing innovative pool.  Trolls merely increase the volume 
of litigation.  If trolls actually serve a function by encouraging patent trade, that may be a useful 
function.  However, if trolls call themselves middlemen but merely purchase and sue, that is 
another matter.  
                                                          
15
 Id. at 1592-1603. 
16
 Merges, Supra note 3, at 1590-91. 
17
 Id. at 1603-07. 
18
 Id. at 1602. 
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Merges contends that trolling behavior is a form of blackmail, an act with no social virtue 
or benefit.
19
  Blackmail is a wasteful economic transaction because a party uses resources to get 
information and in exchange for suppressing that information, receives a payment from another 
party.
20
  While Merges may liken trolling to blackmail, a patent is part of the public record.  
Trolls trade in patents that have not yet been enforced against parties that are allegedly practicing 
the underlying innovation described in the patent, with the intent to seek rent from the allegedly 
practicing parties.  The threat of litigation and a potential injunction forces a payment from the 
alleged infringer.  There may be some similarity to blackmail in the potential injunction that 
threatens to deprive the alleged infringer of a revenue source; but more significantly, it threatens 
to make society poorer by removing a potential product from the marketplace or raising the cost 
of production and ultimately, the cost of the product.  However, a better analogy may be that 
trolling is really champertous behavior since a troll is less interested in depriving society of the 
patented product and more interested in being paid for someone’s use, by using injunctions and 
the courts as negotiating levers.    
Historically, the courts have been effective in placing limits on troll-like behavior.  These 
judicial decisions were interpretations of the existing law, but they prevented more extreme 
solutions from being implemented through new legislation resulting from public outcry.
21
 
Timo Fischer and Joachim Henkel take a closer look at patent trolls through a statistical 
analysis of data collected to examine and clarify characteristics of trolling behavior.
22
  Their 
study concludes that: 1) patents obtained by trolls are generally broad and have a high likelihood 
of being infringed; 2) the patents purchased are generally part of “thickets” and have a high 
substitution cost; and 3) patents sought by trolls tend to be higher quality than those of practicing 
entities, resulting in a higher probability that patent validity will be upheld by a court.
23
  The 
                                                          
19
 Id. at 1599-1602. 
20
 Merges, Supra note 3, at 1600-01.  
21
 Id., 1583, 1607-1609. 
22
 Timo Fischer & Joachim Henkel, Patent Trolls on Markets for Technology - An Empirical Analysis of Trolls' Patent 
Acquisitions. at 3, Paper presented at "Opening Up Innovation: Strategy, Organization and Technology" at Imperial 
College London Business School, June 16 - 18, 2010, 
http://www2.druId.dk/conferences/viewpaper.php?id=501834&cf=43   (last visited Dec. 12, 2010); see also 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1523102&rec=1&srcabs=1498390   (alternate source last 
visited Dec. 12 2010).  Their research determined that there are patent trolls operating throughout the European 
Economic Zone and not just in the United States.   
23
 Id., at 2. 
11 
 
study by Fischer and Henkel did not delve into business method patents (which are available in 
the United States) or situations that involved relatively weak patents but were resolved out of 
court. 
Fischer and Henkel define trolls "as individuals or firms that seek to generate profits 
mainly or exclusively from licensing or selling their (often simplistic) patented technology to a 
manufacturing firm that, at the point in time when fees are claimed, already infringes on the 
[troll’s] patent and is therefore under particular pressure to reach an agreement with the [troll].”24 
Trolls should be distinguished from other non-practicing entities such as pure research firms or 
licensing firms that seek to license to others before infringement is detected.
25
 However, they 
recognize that the term “troll” may cause confusion because their definition encompasses not 
only entities who hide their patents until they are infringed but also inventors who are failed 
licensors who later enforce patent rights once they discover infringement.
26
  Fischer and Henkel 
further point out that trolls may also have a positive effect because these entities may force large 
corporations to respect the rights of small or financially constrained inventors.
27
  Thus it seems 
that trolls may be reviled because of their willingness to litigate but they may be nonetheless 
beneficial for a segment of patent owners.  However, Fischer and Henkel still denounce trolling 
behavior because its detriments outweigh its benefits. 
Patent trolls are active buyers and sellers of patents, purchasing or licensing patents in an 
effort to obtain revenues through reselling the patent or through licensing agreements.
28
  This 
behavior challenges the belief that increased patent rights improve market functions for 
technology.
29
  What distinguishes trolls from other purchasers is that they are entities interested 
in purchasing a patent solely for its exclusion rights and not for the underlying technology.
30
  
Furthermore, transactions involving trolls do not generally concern technology transfer but rather 
the selling or licensing of patent rights to an entity already using the patented technology.
31
  
                                                          
24
 Id. at 3.  Fischer and Henkel use the term “troll” and “shark” interchangeably throughout the paper.  
25
 Id.  
26
 Id. at 4.  
27
 Fischer & Henkel, Supra note 22, at 4. 
28
Id., at 3.  
29
 Id.  
30
 Id.  
31
 Id.  
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These patent-only transactions are part of the business model used by trolls.
32
  Purchasing 
patents for enforcement and not commercialization is what has caused consternation among the 
patent community. 
Fischer and Henkel proceed to clear up some misconceptions about patent trolls.  There is 
a generally held belief that patent trolls purchase patents of dubious quality but their most 
commonly used business strategies would indicate otherwise.
33
  Three business strategies or 
combinations of strategies are commonly used by trolls: 1) an injunction-based strategy; 2) a 
damage-based strategy; or 3) a cost-switching based strategy.
34
  An injunctive strategy employs a 
low-quality patent to successfully induce an infringer to settle if a potential temporary injunction 
would immediately affect the infringer, but defensive measures to invalidate the weak patent take 
years.
35
  A damage-based strategy requires a higher quality patent since the troll is going after a 
monetary award from a court and invalidity proceedings to overturn the patent are generally part 
of such a suit.
36
  A troll uses a “switching cost-based” strategy because it would be costly for the 
infringer to switch to a non-infringing alternative.
37
 This strategy exploits the high cost of 
moving to use of a non-infringing product through the threat of a potential injunction award by 
the courts.  The latter two strategies require a full trial and eventual judicial remedy.  They take 
time and higher quality patents are required because a troll will have to overcome invalidity 
proceedings in order to be successful.
38
  
Patentee friendly injunctions and high damage awards encourage the patent troll business 
model.
39
  Since courts, especially in the U.S. rarely take into account an infringer’s cost in 
switching to a replacement technology due to an injunction, Fischer and Henkel argue that this 
can lead to excessive damages particularly in cases where a non-infringing technology can easily 
be used.
40
  Excessive damage awards are common, as shown by the “holdup” analysis conducted 
by Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro, described below.  Fast and easily obtained pre-trial or 
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preliminary injunctions increase a troll’s leverage over the infringer, thereby increasing the 
potential to obtain high royalties.
41
   
A patent troll is more likely to acquire a patent with a broad scope because there is a 
greater chance that such a patent will be infringed, whereas a practicing firm is less concerned 
with a broad scope since its primary concern is to prevent others from making similar products.
42
  
Since one strategy employed by trolls is to attack infringers who face a high cost of employing 
alternate technologies, a troll will likely focus on purchasing patents with a “high-degree of 
overlap” or those that are a part of complex technologies, or those patents that are part of 
thickets.
43
 Over the last decade larger companies have not only diversified the business-side of 
their intellectual property but they have also learned how to defend themselves from trolls and 
use tactics to exploit competitors. Yet, companies are still not immune from troll attacks.  
Despite recent efforts by courts, Fischer and Henkel believe that the patent troll business 
model will continue to be successful. They feel it will continue because 1) determining patent 
boundaries is complicated, making it difficult for inventors to predict whether a new product will 
infringe; 2) there are an ever increasing number of patent application filings; 3) not all countries 
have made legal changes to curb trolls; 4) laws requiring patent practice may easily be 
circumvented by creating nominal production facilities; and 5) the switching cost-based strategy 
is not affected by any of the current legal changes.
44
 
The business models which trolls employ favor the troll over practicing entities when it 
comes to identifying and purchasing patents.
45
  Patent trolls are adept at identifying suitable 
patents and extracting value, as both are core competencies of the troll’s business model.46  By 
contrast, practicing firms are generally in the business of using the patented invention and will 
extract value from patents by 1) preventing imitation, 2) cross-licensing, or 3) licensing.
47
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Obtaining full value from a patent will generally involve some licensing.
48
  Attempts to receive 
royalties may be difficult because without an amicable agreement another practicing entity may 
counter-sue for other product infringement, or the attempted licensor may be in a business 
relationship with the potential licensee.
49
  Trolls are not vulnerable to either type of counter-
suit.
50
    While firms that obtain patent can be said to be in the business of using the patented 
inventions, there is a push to patent as much as possible, creating an abundance of patented 
innovations but no clear use for these innovations, leading to greater efforts by companies to find 
commercial value for their intellectual property portfolio.   
Remedies and Their Impact 
To understand the impact of remedies on the patent system the origins of how economic 
analysis has divided remedies into property rules and liability rules should be examined. Despite 
the existence of a hybrid system, there is still considerable debate on whether a pure property 
remedy system is superior to a pure liability remedy system.  Robert Merges argues for a 
property based system.  Blair and Cotter argue that a property system is necessary but that 
damages would be better determined by a tort law analysis.  Finally Peter Menell argues that 
patents are very different from tangible property and the same property rules should not be 
applied to both tangible and intangible property.  
Before the term “patent troll” was coined, Robert Merges examined whether property 
rules or liability rules were more conducive to patent infringement remedies.  In the wake of 
increased concern over patent trolls and potential patent system changes to curb troll behavior, 
there has been increased debate on which set of rules would make better remedies to combat 
patent infringement.  Economic analysis under these rules stems from the Coase transaction 
theorem and the subsequent expansion by Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed.
51
  Merges 
describes a property rule as a legal entitlement where the entitlement holder sets an anticipated 
price and only after reaching an agreement with a second party through bargaining can the 
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entitlement be lawfully used by the second party.
52
  Injunctive relief is the expected remedy for 
patent infringement and only through achieving an agreement with the infringing party, will the 
patentee allow the infringer to use the patented invention.  
A liability rule accepts infringement, but is followed by a tribunal proceeding after 
infringement occurs to determine appropriate compensation for the infringement.
53
 Such a 
remedy is perceived to be a compulsory licence, usually granted by the courts, allowing an 
infringer to continue using the patented invention in exchange for money. 
Merges states that under Coase’s theorem, if the transaction costs are zero, property 
rights allocations will eventually be transferred “to their highest-value use through private 
bargains.”54 However, if transaction costs are greater than zero, a transfer of property to a higher 
value user may not occur.  This is an example of a property rule.  The theorem was initially 
applied to physical property but also applies to patent transactions where it is certain that either a 
valid patent right does or does not exist.   
Merges accepts the limitations of the theorem, noting that the problem of applying 
Coase’s theorem to intellectual property rights arises from the property’s intangible nature.  
Infringement detection and the severity of that infringement, or valuation, are not easily 
determined because a patent’s scope or boundary is often unclear. The value of prior patented 
creations on a current product or process and the uncertainty over whether an independently 
created invention infringes a previous one further blur the boundaries.  Valuation is further 
complicated as patented works can be cumulative and even interdependent.  The boundary 
uncertainty also makes it difficult for parties to effectively negotiate a transaction.  Furthermore, 
neither strategic behavior nor the use of blocking patents is part of the Coasian consideration.  
Both of these tactics will result in conflict rather than a negotiated, equitable division of assets 
and resources.  All these complications indicate high transaction costs which will prevent 
efficient transactions.   
Calabresi and Melamed expanded upon Coase’s theorem, indicating how shifting 
transaction costs may change a property rule to a liability rule and vice versa.  A liability rule 
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will likely be preferred if transaction costs are high, there are many parties to a transaction, or 
transaction valuation between the parties is complicated.  Conversely, if transaction costs are 
low, there are few parties to a transaction, or valuation is easy, a property rule may be better 
suited.  Merges argues that patent cases fit the Calabresi/Melamed property rule criteria.  In a 
patent dispute there are two parties to a transaction, transaction costs between the parties are 
relatively low, and courts have a difficult time properly determining the value of the patented 
invention due to the complexity of the patented invention and specific market conditions.
55
  In 
Merges’ opinion, the parties to the transaction are best suited to accurately value the technology 
while courts are less able to determine the value of complex intellectual property transactions.
56
  
Thus a liability rule will create inaccurate results when damages are determined by the courts 
and a property rule would allow a more accurate resolution.  Courts are readily able to make 
complex calculations with tangible property.  However, there is a general perception among 
many U.S. intellectual property scholars, that the intangible nature of patents confuses 
assessment by all parties who are not the plaintiff and defendant.  However, accurate valuation is 
really not possible when interested parties differ in their assessment and one uses a lever, such as 
an injunction, to pry more royalties out of the pocket of the other.   
There have been arguments that transaction costs are actually high and not low, because 
patents and patent transactions are both complicated.  This makes a liability rule more suitable 
for deciding patent disputes.  Rather than preventing patent transactions, Merges contends that 
the presence of strong property rights will actually facilitate patent transactions rather than 
preventing them because private parties will force institutional changes to lower transaction 
costs.
57
  For emerging technological industry segments, he holds that the current presence of high 
transaction costs should not be changed through government intervention but should, for the time 
being, be resolved through private transactions.
58
  Others argue that the pervasive transaction 
costs should lead to the use of liability rules and even compulsory licenses.
59
  However, strong 
property rules should continue even in the face of high transaction costs because they have led to 
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private institutional changes which eventually lowered transactional costs.
60
  Strong property 
rules actually led to private contracts that established private liability rules through the creation 
of patent pools.
61
  Merges contends that statutory liability rules enforced by courts would lack 
the flexibility that private institutions and institutional agreements have.
62
  However, in making 
this claim, Merges ignores the potential anti-competitive nature of patent pools and also assumes 
that private institutions lack the bureaucracy and other externalities which confuse court 
assessment.  
Without a right to injunctive relief, Merges believes that a patent will be worth 
considerably less and this loss of value would diminish the incentive to invent.
63
  He further 
asserts that although using injunctive relief as a bargaining chip in negotiations may lead to 
overcompensation, a damages based system will likely undercompensate.
64
  This point is 
discussed below in greater detail.  While there is some truth to such economic claims, perfect 
compensation is unlikely regardless of the method used to determine it and terms such as 
overcompensation and undercompensation are relative. 
Calls in the U.S. to change the current property rule system of dealing with infringement 
to a liability rule system require closer examination.  Merges believes that compulsory license 
awards are a rash decision and parties should be allowed to examine creative solutions to resolve 
impasses.
65
  Scholars should examine a wide range of enforcement technologies and techniques, 
in addition to institutional changes and arrangements using property rights theory.
66
  It would 
also appear that small adjustments to the patent system (such as those outlined in the eBay 
decision below) appear to appeal to Merges.
67
  Merges recites a common U.S. position towards 
compulsory licenses, but it has also become a position taken by Canada and the U.K. in recent 
years. 
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In a more recent work Merges finds that patent trolling has caused a re-examination of 
whether patents should be treated the same way as physical property.  Examining patent rights 
under a property law theory is problematical because patents are based on an underlying 
technology.  Infringers and courts often have a difficult time defining the exact boundaries of the 
patented technology.  This causes an increase in measurement costs (litigation fees) to determine 
the boundaries.  Merges indicates that, while measurement costs are an increasing problem, 
attempts to ameliorate these increases should be handled with subtle methods rather than with 
wholesale changes to patent law.  Large scale and significant changes to the law may actually 
cause unforeseen results which may destabilize the system rather than resolve the problems.  
Merges supports a private solution rather than changing the existing patent laws.  This is 
the preferred solution in a market economy; wholesale systemic changes may be avoided if a 
private solution can be found, particularly if private solutions are diminished and greater public 
involvement takes place.  This is an ideological position lacking a long enough historical 
timeline to show whether it is a correct position.  Merges notes that overly strong and inefficient 
property rules can be overcome if the cost of coordinating a solution between private parties is 
low, but firms will race to acquire more patents if “coordination costs” are high.68  Coordination 
costs are the cost of establishing private cooperative transaction systems as a means of 
overcoming strong property rights.
69
  However, property rights in patents do not lend themselves 
to a collective private solution since increased property rights push inventors to compete with 
one-another. High competition is likely to encourage inventors to lobby for stronger patent 
rights, encouraging a legislative solution.  Nonetheless, Merges contends that legislative changes 
should be discouraged because only some parties will be consulted through the legislative 
process. There is also a great deal of lobbying from groups with widely differing interests.  
Furthermore, the legislative process is slow-moving and the process’ deal-making nature may 
create undesirable changes.
70
 There is a certain irony in this position because patent law is a 
legislative creation, already shaped by some of the interests Merges feels will make undesirable 
changes.  
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There have been numerous calls for changing the U.S. patent laws to combat trolling 
behavior, but competing interests have created a legislative impasse.  Even if legislation were 
passed, the potential side effects could cause unforeseen harms to property rights. The 
unforeseeable impact on property rights dictates that minor institutional adjustments may be 
better suited for determining damages in patent cases.
71
  Such an adjustment was made when the 
U.S. Supreme Court limited the use of automatic permanent injunctions in the eBay v. 
MercExchange case, greatly limiting a powerful bargaining tool that trolls use to exact royalty 
payments.  The Supreme Court’s directive was a prime example of how the legal process and the 
courts were effective in combating problems with the patent system.  Judicial discretion to limit 
injunctions was encouraged so that disproportionate damage settlements can be curbed when a 
patented invention is a component of a complex multi-component device.
72
  With eBay in mind, 
Merges suggests that the Court should fashion a test to limit damages to strict conformity with 
the actual economic value of the patented invention. The test should examine the infringer’s 
profit with the patented invention minus an estimate of the infringer’s profit using the next 
alternative.
73
 
Problems with both the legislative process and self-regulation lead Merges to suggest that 
the courts are the most capable entities for dealing with the impact of trolls on the system.  
However, even the courts have difficulty.  Complex technologies and the difficulty of 
apportioning the value of a patented component in relation to a whole device are challenging 
issues for judges (and juries in U.S. courts).  That is why valuation rules should be established to 
clearly define differences in profit between the infringer’s product including the infringing 
component and the profit using an unpatented alternative (the next best thing).  This solution, 
like the eBay decision for injunctions, would be a minor change and would help limit the rent-
seeking behavior of trolls.
74
 
Merges believes that current remedies must be further refined.  Expert testimony refers to 
an apportionment “rule of thumb” entitling patentees to between a quarter and a third of profits 
of the infringer’s product.  The use of this rule leads to further valuation problems for complex 
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devices consisting of several patents.
75
  Patent drafting also leads to expansive interpretations of 
inventions, even though the invention may only be a small component of the entire device.
76
  
Finally, patent trials are generally very complex. This complexity leads judges to deny evidence 
showing that other patented or non-patented components are significant to the invention.
77
  These 
are problems with the patent trial system which relatively minor changes may resolve.
78
 
Roger Blair and Thomas Cotter are more concerned with greater accuracy in patent 
damage calculations. They indicate that tort law principles are well suited to patent remedy 
analysis.    Blair and Cotter start by stating that a patent system should strive to maximize social 
values, where social costs are subtracted from social benefits.
79
  They argue that the most 
economically efficient approach to meet the goals of the patent system in the U.S. is through the 
tort law “cause-in-fact” standard (“but-for”) and proximate cause concepts can be applied to 
accurately gauge damages, promote innovation, and encourage disclosure. 
80
  Tort-law concepts 
could be used to more accurately assess infringement damages.  Despite their desire to see these 
concepts commonly applied by courts, Blair and Cotter are firm believers that injunctions should 
still be awarded as part of patent remedies and that the same remedies should be available to 
patent holders, regardless of whether the holder is practicing the invention or not. 
In supporting their argument, Blair and Cotter describe the current damage remedies 
available under the U.S. Patent Act.  These include lost profits and a reasonable royalty.  The 
availability of lost profits and reasonable royalties as infringement awards are moves towards a 
“tort-law framework,” despite reluctance of courts to treat patent damages as other torts.81  
Disgorging profits attributable to the infringement, under the theory that profits are held in trust 
for the patentee, has not been a valid remedy since 1946, due to the perceived expense, time and 
complexity of accounting for profits.
82
  The Patent Act currently entitles patentees to recover 
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“damages adequate to compensate for infringement,” but no less than a reasonable royalty.83 
Current compensation awards for lost profits or reasonable royalties have never been defined by 
statute but calculation methods have nonetheless been left up to the courts.
84
 Courts lack residual 
authority to award restitutionary damages; but under statute, courts can award up to treble 
damages for willful infringement.
85
   
Lost profits are one method of determining damages because infringers can reduce 
patentee profits by: a) diverting sales; b) causing lower sale prices due to competition with the 
patentee; c) increasing patentee costs through advertising and marketing expenditures; and d) 
causing lost sales for products sold in conjunction with the patented product or non-patented 
products that compete with the infringing products.
86
  To determine whether lost profits should 
be awarded, courts have used a four factor test established in Panduit Corp v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre 
Works, Inc. These factors are: 1) demand for the patented product; 2) absence of acceptable non-
infringing substitutes; 3) manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit invention demand; 4) 
the amount of profit the patentee would have made.
87
  To determine the amount of profit, courts 
take into account the price at which the patent owner would have made increased sales but also 
the costs associated with making increased sales.
88
 
Historically, lost profits calculations have been complicated because of substitutability 
and apportionment.
89
  The concept of substitutability requires courts to determine whether there 
are non-infringing products which could be substituted for the infringing product.
90
  However, 
determining whether a product is a substitute can depend on several factors including 
technologies involved and the prices of products.
91
 If a substitute exists, the patentee’s sales 
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would be lower even if there was no infringement.
92
  The concept of apportionment was used by 
courts to try to determine what part of the infringer’s profit is the result of using the patented 
invention, when the infringing technology is only a small part of the finished product.
93
 
Since the mid 1980s, U.S. courts have implemented tort law cause-in-fact and proximate 
cause standards in determining patent damages.
94
  Blair and Cotter contend that this adoption has 
resulted in a simpler analysis but it has also required courts to become more economically 
sophisticated than they previously were.
95
  Determining the profits a patentee would have earned 
but-for the infringement is still not without problems.
96
  It has resulted in a more flexible 
application of the Panduit test regarding the following two factors: 1) a partial absence of non-
infringing substitutes exists (factor two of the original test) and 2) where infringement has 
resulted in lost sales of unpatented products (factor three of the original test).
97
  Recent analysis 
of Panduit factor two indicates that apportionment calculations have given way to a market share 
calculation approach.
98
  This is because the availability of substitute products is no longer 
measured on a technological basis but through a consumer demand basis and because substitutes 
tend to be imperfect, resulting in sales by non-infringing competitors.
99
  Therefore, either a 
patented component is the reason for product demand, entitling the patentee to its entire market 
value of lost profits on sales; or a product without the patented component is a non-infringing 
substitute and lost profits attributed to the patented component result in no lost profits.
100
  In a 
“but-for” analysis of patent infringement damages, apportionment calculations become 
unnecessary.  
There have been three cases where the court applied a “but-for” analysis permitting 
recovery for damages resulting from lost profits on the sales of unpatented products.
101
  In Paper 
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Converting Machines v. Magna Graphics, the court found that industry standards indicated that 
every purchaser would buy an entire line of products and that patentee would have sold patented 
and non-patented products together but-for the infringement.
102
  In Rite-Hite v. Kelly the court 
stated that cause-in-fact and proximate cause applied to patent infringement, allowing damage 
recovery for “reasonable, objectively foreseeable consequences of infringement.”103  King 
Instrument v. Perego indicates some problems with a “but-for” analysis because the court 
allowed a non-practicing entity to collect lost profits due to infringement of its patent, even 
though the lost profits were for sales of non-patented products.
104
  Blair and Cotter opine that the 
Federal Circuit rightly decided that a reasonable royalty would not be sufficient compensation in 
King.  However, lost profits are normally not awarded to non-practicing entities and could not be 
justified through a “but-for” test or even a standard causation test.105  There does not appear to be 
a clear answer and the precedential value of King is questionable, especially since it can 
potentially result in punitive damage awards. 
If lost profits cannot be shown, a patentee can still be awarded no less than a reasonable 
royalty in damages.
106
  To determine a reasonable royalty, courts have relied on either the 
Georgia Pacific factors or the analytical approach.
107
  The Georgia Pacific factors are a series of 
fifteen factors which can be considered to determine a reasonable royalty.
108
  Not all fifteen 
factors need be considered and courts often focus on only a few to determine a reasonable 
royalty.
109
  By contrast, the analytical method subtracts the infringer’s rate of return on non-
infringing goods from the rate of return of the defendant’s infringing goods, multiplying this rate 
by the number of infringing goods sold to determine the royalty.
110
  
Blair and Cotter note that the Georgia Pacific factors assume royalty calculations based 
on a hypothetical willing licensor and licensee at the time of infringement.
111
 The rate tends to 
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leave some profit for the infringer because the calculation falls between the “maximum 
incremental profit (or cost savings)” expected by the infringer and “the maximum profit the 
patentee could have expected to earn from her next-best alternative to licensing the invention.”112  
Blair and Cotter indicate that while royalties are regularly determined by U.S. courts, there are 
problems with royalty calculation methods when it comes to accurately determining a royalty.  
The first difficulty is the assumption of a hypothetical negotiation. Infringement and a valid 
patent have been conclusively determined by the courts prior to an award of damages based on 
the hypothetical negotiation.  In a real negotiation patent validity and infringement are 
commonly both uncertain and this uncertainty often factors into negotiations.
113
  The second 
issue is that courts may take into account events that occur after infringement to determine the 
royalty rate, removing further uncertainty which would exist in a real negotiation.
114
  Risk 
removal by the courts would seem to inflate the reasonable royalty rate. While a reasonable 
royalty may seem to leave the infringer no worse off than before the infringement, infringers still 
face a significant penalty because of litigation costs and the general coupling of an injunction 
with the royalty payments as part of the final remedy.
115
  Another issue with the reasonable 
royalty calculation is that a willing licensor and licensee may not actually reach an agreement, 
making the royalty calculation a substitute for lost profits.
116
 A final issue with a court 
determined royalty rate is that courts may have to apportion the damages where the patented 
invention is a small part of the whole product while entire market calculations are used to 
determine rates when the patented invention is the reason for market demand.
117
  
It appears that Blair and Cotter do not support the use of a reasonable royalty because 
there are too many factors which skew the awards.  Although a reasonable royalty is considered 
part of a liability rule, it does not really conform to the “but-for” tort standard that they advocate.  
The lack of accuracy does not make it suitable for a liability remedy.  Not only does a reasonable 
royalty award lack accuracy but it is generally coupled with an injunction.  The injunction gives 
the patent owner considerable leverage in future negotiations and can potentially result in a 
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windfall.  Nonetheless, the reasonable royalty award appears to be a fixture of the patent system 
and courts are striving for greater accuracy in situations where it is an appropriate remedy.  The 
appropriateness of this remedy will be discussed later. 
Blair and Cotter state that the objectives of a patent system should be to “maximize social 
values” or the difference between social benefits and costs.118  The social benefit of patent 
protections should outweigh the social costs and the resulting system should do this better than 
any alternate patent schemes.
119
  Blair and Cotter next use economic arguments to support 
remedies that would return the patent owner to the position she would have occupied but-for the 
infringement.
120
  Their arguments point to a conclusion that a liability oriented approach can 
better achieve the goals of the patent system by promoting invention and increasing disclosure.
121
   
The current patent system is theoretically based on market transactions and incentives.  
The incentive is that inventors gain the right to exclude others from the marketplace for a period 
of time.
122
  This right to exclude is protected by a property rule granting the inventor an 
injunction against infringers, rather than a liability rule which would allow infringement but with 
indefinite damage payments.
123
  It is widely believed that injunctive relief encourages licensing 
negotiations which more accurately reflect the market value of the invention rather than a 
compulsory license granted by the courts under a liability theory.
124
  A second theory supporting 
injunctions is that an inventor requires injunctive relief as an incentive to try to recover the 
investment in the invention.
125
  Blair and Cotter argue that a better method would be one where 
inventors are made no worse off and infringers no better off as a result of the infringement.
126
 
However, this would require that a patentee be awarded the greater of her lost profits or the 
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infringer’s profits attributable to the invention, a rule rejected by U.S. courts.127  Nonetheless, a 
liability rule can be adapted to the current system to best serve the goals of the patent regime.
128
 
As part of their analysis of the patent system goals, Blair and Cotter examine some of the 
risks faced by inventors.  Determining whether to invest in the inventive process entails risks, 
such as: 1) the risk of failure; 2) the risk that even if the invention is created, there may be no 
market for it; 3) the unknown cost of creating the invention; and 4) the risk of infringement.
129
  
These risks exist even if there is a patent system.  Without a patent system to protect inventors, 
the cost of copying an invention may be small compared to the cost of invention.
130
 Alternatives 
to a patent system may cause the inventor to keep the invention secret or to enter the market in 
an attempt to capture the marketplace by virtue of being first to market.
131
  Because of the risks, 
some protection is necessary.  
If courts were to adapt the current system to one where an inventor would be put in the 
position the inventor would have been but-for the infringement, lost profits would be the 
difference between the inventor’s actual profits and the amount potentially earned but-for the 
infringement.  Royalties would amount to the value to which the parties would have agreed to 
but-for the infringement.
132
  This system would also have to include legal fees without current 
limitations imposed by the courts, accounting for interest due to time between infringement and 
final payment, and extending damages for potential future losses beyond the trial.
133
 
As part of the lost profits analysis, Blair and Cotter examined three types of infringement 
behaviour in an attempt to show that infringement damages can accurately be modeled.  The first 
behavior is known as Cournot Behavior, where competition affects production quantities.
134
  
Two time frames were examined.  The first case examined a situation where the infringer plans 
to be in the market for a short period while the second is where the infringer expects to be on the 
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market for an extended period because infringement will be difficult to detect.
135
  In the short 
period situation, due to an increase in the quantity on the market, the price of the patented 
product falls, decreasing patentee’s profit because of price erosion.136  In the long period 
infringement, damages to the patentee result from price erosion due to an increased quantity of 
patented goods on the market and also because the patentee will be forced to decrease the 
quantity produced.
137
  In the short and long period models, damages amount to the difference 
between patentee’s actual profit and the “but-for” profit, while infringer profits are less than the 
damage amount.
138
  In the short period, price erosion accounts for the damages but the infringer 
profits are lower than damages.
139
  In the long period, price erosion and lower quantity account 
for the damages; but again, infringer profits are lower than actual damages.
140
  Even if restitution 
were available, it would undercompensate the patentee.
141
 
The second type of infringement behavior is known as Bertrand Behavior, where patentee 
and infringer compete on price.
142
 This model assumes that the patented and infringing products 
are substitutes for one another and that the infringer enters the market with a lower-priced 
product than the patentee.
143
  In a situation where the infringer enters for a short period, 
consumers will purchase the lower-priced product, leaving the patentee with no profit while the 
infringer earns slightly less than patentee’s potential profits but-for the infringement.144  For a 
long-period situation, the patentee will be forced to lower prices to compete, so that the product 
price will be equal to costs, resulting in no patentee or infringer profits.
145
  In the short-period 
study, restitution would approximate patentee damages (assuming costs remained equal).
146
  In a 
long-period situation damages would still be equal to but-for profits; but since the infringer also 
earns no profit, restitution does not adequately cover the damages.
147
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Chamberlain Behavior represents the third type of theoretical infringement behavior, 
where parties do not compete but split sales between them.
148
 The price would remain constant 
but sales would be divided evenly, resulting in damages due to sales erosion.
149
 In this case, 
damages would be equal to infringer profits due to the infringer half of sales.
150
  This theory 
ignores certain externalities such as the first mover’s advantage and assumes that all other factors 
between the parties (including production, marketing, demand, supply, market access, etc.) are 
equal. 
These three models indicate that damages are calculable and the difference between 
actual and “but-for” profits can be determined.151  While accurate remedies will depend on courts 
taking into account the correct economic behavior, as well as other variables, accurate 
measurements are possible and courts are capable of developing accurate remedy calculations.  
Blair and Cotter further provide a method of determining whether courts should grant 
royalty payments or require that lost profits be awarded.  In examining a reasonable royalty, 
idealized calculations would lead to a license agreement where patentee would not agree to a 
royalty less than profits that could be made by manufacturing the invention, while the infringer 
would agree to a royalty no higher than potential profits from using a non-infringing 
alternative.
152
  If a patentee can earn higher profits manufacturing the invention, the patentee 
would not have granted a license and this would result in a lost profits calculation.
153
  However, 
if profits cannot be calculated a reasonable royalty calculation would be used to serve as a 
deterrent.
154
  
Up to this point, Blair and Cotter have ignored “that patent infringement is a strict 
liability tort and that independent discovery of an already patented invention is not a defense.”155 
The question arises whether it is economically optimal to demand “but-for” damages from an 
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infringer who discovered the invention independently.
156
  Under these circumstances Blair and 
Cotter indicate that economic considerations should take into account which party bears the 
burden of patent notice and patent search, and of how these considerations impact damage 
calculations.  If the burden of notice lies with patentee, he will provide notice of the patent when 
the benefit exceeds the costs.
157
  If the burden lies with the infringer, she will conduct a patent 
search if benefits exceed costs, taking into account the probability that someone else already 
patented the invention, the likely damages in an infringement suit, and the expected cost of 
litigation.
158
  Ideally, a patent system will allocate the burden of notice or search depending on 
the level at which it would encourage or inhibit innovation, but this is not easily determined.
159
  
The current patent system requires patentees to provide notice in order to recover 
damages
160
 but there are issues with the current law because: 1) constructive and not actual 
notice is required; 2) no notice is required for processes; 3) if patented goods are not marked then 
actual notice must be given to infringers; and 4) entities that hold patents but choose not to 
market their inventions do not have to provide notice.
161
  If tort concepts are to be more readily 
applied notice rules need to be better at providing notice.    
Blair and Cotter apply a further tort law principle, proximate cause, to the remedy 
calculation.  Even if a breach exists, and the breach causes injury, liability is limited to injuries 
which are proximate to the breach.
162
  In a patent remedy situation, even if the injury would not 
have occurred but-for the breach, the injury may not be foreseeable, or it may be too speculative, 
or too remote.
163
  They argue that proximate cause can easily be applied to U.S. lost profits 
analysis due to unpatented goods that compete with the infringing product or loss of sales for 
convoyed goods.
164
  However, in a situation where an infringer is aware of the patent, 
infringement is considered intentional and any damages resulting from the infringement, 
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including collateral and unpatented goods, are foreseeable.
165
  Proximate cause has a greater 
applicability for the innocent infringer without notice, since damages to convoyed or unpatented 
goods may be too remotely connected or unforeseeable.
166
  However, a further problem exists 
when proximate cause analysis is applied to an injury that would be the same whether a patented 
invention was used or a non-infringing alternative was used.  Blair and Cotter point out that by 
ignoring the non-infringing alternative the infringer increases the probability of harm to the 
patent owner and should thus be liable for the injury.
167
 
Blair and Cotter lastly move to examine patent non-use.  They note five reasons why an 
inventor may not commercialize her patent.
168
  These reasons are: 1) the patented invention may 
not be commercially viable; 2) the patented invention is less viable than patentee’s other 
technologies; 3) the invention is not viable within the patentee’s area of expertise; 4) willing 
licensees are unavailable; or 5) the new invention would compete with patentee’s existing 
products.
169
  There are other reasons not to commercialize a patent. However, Blair and Cotter 
fail to mention purely strategic reasons for patent applications and focus on areas where 
commercial value can be gained from the patent itself.  It is their position that reasons 1) - 4) 
should result in reasonable royalty damages.
170
  However, because of Rite-Hite and King 
Instrument, a party who did not market or license his patented invention for reason 5) may be 
able to recover lost profits.
171
  This is further supported by proximate-cause analysis which could 
result in lost profits from lost sales of other non-patented goods and, in the opinion of Blair and 
Cotter, would be consistent with the purpose of patent law.
172
   
Under current U.S. law, patent non-use is perfectly valid and the Supreme Court has 
stated that it will not invalidate a patent for failure to work.
173
  Some commentators have stated 
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that non-practicing patent owners should not receive the same protection as practicing entities, 
going so far as to state that infringement should be encouraged in some cases.  However, Blair 
and Cotter indicate that these positions pose problems related to disclosure, pre-emptive 
patenting, and enforceability. Nonetheless, U.S. practice indicates that remedies may be affected 
by use and non-use. 
Pre-emptive patenting is anti-competitive behavior.  It is where an inventor already has a 
patented invention but patents a subsequent invention to suppress the subsequent invention, in an 
attempt to extend the monopoly on the first invention.
174
  Yet, an economically rational patentee 
would not use a subsequently patented invention if using it lowered overall profits or if the lost 
profits on the sale of other products would be greater than the royalty received as a result of 
licensing the subsequently patented invention.
175
  Blair and Cotter feel that economically rational 
behavior will rarely result in pre-emptive patenting.  Thus the rare occurrence of pre-emptive 
patenting should not lead to exceptions to patent protections for such actions.
176
   
Blair and Cotter further take the position that any rule penalizing patent non-use would 
impact disclosure because an inventor would likely choose to keep an invention secret if there 
were no way to enforce rights without marketing the invention.
177
  However, this also seems to 
imply that the importance of the freedom to use or not use would trump the importance to the 
inventor of both the protections and potential damages. Thus under this reasoning a patentee 
would rather suppress an invention rather than receive less than the full potential royalty value of 
a patented invention.  If patent protections such as injunctions were removed and damages 
limited to just a reasonable royalty, Blair and Cotter believe that an inventor, faced with the 
prospect of patenting two inventions but only practicing one, would likely choose to suppress the 
non-practiced invention rather than patent it.
178
  Of course this creates a risk that without 
patenting the second invention, someone else will patent it. This may not have been 
contemplated by Blair and Cotter, since at the time of writing, the U.S. was still operating under 
a first-to-invent system.  Even if the inventor patents both inventions but only practices one, the 
lack of an injunction will encourage infringement since the worst penalty faced by an infringer 
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would still amount to a compulsory license.
179
  Finally, it may also not be economically or 
socially beneficial to patent both inventions and market them merely to maintain patent rights.
180
  
To summarize, Blair and Cotter support an absolute right to an injunction as a remedy for 
patent infringement, but they recognize that damages are also part of the remedy.  They call for a 
tort-law analysis for damages and point out that even though the current system does not support 
disgorgement as a remedy, lost profits are well suited as a remedy under a “but-for” analysis.  
While they seek to reform infringement damages, Blair and Cotter are very much against 
awarding a reasonable royalty except where no other remedy is available, and they do not 
support the award of damages in lieu of an injunction.   
Peter Menell is another voice in the debate over whether property rights should be 
applied to patents.  Merges, Blair, and Cotter are strong supporters of treating patents as 
property.  However, Merges also recognizes that there may be limits to the effectiveness of 
awarding an injunction for every infringed patent.  Like Merges, Menell supports a patent system 
that incorporates some flexibility to avoid decisions which lead to results contrary to the goals of 
the patent system.  However, while Merges, Blair, and Cotter, support property rights in a patent, 
Menell directly attacks attempts to treat patents like physical property.  Menell would greatly 
limit the property rights associated with a patent. 
Menell believes that peculiarities in the nature of a patent should discourage courts from 
treating patents in exactly the same way as physical property.  Ideological movements should 
yield to the proper working of an efficient intellectual property system, because a system that 
treats patents as an absolute property right may actually hinder the goals of an intellectual 
property system.  A continued Utilitarian approach rather than an absolute approach is better 
suited to the continued well being of the U.S. patent system.  Menell examines some of the 
problems that exist in granting absolute property rights to intellectual property.  To support his 
examination, he illustrates the differences between physical property and intellectual property, 
especially the incompatibility of absolute property rights when applied to intellectual property.  
He further indicates that there are competing interest groups in the battle over the applicability of 
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property rights to intellectual property and that these groups often have widely differing 
motivations.   
Menell notes that the philosophy of John Locke considers life, liberty, and property to be 
an inalienable right and is a motivation for the Property Rights Movement (PRM).
181
  The PRM 
supports strong - even absolute, property rights.  While there are calls for this absolute vision to 
apply to all property, including patents, the natural rights theory has really only applied to 
inventorship in U.S. IP.
182
  Menell posits that the framers of the constitution had no intention of 
granting absolute property rights in intellectual property, since powers to promote science and 
the useful arts were given to Congress.  Since Congress was given this power, it seems to 
indicate a more Utilitarian approach rather than the granting of an absolute right.  Utilitarianism 
has played a greater role in developing actual intellectual property law than absolute property 
rights.
183
  Menell indicates that under both the natural rights and utilitarian theories, private 
property is considered exclusive, transferable, and free from government interference.  
Utilitarianism, through neoclassical economic theory, examines property as a bundle of rights, 
with the bundled rights being adjusted as needed to promote science and progress.
184
 The rights 
in the bundle are owned and transferable but can also be limited.
185
   
Intellectual property protection is justified because the competitive market is unable to 
support efficient innovation in areas where research and development is costly but the outcomes 
are easily and cheaply duplicated.
186
  Protecting innovation is a legal solution to a market 
problem.  By granting exclusive use to a person for a period of time, knowledge development is 
protected.  However, such a grant creates a monopoly, resulting in a deadweight loss to 
consumers and potential limits on further research use of the knowledge. 
187
  Patent law attempts 
to balance protections with disclosure and public access.
188
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Protections granted by a patent come in the form of a grant of certain property rights.  
Despite this, Menell states that treatment of property rights should vary with the type of 
resources.
189
  Patents are significantly different from physical property.  There is a utilitarian 
goal in granting property ownership, including a belief that private use will be more efficient 
than others.  However, the goals in granting property rights to land or physical property are 
different than those of patents and come with different conditions.  One difference is that patents 
are intended to promote innovation.  To achieve this goal, associated laws must be flexible 
enough to change with public policy, technology, and economics. 
190
  Another difference is that 
patent exclusivity is limited because of the non-obviousness, novelty, utility, and disclosure 
requirements, the experimental use defense, and other limitations.
191
 A further distinction 
between property and patents is that use of a patent by one party does not limit or prevent use of 
that knowledge by another, whereas physical property use is more limited, despite the ability for 
physical property to accommodate multiple interests.     
Menell points out that the PRM seeks to establish strong property rights and apply these 
rights to both physical and intangible property.  Their motivation for strong protection is 
primarily ideological in nature, whereas patent owners see property rights as a means of profiting 
from investments in invention and innovation.
192
  These owners “tend to be far more agnostic 
about government intervention” particularly since government tends to provide funding for so 
much technological research.
193
   
In addition to ideological differences, there are significant other differences between 
tangible (physical property) and intangible property (patents).  Physical, tangible property can be 
depleted through over-use while intellectual resources cannot be depleted in such a way.
194
  
Exclusive rights, such as those given to real property owners, could lead to under-utilization of 
intellectual property, limiting the cumulative nature of technological progress.
195
  The PRM 
group believes that all resources should be owned, but patent law limits ownership protection for 
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certain knowledge and attempts to place much in the public domain.
196
  Ownership is also 
limited to a certain period of time.  A second issue over making absolute property rules for 
patents is that boundaries are ill-defined for most patents, while they are quite clear for tangible 
property.
197
 Monitoring and enforcement costs can be very high for infringement because of the 
need to observe the flow of knowledge, whereas tangible property can be easily monitored.
198
  
Finally, considerable debates among patent owners over limits and application of property law 
prevent a unified front.  Certain technological areas support strong protection, while others 
support weaker protection or weaker protections in certain cases. 
The PRM is tied with a social, political, and economic ideology.  The movement supports 
strong property rights, minimal government involvement in markets, and individual liberty.
199
  
While property protection plays a role in fostering progress and invention, very strong protection 
could stunt innovation, which is dependent on the cumulative nature of knowledge.
200
  These 
strong rights might also prevent optimal use of IP resources because of the potentially high 
transaction costs in obtaining licenses.
201
  Strong property rules could limit the flexibility 
currently built into the IP protection system.
202
  Finally, in certain technological fields, a trend 
towards collaborative efforts would be hindered by strong property rights.
203
 
Because of the philosophical, religious, functional, structural, and political differences 
between proponents of PRM and IP owners, it is unlikely that there will be a viable marriage 
between the two. While there are similarities and property law plays a role in IP protection, if IP 
were to adopt protections of the kind advocated by the PRM group, the purpose of IP protection 
would likely be thwarted. 
Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro also support a more flexible patent system which limits 
absolute property rights, in particular for situations involving certain non-practicing entities.  
They specifically mention trolls as the non-practicing entities that are the most egregious abusers 
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of patent property rights, creating holdup and royalty stacking situations.  Lemley and Shapiro 
provide an economic analysis for why flexibility is necessary, particularly with certain non-
practicing entities.  A patent holdup occurs where a patentee uses an injunction award or the 
threat of injunction to gain exorbitant royalties from an infringer who is heavily invested in the 
use of the patented technology.
204
  For a holdup to occur, it is a necessary condition that the 
infringer is invested heavily in using the patented technology and the prospect of having to stop 
using the technology is costly.
205
  If a litigation outcome determines that a patent is valid, the 
patentee’s bargaining position is extremely strong.  If post litigation negotiations fail, the 
infringer must stop using the infringing product and attempt to design around it or wait until the 
patent term expires.
206
  The result will be that the infringer will likely pay more than the actual 
value of the patent in order to avoid the costly alternative of not using the patented technology. 
Continuing the analysis, Lemley and Shapiro state that in a situation where a producer 
has no competition, that producer will make the most profit.
207
  However, if there is a competing 
product on the market the producer’s profits will be reduced.208 To support their holdup 
argument, Lemley and Shapiro developed a calculation to determine a natural benchmark for a 
negotiated patent.  The benchmark is supposed to indicate the royalty rate that two parties would 
agree to under normal negotiating conditions.  If the negotiations take place before litigation, the 
litigation outcome’s uncertainty is part of the patent valuation.  Because of this uncertainty, 
Lemley and Shapiro determined that the resulting royalty rate will be directly proportional to the 
patent strength.
209
  Prior to litigation, infringement and validity are both uncertain.  After 
litigation, patent validity and infringement will both be conclusively determined.  Therefore 
negotiations taking place before litigation will result in a royalty considerably lower than a 
royalty negotiated with certain patent validity and certain infringement.
210
  The negotiation 
which takes into account uncertainty is considered the benchmark for what a reasonable royalty 
should be.
211
  Lemley and Shapiro based their benchmark calculation on the per-unit value of the 
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patented feature to the infringing firm (V), the patent strength (θ), and the bargaining skill of the 
patent holder (B).
212
  Both the patent strength and the bargaining skill are measured on a scale of 
0 to 1.  This benchmark calculation (V x θ x B) is used for comparisons to post-litigation court 
awards and royalty rates made through negotiations with a looming threat of injunction.
213
 
Lemley and Shapiro examined the impact of injunctive power using two strategies that 
can be used by an infringer facing litigation: 1) litigation alone and 2) litigation and product 
redesign.
214
  If the infringer gambles and loses using the litigation strategy, the infringer will face 
redesign costs plus lost sales due to market absence.
215
  Lemley and Shapiro calculated royalty 
rates in these circumstances and compared them to the benchmark rate.  Using an example where 
only 10% of total sales are lost due to market absence, their model shows that an infringer will 
agree to a royalty amounting to 110% above the benchmark royalty rate in order to avoid an 
injunction.
216
  This rate will increase as the redesign complexity increases.
217
  If the infringer 
chooses to redesign during litigation, the infringer not only incurs the litigation costs but the 
redesign costs. In order to avoid redesign costs, especially on a weak patent, the Lemley and 
Shapiro economic model indicates that the infringer would be willing to pay a 40% premium 
above the benchmark rate.
218
  In situations where the patented invention adds no value to the 
infringer’s invention, Lemley and Shapiro determined that all royalty above the benchmark rate 
is the result of a holdup and makes no economic contribution.
219
 
Royalty stacking is the situation where the components or manufacturing methods of a 
company’s single product are covered by several patents, leading to multiple royalty payments to 
multiple parties.
220
  Royalty rates in a stacking situation are affected by rates that other firms pay 
to the patentee because of 1) rent splitting, 2) shutdown, and 3) a situation known as the Cournot 
complement.
221
  In a rent splitting situation, a firm pays royalties to multiple patent holders, 
cutting into its profit margins. If that firm pays royalties to many patent owners, its margins will 
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be reduced and so will the amounts it can pay to potential licensors.  The relatively small profit 
margin on the product will likely limit the power of a threatened injunction by any one 
patentee.
222
  If the downstream firm’s royalty payments are each above the benchmark royalty 
limit, the company may still be able to operate; however the firm will shut down before the profit 
margin becomes less than zero.
223
  The Cournot complement arises when multiple downstream 
firms “with market power sell complementary products.”224  A holdup results in a product price 
increase leading to reduced demand and output, ultimately increasing the economic deadweight 
loss and resulting in a net social detriment.
225
   
Infringement can result from an overt act to use a patented technology or it can be the 
result of independent development.  The point in a product’s development timeline is also 
significant as to how strong a patentee’s bargaining position is.  The threat of an injunction early 
in product development will have little effect, as the infringer can design around the patented 
invention.  However, once the product is developed and on sale, the threat of an injunction can 
be extremely effective because of the potential cost of production shutdown and the cost to 
design around the patented invention.  Lemley and Shapiro assume that the cost to design around 
the patented innovation will be large, but this will often vary with what is actually patented and 
the technological field.  These circumstances clearly make it more profitable for a patentee to 
engage in strategic behavior, waiting until the infringer is already in production before providing 
infringement notification. 
226
  This delay and surprise create a holdup situation. If there are 
multiple patents that cover an invention, this may result in multiple holdups and a royalty 
stacking situation, imposing costs on the infringer that are out of proportion with the actual value 
of the patented inventions. 
Holdups and royalty stacking are amplified after courts have determined that a patent is 
both valid and infringed.  Not only are damages disproportionately large but they are often 
followed by a permanent injunction.  This creates a twofold burden on the infringer.  Based on a 
benchmark calculation model developed by Lemley and Shapiro, post-trial negotiations, the 
failure of which may result in an injunction, will result in royalties that are significantly higher 
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than the benchmark value.  The royalty is 110% greater than the benchmark in situations where 
the infringer solely decides to wager on the outcome of litigation, and loses.
227
  If the infringer 
redesigns the product during litigation, the award will be 40% higher than the benchmark rate; 
but that amount will depend on both the redesign cost and the probability of litigation success.
228
 
Lemley and Shapiro indicate that royalties tend to be particularly disproportionate in 
situations where a component of the infringer’s product is patented, but the rest of the product is 
predominantly non-infringing.
229
  The single component may result in an injunction preventing 
sale of the entire device.  Thus it is not uncommon for an infringer to pay a high royalty fee 
simply to avoid litigation and the threat of an injunction.
230
  Lemley and Shapiro believe these 
situations are ripe for abuse, as illustrated by the results of NTP v. Research in Motion, where the 
parties agreed to a settlement eighteen times the reasonable royalty award.
231
  The size of 
reasonable royalties damage awards are a significant concern, particularly in electronics and 
semi-conductors.
232
   
Courts will generally rely on the Georgia Pacific factors to determine a reasonable 
royalty.  The fifteen factors are applied based on hypothetical negotiations at the time of the 
infringement.
233
  Lemley and Shapiro determined that a court royalty award ends up being higher 
than the benchmark royalty partly because validity and infringement risk, assumed in a real 
negotiation, are removed.
234
  Calculations not only ignore risks inherent in a real negotiation but 
they also do not account for the unwillingness of the parties to agree.
235
   They list three further 
reasons why reasonable royalties overcompensate patentees: 1) reliance on industry rates are 
from past legal battles and not private deals; 2) experts overcompensate because private 
agreements are not publicly disclosed; and 3) determining the royalty rate for a patented 
component can be messy and inaccurate, particularly if apportionment calculations need to be 
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made for a component.
236
  In relation to the third reason, calculations can further be skewed 
when applying the “entire market value” rule, which also permits royalties on unpatented 
products so long as the patented product drove sales.
237
  The strength of the Lemley and Shapiro 
argument depend on many assumptions and their arguments will be analyzed in greater detail 
when several economic approaches to patent remedies are examined in Part IV. 
Lemley and Shapiro make several policy recommendations to curb strategic patent 
holdups and royalty stacking by non-practicing entities. There should be limits on injunctions 
and imposition of stays for certain patentees.
238
  After an infringement suit is completed, if the 
patentee is a non-practicing entity and the cost of the redesign burden for the infringer is very 
high, the courts should stay an injunction and allow parties to negotiate a licensing agreement.
239
  
If the parties cannot reach an agreement, then the court should decide on a continuing reasonable 
royalty that would allow the infringer continued use of the patented innovation. If the redesign 
burden on the infringer is low and the patent adds to the infringer’s product, the court should 
award an injunction and allow the parties to negotiate a licensing agreement.
240
 
In component situations, courts should also determine royalty assessment by comparing 
the value of the patented component to the next best non-infringing alternative.
241
  This would 
reflect a truer valuation of the actual component.
242
  This comparison has a precedent in 
determining damages for lost profits because courts limit damage awards due to the presence of 
non-infringing alternatives.
243
 
Finally, in order to more accurately assess the value of the patented invention, Lemley 
and Shapiro believe that courts should also take into consideration other non-patented 
components of the device.
244
  This will allow the court to more clearly see the value of the 
patented invention in the context of the whole device.
245
  Court procedure could be modified 
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during damage assessment to allow courts to consider the royalties on other components in the 
device.
246
 Alternatively, since modifications to allow other agreements into evidence may cause 
greater complications, parties could introduce evidence indicating the value of other non-
patented components to buyers.
247
  This would allow the courts to assess the value of the 
patented device in the context of a multi-component product.
248
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Chapter Two 
Purpose of a Patent System 
Before examining how remedies can affect a patent system, there should be some 
indication what the goals of a patent system are.  Why create a patent system at all?  The United 
States (U.S.) constitution clearly states that Congress can make laws to promote science and the 
useful arts.
249
  Canada’s constitution entitles Parliamentary regulation of patents and copyrights, 
but it does not describe the goals, or encompass the breadth of control given to U.S. Congress. 
250
  
Nonetheless, Canada’s federal government still has significant power over the regulation of 
patents, compulsory licensing, and property rights.
251
   Powers to regulate patents are not 
constitutionally enshrined in the United Kingdom (U.K.), but making laws to regulate patents, 
inventions, and the sciences is well within the law-making power of Parliament.
252
  While neither 
the U.K. Constitutions Reform Act 2005 nor the 1977 Patent Act state intellectual property 
goals, there is an unwritten assumption that the patent act is to benefit society.
253
 
Commentators often stress that encouraging innovation is the goal of a patent system.
254
  
Of course it is true that patent systems are designed to encourage innovation, however that is not 
the only goal.  Innovation is just one of several goals and these other goals should not be ignored 
when analyzing a patent system.
 255
 
David Vaver states that a patent system is supposed to “create incentives for innovation, 
without unduly limiting access for consumers and follow-on innovators.”256  There must be a 
balance between protection and access to allow others to expand upon the patented works. 
257
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The incentive should not only encourage innovation but also encourage the inventor to develop 
and market the invention.  An effective patent system should also allow an inventor to recover 
the cost of creating the invention and even make potential profits.  However, an ideal system 
would also keep rewards in proportion with the effort put in by the innovator.  Financiers and 
distributors should also have an opportunity to make a profit since they are responsible for 
making the inventions or inventive results publicly available.  There must ultimately be a 
balancing of rights between patent owners and potential beneficiaries of the invention.  
Amy Landers, like Vaver, indicates that the patent system has several goals beyond 
innovating for the sake of innovation.  She notes that a patent system should encourage 
commercialization in order to truly be a system that benefits the public.
258
  Innovation as a goal 
encourages patent accumulation.  However, patent accumulation also encourages patent-only 
transactions, which does not necessarily lead to greater commercialization. 
Similarly, Roger Blair and Thomas Cotter look beyond just encouraging innovation as 
the sole goal of the patent system.  They indicate that the patent system should be designed to 
“maximize social values” or the difference between social benefits and costs.259  Encouraging 
discovery and dissemination of new ideas are social benefits of a patent system.
260
  These 
benefits include not just the creation of new ideas but also commercialization or use of the 
inventions to ultimately benefit society.  As noted earlier, the social benefit of giving exclusive 
rights to a patentee should outweigh the social costs and any existing patent system should do 
this better than alternate schemes or systems.
261
   
These goals are significant in the context of encouraging access to innovation 
information, economic development, investment, and commercialization.  The beneficiaries of a 
patent system are not only inventors.  They are also future inventors, investors, and consumers.  
The benefit to society stems from these directly related goals.   
An inventor’s attempt to create an invention involves certain risks which can have 
economic implications, such as: 1) the risk of failure or not creating the invention; 2) the risk that 
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even if the invention is created, there may be no market for it; 3) the unknown cost of research 
and development; and 4) the risk of infringement.
262
  These risks exist with or without a patent 
system and whether or not the inventor is cognizant of them.  They also indicate how tenuous the 
position of the inventor may be even if the inventor has the protection of a patent.  Each of these 
risks involves significant financial and labor investments with potentially limited rewards.   
Even if the patent owner is capable of overcoming all of the risks, she may still choose to 
sell the invention or license it to another.  There are several business reasons to do this, even if 
the buyer or licensor is a competitor.  The incentive is greater profit through patent trade.  
Optionally, the patent owner may choose to neither license nor sell the patented invention, opting 
to do nothing.  Each of these marketing avenues is available to the patent owner.  While profiting 
from an invention is a great incentive, there are a myriad of reasons why a patentee may choose a 
particular marketing strategy. 
The initial financial risks associated with the research and development process fall to the 
inventor.  Upon completing an invention, the inventor may attempt to commercialize it in order 
to receive compensation and potential profits for her labour.  However, if the inventor does not 
have the resources to market the innovation or if there is no market for it, she will receive no 
compensation.  At this point, an inventor is a non-practicing entity because the innovation is not 
being used.  In an effort to recover some of the invested costs, she may try to sell or license the 
innovation to someone who is more capable of marketing it.   If the inventor is lucky enough to 
find a patent licensee or buyer, then some or all of the risk will be transferred to the buyer.  The 
buyer will have to overcome similar risks in finding a way to recover the cost of paying for the 
patent.  From an economic standpoint, the buyer will face the potential that there is no further 
market for the invention and the risk that the patent might be infringed or invalidated.  Thus the 
risk has shifted to the purchaser and the purchaser must try to recover the expenditure as well as 
the potential cost of the risks.  Despite the protections afforded by a patent, the risks are 
considerable.  As Blair and Cotter indicate, there is a risk involved in creating an innovation but 
there is also a risk in marketing the innovation.  The patent system will ideally create incentives 
for innovators to encourage taking these risks.   
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Without a patent system, an inventor who devotes the time, effort, and resources to create 
an invention will face the possibility that another party may copy and market the invention 
without having to devote the resources to invent.
263
  The cost of copying an invention is usually 
small compared to the cost of research and development in creating the invention.  Since both the 
copyist and the inventor would have to expend resources in commercializing the invention, the 
copyist avoids the costs devoted to the inventive process, creating a competitive advantage.  This 
generally puts the inventor at a distinct disadvantage when the two parties compete in the 
marketplace.  This may be less of a disadvantage if the inventor is a large company with 
significant resources, but it puts small inventors with limited resources at a significant 
competitive disadvantage.  Big or small, there is a disincentive to put forth the time, money, and 
effort to create since someone might just copy the resulting invention before a company can 
successfully reach the market.  A system that lacks adequate protection may cause the inventor to 
keep the invention secret unless she can enter the marketplace and capture an overwhelming 
share of consumers by being first to commercialize the innovation.
264
   
Without patent protection, invention will go on but there will be less willingness to 
publish information and more care taken before goods are openly sold.  An inventor would either 
have to be first to market or would have to keep the invention secret.  In being first to market the 
inventor would use that position to gain such a significant hold on the product market that 
competitors would have difficulty convincing consumers to switch to their product.  Achieving 
market supremacy is difficult.  Even if an inventor manages to be first to the marketplace, there 
is no guarantee that the inventor’s product will sell.  The copyist may actually have an advantage 
by being patient.  By collecting marketing data on the product, the copyist can enter the 
marketplace at a later time and use the marketing data to nullify any advantages the inventor may 
have due to the head-start.  The alternative to gaining overwhelming market share is for the 
inventor to keep the invention secret.  This may work if the patent is for a process but it becomes 
difficult to prevent others from re-constructing materials or machines. Secrecy also limits follow-
on inventions because information is not published or shared.  This also puts fewer products into 
the stream of commerce, thus affecting society. 
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The patent system is an attempt to correct the market inefficiency created by copyists by 
providing protection for inventors in an effort to encourage innovation.
265
  A patent system 
should do this by protecting inventors from copyists and by providing incentives to create, to 
disclose or publicize, to commercialize, and to encourage others to use this information for 
further invention.  The system should further create a disincentive for copyists.  Publication and 
disclosure allow other inventors to improve upon existing inventions.  Protection for inventors is 
also intended to encourage research and development (R & D), which provides jobs and 
encourages scientific education within a country.  R & D spending also increases manufacturing 
and commercialization efforts as viable inventions enter the marketplace.  Invention 
commercialization also provides new and better products for consumers.  If these results come 
about because innovation is encouraged, then it is clearly beneficial for a country to find ways to 
encourage innovation.  
However, a patent system should not provide incentive to innovate for the sake of 
innovation.  Nor should such a system exist to solely protect the inventor or create barriers that 
exclude users and future inventors.
266
  Encouraging innovation is intended to ultimately benefit 
society at large and not just inventors or invention owners.  However, a system that disseminates 
innovation without protecting the inventor actually discourages other inventions.  A patent 
system should strike a balance between protecting inventors, follow-on inventors, and 
beneficiaries.   
Blair and Cotter list social costs which arise when patent protection exists and these 
should be balanced against the social benefits.  These costs include: 1) the “systemic costs of 
processing, enforcing, and maintaining patent rights”; 2) the potential for existing patents to 
inhibit invention, by raising the cost of follow-on inventions; 3) the increased cost of the 
inventive process and ultimately the products created, due to patent infringement searches; 4) 
duplicated efforts by multiple inventors; 5) the existence of “deadweight” losses arising from 
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patent monopoly rights; and 6) the potential litigation costs due to unclear patent boundaries.
267
  
There should be a net social benefit when balancing benefits and costs.   
William Landes and Richard Posner indicate that disclosure is a significant reason to 
create a patent system, even as they question other reasons given in support of the system.
 268
  
Without a patent system, Posner and Landes believe that inventors would invest more heavily in 
methods of maintaining trade secrecy.  There would also be greater funding for inventions that 
could be kept secret.  Posner and Landes propose that another consequence of keeping 
manufacturing processes secret would be a generally less efficient manufacturing 
system.  Disclosure through a patent allows process licensing to someone who would be better 
able to use the innovation, while trade secrets make such licensing difficult.  If a trade secret 
were the only option, there would be no way of efficiently exchanging information about a 
process that may be useful in other industries or in other areas.  The innovator may never learn of 
other potential uses and a manufacturer in another industry would have no easy way of learning 
of the invention.  A system relying on trade secrets is not a particularly efficient system and the 
goals sought under the current system would be difficult to achieve.  Landes and Posner indicate 
that patenting may be unnecessary where a monopoly exists but it is needed in high-competition 
environments.  To increase profits, owners of a monopoly can both lower costs and raise prices 
on their innovation.  Innovations that are difficult to reverse-engineer give the inventor an 
experience advantage which can also act as a barrier to entry.  Landes and Posner further note 
that without patent protection, an inventor would have to use superior efficiency or economies of 
scale to create barriers to entry for other manufacturers.  The advantages of experience and low 
costs can allow a company without a patent to entrench itself and limit competition.  However, a 
patent is necessary in competitive industries because companies have neither the economies of 
scale nor expertise superior to their competitors.  In high competition environments, a patent 
rewards innovation by giving innovators a limited monopoly to gain an advantage over their 
competitors, in exchange for disclosure.  Landes and Posner finally conclude that even if a patent 
would be unnecessary to encourage innovation, patenting is essential to follow-on innovation 
because it encourages disclosure.   
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If the cost of obtaining, maintaining, or enforcing a patent is high innovators will not 
resort to patents and will seek alternative ways to protect their innovations.  This indicates that 
patent applications and awards should be reasonably available to inventors.  Dispute resolution 
should be accessible and remedies should be credible in order to prevent infringement.  
However, the protections given by a patent should not be so strong that new inventors will be 
discouraged from wading into the creative waters for fear of being bitten by patent enforcers.  A 
balance must be maintained.  There must be a system to notify others that an invention is 
patented and there must be a means of finding these inventions without undue cost.  Boundaries 
should also be clear to limit boundary disputes, to prevent the unwary from infringing, and to 
prevent patent holders from claiming well beyond their bounds.  Independent inventors face the 
highest burden because their efforts may be for naught. An ideal system would limit duplicated 
efforts.  Finally, deadweight losses are economic losses faced by consumer society because of 
higher than optimal pricing and lower than optimal access to the invention.  Each of these costs 
will have a detrimental effect on inventive efforts and each provides an obstacle to an ideal 
patent system. 
Attempts to balance costs and benefits are reflected, to an extent, in infringement 
remedies in Canada, England, and the U.S. because all three jurisdictions have remedies that are 
not intended to punish infringers but to compensate inventors
269
.  However, existing gaps in the 
system have allowed certain patent holders to obtain very high profits, not as a result of their 
creative abilities or marketing prowess but because of their willingness to litigate.  Long-
standing approaches to patent remedies may fall short in certain situations and may not be 
maintaining the goals of the patent system.  Furthermore, debate in dealing with a certain non-
practicing patent holders has focused entirely on patent holders and infringers but not on the 
other stake-holders.  As legal interpreters, it should fall to the courts to mitigate potential 
inequities in the system and to protect other stake-holders.   
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A Short Summary of Property Rights in Patents 
Property can be defined as a legal thing with an “objectively defined area for value-
producing activity and choice.”270  Ownership is created through an operation of law, and that 
law ultimately dictates the level of control that an owner will have over that object.
271
  The level 
of control granted will entitle owners to use the object so long as it is within the boundaries of 
the law.  Therefore, to facilitate efficient resource usage by private persons, rights and control 
must be legally defined before a person can make decisions related to the property.  
Property rights, in their broadest form, entitle a person to complete control and ownership 
over a thing while excluding all others from control and ownership.
272
  A property right creates a 
legal entitlement in the owned property.  This entitlement gives the property owner a legal right 
to use the property and a right to prevent others from using the property.  Non-owners are not 
entitled to use the property, and only with the permission of the owner can anyone else obtain 
rights or entitlement to the property.  In a pure free-market system the entitlement holder sets an 
initial price, and only after reaching an agreement through bargaining with a second party can the 
entitlement be legally infringed or taken by the second party.
273
  The bargain reached may entail 
a partial or complete transfer of control and ownership.  
There can be many property rights but these will often include a right to exploit the 
property, a right to property alienability, and a right to exclude others from the property.  It is 
often stated that the most significant entitlement is a right to exclude.  It is not that the right to 
alienability, the right to exploit, and any other rights are unimportant but they are often limited 
by a country’s statutes.274   While the right to exclude may also be limited, that limit generally 
pertains to the government’s use and not use by other parties.  Included in the patentee’s right to 
exclude is the right to prevent others from making, using, selling, or importing the innovation 
which is the subject of the patent.
275
  A person or entity has no right to use the patentee’s 
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invention and may even have a duty not to use the patentee’s invention. 276  A person or entity 
may acquire rights to use the patented innovation if authorized by the patentee.  However, quite 
often patent acquisition may be limited by the state.   
A further aspect of the right to exclude is that knowledge or intent is not a factor in 
determining liability for a breach of that right.  Anyone using a patented invention without the 
patentee’s authorization has breached the patentee’s rights.  The breach is known as patent 
infringement and it is a strict liability issue.  Infringement, like a physical trespass, requires no 
intent or knowledge.  Innocent infringers and even good-faith avoiders are just as liable as the 
willful one.
277
  Only an authorized right to enter or use the property would be valid while all 
others would face sanctions. 
Patents, Property, and the Property Rights Movement 
It is commonly stated that economic theory justifies creating patent protections because 
the free-market is unable to support efficient innovation in areas where research and 
development is costly but the outcomes are easily and cheaply duplicated.
278
  Patent protection is 
a legal solution to a market problem.  In order to provide incentive for inventors to put in the 
time and effort to innovate, knowledge is protected by granting exclusive use to a person for a 
period of time.  This prevents the copyist from taking advantage of the labors of another and 
encourages people to invent.  However, there is a question of whether the patent incentive is 
really necessary.  William Landes and Richard Posner have found that the incentive will vary 
depending on the industry and that the cost of copying will vary depending on the innovation.  In 
many industrial applications the cost of duplicating an industrial innovation will be very high, 
creating a cost disadvantage for the imitator.
279
 Even without a patent, the inventor will gain an 
advantage by being first to market and the first to develop expertise in producing the innovation.   
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The exclusive grant creates a monopoly, resulting in an economic deadweight loss to 
consumers and potential limits on further research use of the knowledge. 
280
 A deadweight loss is 
a result of monopolistic pricing, creating higher prices for the patented invention and lower 
supply, as patent law attempts to balance the protections with disclosure and public access.  
Limits on further research arise under strong property rights rules because any use not-authorized 
by the patent owner is prohibited.  This creates the need for licensing (which is not a bad thing), 
but would stunt innovation if the property right were so strong that a researcher would be afraid 
to commence research for fear of infringing. 
Peter Menell believes that treatment of property rights should vary with the type of 
resources.
281
  While patents are considered property in each of the three jurisdictions, they are 
also property distinct from physical property.  One distinction is that patents are intangible 
whereas physical property is tangible.  This is significant because tangibility is directly related to 
the scarcity or limited availability of physical property.  Communal property is considered to be 
inefficient and wasteful in a free-market economic system because everyone will want to use and 
abuse the property because of its lack of scarcity.  By contrast, private ownership is supposed to 
encourage efficient use of scarce resources and property.  However, with a patent, it is not the 
scarcity of resources but the lack thereof, which is really a concern.  While physical property use 
is limited and cannot easily be used by multiple parties, the use of a patent by one party does not 
limit or prevent use of that knowledge by another.  Limitless patent usage is what actually 
requires a property right because access to a patented innovation would otherwise be easy.  The 
property right granted in a patent is intended as incentive to invest in the innovation process.  
Thus patent owners are given the right to exclude all others for a period of time, essentially 
giving the owner exclusive use for that time.  The property right is not granted for efficient use 
of scarce resources.  The incentive of property rights in a patent is granted to encourage 
innovation, and it is widely believed that continued protection will further encourage 
commercialization.     
While efficient use of property can be attributed to patents rights, the incentive to 
innovate and use of scarce resources are very distinct goals.  Efficient use of scarce resources 
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may be a policy for providing property rights in land or goods but for patents it is the complete 
lack of scarcity which the property right attempts to address.  The property right, through the 
right to exclude, provides a limited period where the inventor can commercialize the innovation 
in an attempt to profit (and recover R&D costs).  As Landes and Posner point out, the monopoly 
and property protection granted to an innovator will influence the mark-up in price for the 
innovation but will not have a bearing on costs incurred in making the innovation.  
Patents also entail an exclusive property right created with the intent to promote 
innovation and commercialization.  Economic efficiency is behind calls to adjust aspects of 
patent rights.  Economic efficiency is a separate concern apart from the original goals of 
promoting innovation and subsequent commercialization.  Improving efficiency may help the 
system but it is not a goal of a patent system.       
Additional concerns in a patent system entail that the exclusive right in a patent is 
tempered by laws that allow flexibility capable of adapting to changes in public policy, 
technology, and economics.
282
  Such exclusivity limits can be seen in the duration of a patent and 
by a threshold requirement that the underlying invention is non-obvious, novel, useful, and is of 
an appropriate subject matter.
283
  A specific duration limits the exclusivity timeframe and allows 
the patent to eventually enter the public sphere.  A requirement for an invention to be non-
obvious, novel, useful, and of appropriate subject matter limits the scope of what can be patented 
to new inventions, ones that differ from existing inventions, and have commercial applicability. 
Laws of nature or abstract thoughts cannot be patented.  
Under international agreements, Canada, the U.S., and England have all established 
patent terms of twenty years.  Physical property ownership may last a lifetime or even longer, 
while patent property rights are limited in duration.
284
  This duration is significant because 
patents fall into the public domain after the twenty year period.
285
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There are also functional and structural differences between tangible and intangible 
property which require different treatments than physical property.  Scarcity applies not only in 
regard to the amount of physical property available but also to the depletion of property value 
through over-use.  The intangible nature of a patent prevents it from being depleted either 
through overuse or scarcity.
286
  Physical property has very distinct and usually obvious 
boundaries; patent boundaries are far less clear and rely on interpreting claim language 
intentionally written to claim as much as possible. Finally, enforcement costs can also be very 
high for patents because of the need to observe the flow of knowledge.  By contrast, land can be 
much more easily monitored.
287
  The lack of clear boundaries makes both avoiding and 
monitoring infringement complicated because neither the patent owner nor the infringer is 
necessarily clear when the boundary lines of the patent have been crossed.  
Under natural rights, private property is considered exclusive, transferable, and free from 
government interference. The natural-rights philosophy of John Locke considered life, liberty, 
and property to be inalienable rights.
288
  While there are calls for this absolute vision to apply to 
all property, including patents, the natural rights theory has limitations.  Despite the best efforts 
of property rights supporters, patent property is not considered absolute.  Property inalienability 
is limited in each of the jurisdictions, whether by constitution or through limited protection under 
laws or both.   Support for strong property rights also appears to be misguided in the case of 
patents because the property right created in a patent is a statutorily created right in all three 
jurisdictions under examination.  The statutory rights also contain limits and allow for 
considerable government interference.  As will be seen, strong property rights have caused 
concerns in the current system. 
Utilitarian ideals, while not reaching the level of property inalienability, also considered 
private property to be exclusive, transferable, and free from government interference.  
Utilitarianism, through neoclassical economic theory, examines property as a bundle of rights.
289
  
Each of the rights in the bundle is owned and is transferable.
290
  Utilitarianism, rather than 
natural law, has played a greater role in developing patent law.  This can be seen in the U.S. and 
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Canada because their respective constitutions give their federal legislative bodies the power to 
promote the progress of science and to make laws regarding patents.
291
  These philosophical 
underpinnings can also be seen in England through the development of the patent as a property 
right and also in limitations imposed by the government through moral and equitable principles.  
Furthermore, each country has adjusted the bundled rights as needed to promote science, 
progress and economic benefits.  While the patent system in each country has been relatively free 
from interference in property rights in recent times, interference is possible under each statute.  
There has been a substantial push to establish strong property rights for all physical and 
intangible property owners.  There are many groups which support this property rights 
movement, and naturally, patent holders support the idea of strong property rights for their own 
intangible property.  But there are ideological differences between patent owners and property 
rights advocates.  Propertizing everything so that it can be bought and sold with no government 
interference may not be as feasible for patents.  Menell observed that strong property rights 
supporters want strong private property protection because of free-market, anti-government 
ideology while patent owners tend to see property rights as a means of profiting from research 
investments.
292
  What motivates the parties in their property rights support is actually quite 
distinct.  Patent owners “tend to be far more agnostic about government intervention” 
particularly since governments tend to provide funding for so much research.
293
  Patent holder 
views on propertization apply insofar as they can profit from it.  Ideology plays far less of a 
motivating role.  Patentee support for strong property rights also varies with the technological 
area.  Pharmaceutical companies want extremely strong protections whereas other technological 
areas are more flexible.  Patentees waver in their views on strong property rights, supporting 
strong propertization when they are patent owners. When they are being accused of 
infringement, their view may be quite the opposite.   
There is also no small irony in property rights advocates’ support for strong property 
rights for patents.  In particular, their demand for government non-interference directly opposes 
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the statutorily created rights and protections for patents.
294
   It is strange that intellectual property 
rights are part of this movement, especially since patent laws are already a form of government 
intervention in the market-place. Without patent laws, an inventor’s labors would be for naught 
because a copyist would not have to expend the research and development cost and effort but 
could merely copy the invention.  Without patent laws inventors are likely to keep information 
secret, or be forced to take risks to enter the marketplace in such a way so that the invention 
would prevent others from entering into competition with the inventor.  In order to prevent 
inventors from keeping innovations secret and to eliminate some of the risks for inventors, the 
patent system provides protection from copyists by giving inventors a limited monopoly and 
property right in the patent.  Thus it is government intervention which is responsible for 
maintaining the property rights enjoyed by intellectual property holders (government 
intervention also maintains the rights of holder of land and goods).  Otherwise harsh free-market 
conditions would prevail. 
Despite this ideological push, countries have kept patents from becoming like physical 
property.  Each of the governments has retained considerable control over patent rights and has 
created circumstances where patent rights can be limited.  
Patents as Property Under Statute in Canada, the United States, and England  
The specifics of property rights will vary from country to country.  However, in Canada, 
the U.S., and England patent property rights are treated similarly.  Each country has a strong 
sense of property rights that is entrenched in its laws and social consciousness.  The specifics of 
patent rights vary, but the general concepts are very similar.  Each country grants a property right 
in the patent, but each country also recognizes that the right is not absolute.  There are limits 
defined in each country’s statutes.   
Canada 
The Canadian Patent Act provides the patent holder with what seems like an affirmative 
right, to make, use, construct, and sell the patented invention.
295
  The patent act states that a 
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patentee has “the exclusive right, privilege and liberty of making, constructing and using the 
invention and selling it to others to be used[.]”  This language, along with language in other 
sections of the Patent Act, indicates that patents are viewed, under the statute, as property.
296
  
Section 27(4) refers to the “boundaries” of the patent as property and s. 49 details the 
requirements that must be followed to  assign a patent.  
Canadian courts have often treated patents as a form of physical property but more 
recently have used language which emphasizes that patent rights are really just the right to 
exclude.
297
  In his dissenting opinion in Harvard College v. Canada, Justice Binnie stated: 
“[T]he Patent Act gives the owner, as against the rest of the 
world, ‘the exclusive right, privilege and liberty of making, 
constructing and using the invention and selling it to others to be 
used ...’ (emphasis added), and in that respect is framed as a 
positive right, its effect is essentially to prevent others from 
practising an invention that, but for the patent monopoly, they 
would be permitted to practise. In exchange for disclosure to the 
public, the patent protects the disclosed information from 
unauthorized use for a limited time.”298 
It is clear from the legislation and case law language that Canadian courts view patents as a form 
of property with rights and privilege that come with such ownership.  This quote also indicates 
that the right to exclude is understood as paramount despite the other affirmative language in the 
statute.  
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Yet despite case law and affirmations of property rights in parts of the Patent Act, rights 
entailed by the patent may be limited for national security and defence purposes.
299
  Canada has 
also specified very detailed rules for exporting drugs for humanitarian purposes, thus creating a 
further limitation to property rights through the grant of a compulsory license.
300
  There is also a 
section of the patent act which entitles the government to grant a compulsory license to another 
party if the patent right is found to have been abused.
301
  Thus the disclosure, sale, use, the right 
to exclude, or any other right associated with patent as property are far from absolute and may be 
limited by the Canadian government.  
United States 
The U.S. Patent Act provides that a patent holder has the right to exclude others from 
using, making, importing, or offering for sale, or selling.
302
  The Act further states that for the 
purposes of ownership and assignment, patents “shall have the attributes of personal 
property.”303  In Patlex Corporation v. Mossinghoff, the Federal Circuit Court unequivocally 
stated that patents are property.
 304
  This view is reinforced by the concurring opinion of Chief 
Justice Roberts in the recent eBay v. MercExchange decision, where he reaffirms support for 
traditional property rights associated with patents.
305
  
Property in the U.S. is commonly viewed as a bundle of sticks, with each stick in the 
bundle representing an exercisable right.  In patent law, the right to exclude is considered the 
most powerful right, or biggest stick, held by the patent holder.
306
  It is also the right that is 
specifically granted by statute.  It is not that other rights are less important, but there are certain 
conditions under U.S. patent law which may limit other rights.  There are specific provisions in 
the patent code which may prevent disclosure of patented information for national security 
                                                          
299
 See Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. P-4, s. 20 (particularly ss. 20(7)(8) and (17) which entitles the 
government to expropriate any patent and patent invention related to safety of the State).  
300
 See Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. P-4, ss21.01 – 21.2.  
301
 See Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. P-4, s65 (case law has created very exacting conditions which must be 
met before a license will be granted but the power to grant a compulsory license nonetheless exists); see Brantford 
Chemicals Inc. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents) (F.C.) [2007] 4 F.C.R. 547; and see Torpharm Inc. v. Canada 
(Commissioner of Patents) (F.C.), [2004] 4 F.C.R. 29.  
302
 U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §154(a)(1). 
303
 35 U.S.C. § 261 
304
 Patlex Corporation v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1985) citing Consolidated Fruit Jar Co. v. Wright, 
4 Otto 92, 96, 94 U.S. 92, 96, 24 L.Ed. 68 (1876).  
305
 See eBay v. MercExchange (concurring opinion Roberts J.). 
306
 Patlex Corporation v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d at 599; See also Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1368 
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (Per Curiam) and Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
58 
 
purposes, and there may be limitations on the sale of patents if the sale creates a situation that 
would be contrary to anti-trust or competition laws.
307
  A recent decision in Zoltek v. United 
States has indicated that use of an unlicensed patent by the U.S. government is not a taking under 
the eminent domain protections of the Fifth Amendment but as a creation of federal statute; and a 
waiver of sovereign immunity exists through the Tucker Act.
308
  The Tucker Act creates a 
procedure whereby a patentee can claim compensation when the United States government uses, 
manufactures, or has manufactured a patented invention.
309
     
England 
The U.K. Patents Act 1977 explicitly states that a patent shall be considered personal 
property and the property owner can mortgage, assign, or license either the patent or any rights 
under the patent.
310
  The right to exclude can be seen from the remedy associated with a violation 
or infringement of the patent grant.  The Patent Act not only confers property rights on patent 
holders, but also confers the ability to bring infringement proceedings under s.61 of the 1977 Act 
and to seek the appropriate remedy or remedies for the infringement.
311
  These remedies include 
enforcing the right to exclude as well as other equitable remedies and damages, but remedies will 
be covered in more detail below.
312
 
There are also limitations to the patent grant and the absolute property nature of the 
patent.   The 1977 Patent Act allows patent grants to be limited if they are contrary to public 
policy and morality.
313
  Public welfare is assumed within the patent granting process.   
Considerable power is retained by the government to control property rights in a patent 
grant.  Limitations may be placed on the property right if an invention relates to national 
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security, government use, public welfare, or emergency.
314
 There is also a process whereby a 
license may be granted by the government to another if specific conditions are met.
315
 While 
there is no requirement to use a patent, this power may be exercised to create a compulsory 
license. Finally, the right to sell or license a patent may be curtailed by the government if it is 
found that exercising those rights would impede competition.  
An aspect of U.K. law that is quite different from Canadian or U.S. law is that the 
patentee can apply to have an entry made on the register indicating the availability of licenses as 
of right for an already registered patent.
316
  Registration makes it known that a patent holder is 
offering licenses on reasonable terms to any applicant and that, if the parties cannot agree to 
terms, the U.K. Patent Office will set the licensing terms.  This lowers patent renewal fees for the 
patentee but it essentially precludes making claims for infringement and, since an infringer can 
seek a license as of right, royalty demanded by the patentee can be limited.   
One final consideration in granting a property right is the morality element under the 
1977 Patent Act.  Even if all the other conditions are met, the state reserves the right to deny a 
patent grant due to morality and public policy considerations.
317
   
Similarities and Differences 
In any jurisdiction, the rights assigned by law define the scope of the property right.  The 
bundle of rights or available rights may vary according to the statutory language.  The statutory 
language in the three jurisdictions indicates general similarities and slight differences in rights 
held by patent holders. 
In Canada, the statutory language indicates a right to act in utilizing the patented 
invention.  However, the Canadian Supreme Court indicates that patent rights are primarily 
prohibitive.  Even though the Patent Act frames a patent as containing an explicit right, privilege 
and liberty to make, construct, and use, it is the right to exclude that the courts interpret as 
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supreme.
318
  There is little guidance on the extent of the  rights, privileges, and liberties in 
making, constructing, and using, despite statutory support; but it can safely be assumed that they 
exist unless proscribed elsewhere in the statute.   
By contrast, the U.S. statutory language merely confers a right to exclude others from 
using the patent.  It does not provide a right to actually use the patented invention. Patents also 
have the attributes of property, but there is no place in the Patent Act that specifically refers to a 
patent as being property. Patent rights, including the right to exclude, exist insofar as the statute 
does not prohibit or limit the right.  
Under English law, a patent is actually referred to as personal property, entailing all 
property rights as well as enforcement options through the courts.  Unlike the Canadian and U.S. 
statutes the U.K. 1977 Patent Act provides for the affirmative right to trade in either the patent or 
rights associated with it.  This would appear to indicate that there is strong support for patent 
treatment as property.  However, the act is also quite thorough in assigning rights and remedies 
to this intangible property.  
However, in the discussion over the grant of property rights there is a distinction in the 
treatment of rights among the three jurisdictions. Morality is missing from the discussion when 
dealing with property in the U.S. but it is very much a part of the grant of rights in England.  
David Vaver indicates that a property right in the U.S. is independent from the use of that 
right.
319
  Patent rights are granted without consideration for morality or public policy and 
regardless of whether the invention is “good” or “bad,” leaving the morality associated with 
property use as part of other laws.  In England, a property right has a moral quality to it and 
property rights may be denied if these rights would be contrary to public policy or social 
morals.
320
  Thus there appears to be a tempering of the absolute nature of property rights in 
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England, and this view may also extend to intangible property rights in patents.  This is both a 
common law approach to property and an approach supported by statutory language.
321
 
In Canada, as in the U.S., there is no statutory support for morality, but the Canadian 
Supreme Court has made patent granting decisions based on morality and has allowed the Patent 
Office some moral discretion.
322
  While, it seems that patent granting decisions and the property 
rights associated with a patent may be limited on moral or public order considerations by both 
the courts and the Patent Office, the recent Amazon.com v. Canada seems to have curtailed that 
notion.
323
  It also appears that the usefulness requirement for patentability may still be used in 
Canada to potentially limit patentability if an innovation can cause public harm, or at least, 
provide no public benefit.
324
   
Despite the differences in morality and public policy treatment among the three 
jurisdictions, each of the three jurisdictions has national security limitations on patent grants.  It 
is not clear to what extent national security measures may be used to encompass morality related 
issues when a patent will affect the public and public order.   
While there are differences between the three jurisdictions, the case law and the statutes 
make it clear that patents are considered a type of property in all three, but that limits exist to that 
property right.  Furthermore, each of the three jurisdictions emphasizes the patent holder’s right 
to exclude others in the enjoyment of the patent, with their respective legislatures retaining 
certain powers to limit those rights. The patent holder gains that right once a patent is issued.  
Yet each statute also specifically indicates certain conditions where the patent is treated as 
property.  Each statute also defines limitations for the right to exclude and conditions where that 
right may be curtailed.  There are also limitations on the right to sell, use, or license.  It can be 
said that a patent is property, but the operation of law limits both the scope of ownership and of 
control over that property in each of the jurisdictions.  Whether a patent has attributes of property 
rights or is considered property, rights in a patent are conferred by statute in all three states. 
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Property Remedies  
A property rule is designed to generally prevent intentional violations of a property right 
without express consent from the property holder.  Such a rule imposes severe penalties on a 
person who violates a property right so that the penalties will act as a deterrent.
325
  The penalty is 
generally severe enough so that potential rights violators will either bargain with the property 
owner or decide to avoid violating the right, rather than trying to infringe. 
A breach of rights entitlement is usually enforced against an infringing party in the form 
of an injunction granted by the courts.  An injunction is a property rule remedy.  It prevents the 
infringer from continuing the property trespass and prevents the infringer from taking or using 
the property.  Property remedies are ordinarily not merely monetary compensation but are 
equitable in nature.  Courts have considerable discretion in granting property remedies, 
especially when the remedies are intended to right a wrong that cannot be resolved merely with 
money.  
Damages are normally not part of a property rule but are generally considered part of a 
remedy that falls under a liability rule.
326
  However, beyond an injunction, such equitable 
remedies as restitution or disgorgement are valid property remedies.
327
  Restitution is a remedy 
that either restores a property right or returns profits made through improper use of another’s 
property to the property owner.
328
  Disgorgement takes the profits the rights-violator made in 
using the property and gives the profits to the property owner.  These remedies entail 
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compensation to the property owner for the wrongdoer’s unjust use as a result of the violation.  
Alternative remedies can also be granted by the courts if disgorgement and injunctive relief are 
not sufficient.  
Injunctions, disgorgement, and restitution are generally severe enough deterrents so that a 
party will generally attempt to negotiate for use of the property rather than violate the property 
right.  Thus a property owner will decline to enforce property rights or will even sell property 
rights if a bargain is reached.   
It is generally perceived that negotiations are preferable to court enforcement.  Thus the 
perception is that an injunction will allow parties to freely agree or not to agree rather than 
having a court imposed license which neither party would normally accept.  This position is also 
heavily advocated by property rights movement supporters.  While an injunction allows the 
parties to “freely” come to an agreement, an injunction provides one party with a considerable 
amount of leverage in the negotiations.  Also, free negotiations without government interference 
may be preferred by individual parties; but support for absolute injunction awards ignores some 
of the larger patent system considerations.   
Remedies Under Liability Rules 
Liability rules are designed to create an objective valuation of the patent innovation, 
where the state or third party arbitrator determines the value of the patent.  In the case of patents, 
the element of the state that determines the value is the court.
329
  A liability rule, unlike a 
property rule, accepts infringement, but it is followed by an after-the-fact tribunal proceeding to 
determine appropriate compensation for the infringement.
330
  In this way, the legal system allows 
the infringement in exchange for an imposed payment for the offending act.   
Under liability rules, a court-imposed penalty creates a form of compulsory license where 
the injured party must accept a damage award in exchange for previous infringement.  The court 
grants compensation or imposes a penalty for using the patented innovation without consent.  
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The award will usually cover the period of patent use without consent from the time the 
infringement was discovered to the time of the court decision.  Damages, disgorgement, and 
restitution are all remedies for prior use violations.   
However, for continued violations, an injunction or potential further intervention by the 
courts is the basis for compelling an infringing party into a licensing agreement.  The patent 
owner can negotiate a licensing agreement, whether an injunction is awarded or not; but 
economic analysis indicates that the patent owner’s bargaining power will be lessened without an 
injunction.  Without an injunction the award by the court becomes the basis for terms in a 
licensing agreement and the threat of court costs plus imposition by the court becomes the 
bargaining leverage for the patent holder.  With an injunction, the threat of forcing the infringer 
to stop using, selling, or making the infringing innovation acts as leverage.   
Economists have argued that without an injunction, the court damage award becomes the 
ceiling or worst case scenario for a licensing agreement.  They have also argued that, without an 
injunction, patent owners will suffer hardship because they will be undercompensated by 
infringers.  Without an injunction, patent owners will rely on the threat of further court 
proceedings as a means of compelling licensing.  Further court proceedings are seen as 
inadequate leverage.  Economists appear to assume that remedies already granted by a court will 
be followed if courts are asked to resolve a subsequent infringement dispute.  While precedent is 
followed in all three jurisdictions, there is no guarantee that remedies will follow precedent.  The 
uniqueness of each patent and the fact specific nature of the patented innovation and extent of 
infringement will continue to play a role in damage calculations.  The uncertain outcome of a 
court proceeding is likely to compel most parties to come to a licensing agreement in all but the 
most extreme disputes.  Courts can also award an ongoing royalty or a compulsory license that 
calculates present value of future sales in a lump-sum award or a court can provide other 
oversight remedies.
331
  Courts further have the power to tailor remedies to the harm thus 
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allowing plaintiffs to obtain “capitalized future royalties” in circumstances where an injunction 
would be inappropriate and obviating the need for ongoing resort to the courts.
332
  
Disgorgement is a remedy available in Canada and England in the form of an accounting 
for profits.   Restitution is a potential remedy but it is generally not awarded for patent 
infringement in any of the three jurisdictions or more properly, the term may have meaning that 
goes beyond damages or awards for infringement.  However, the restitutionary principle to right 
wrongs where a remedy is designed to compensate is part of general damage awards in all three 
jurisdictions.  Any confusion regarding restitution depends on a general confusion over the 
definition of restitution.  The definition of restitution may involve compensation for harm, or it 
may involve compensation for the infringement of a right, devoid of an injury or even 
punishment for infringing a right.
333
  An account of profits is actually disgorgement.  Under an 
account of profits, damages are generally not awarded in conjunction with the remedy.  Thus, 
restitution may actually be broader than an accounting.  Furthermore, restitution may actually 
cover such remedies as unjust enrichment, which is not currently available as a patent remedy in 
the U.K.
334
   Both disgorgement and restitution are equitable remedies that are viewed as 
property remedies, but they are more akin to liability rules.  Nonetheless, disgorgement and 
restitution, like damages, are remedies imposed by the courts.  These remedies are objectively 
determined by the courts; they do not rely on an injunction as a lever to strike a subjective 
bargain.  Because they are imposed on parties rather than bargained, these remedies have 
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elements of objective determination.  The combination of objective determination with 
imposition makes these remedies more akin to liability rules.
335
  
Disgorgement entails the payment of all infringer’s net profits to the patent owner arising 
from the infringer’s wrongful use of the patented invention.  Restitution is a distinct form of 
compensation, particularly because the patent holder may not have been damaged but may still 
receive a remedy.  Compensation entails putting the injured party into the position the injured 
party would have been in but for the infringement.  Full compensation may be a policy goal or 
even a stated goal but it may not be possible.  Restitution, as a remedy, may not completely 
compensate because damages suffered by the injured party may involve loss of reputation, loss 
of market share, lost profits, and other damages not covered through monetary compensation.   
While embodying elements of compensation in all three jurisdictions, the other form of 
remedy which falls under the liability rule category is statutory damages.  Damages are available 
under statute in Canada, England, and the United States in the form of lost profits or a reasonable 
royalty.  An award of lost profits would be the difference between the patentee’s actual net 
profits and the amount the patent owner could potentially have earned but-for the infringement. 
A financial award of lost profits can be similar to restitution where the damage suffered by the 
injured party is strictly monetary.   However, if there are other injuries suffered by the patent 
owner, then restitution will likely be much more than lost profits.  The other liability rule remedy 
is for a royalty award based on an estimate of the value to which the parties would have agreed 
but-for the infringement.   
It has been argued that a fair approach would entail that a patentee be awarded the greater 
of her lost profits or the infringer’s profits attributable to the invention.336  This is a liability 
based system because it would return the wronged inventor to the position in which she would 
have been but-for the infringement.  However, such an approach would necessarily result in an 
imposed license but would only compensate for prior infringement.  
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Commentators and patent holders alike have been very vocal against situations where the 
court imposes a royalty payment to the patent holder.  Both parties have argued that patent 
owners are undercompensated unless they can negotiate with infringers using an injunction as 
leverage.  Arguments supporting the undercompensation position will be examined later in this 
work. 
Patent Remedies 
Before continuing the examination of remedies in the light of policy goals of the patent 
system, there should be a brief comment on some aspects of court structure and procedures 
which distinguish the three jurisdictions.  Patent cases in the United States are before non-
specialized federal courts, although there has recently been some experimentation with having 
specialized patent judges within each federal district court.  The recently passed America Invents 
Act aims to move patent disputes out of federal trial courts and to place initial disputes before 
Patent Office tribunals.  Appeals from the Patent Office tribunals can directly be appealed to the 
Federal Circuit Court, a specialized court with limited subject matter jurisdiction that hears all 
patent case appeals.  Disputes may still end up before federal trial courts but it is the intention of 
recent changes to streamline the dispute process through the Patent Office and to lower trial 
costs.  In England, there are specialized patent courts and appeals are heard before a general 
appeals panel which usually includes at least one former patent judge.  In Canada, there are 
neither specialized patent courts nor specialized courts of appeal, but federal courts  are courts of 
limited subject jurisdiction, which normally hear patent cases.
337
  In both Canada and England, 
patent cases are solely before a judge, with no jury, increasing some judicial discretion.  U.S. 
patent cases that go before federal trial courts are juried trials unless the parties agree to do 
otherwise, but Patent Office tribunals are not juried.  The presence of juries minimizes some of 
the discretion which resides with the English and Canadian judiciary.  One final nuance of the 
court systems are legal fees.  In the U.S. each party pays its own legal fees, but the court may 
award legal fees in exceptional circumstances.  In Canada and England, the loser generally pays 
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the legal costs but these are subject to limitations by the courts and are usually less than two 
thirds of the total legal costs.
338
  Liability rules, property rules, and equity rules are legal rules 
which the courts in all three jurisdictions can and do apply to patent infringement remedies in 
order to better balance the goals of the patent system.  
Remedies Under Property Rules and Patents 
A property right in a patent is a statutorily created right.  That right entails a property 
right in the patent itself, distinct from the underlying invention and any property rights in the 
invention.  As already noted, the U.K. patents act is the only statute in the three jurisdictions that 
explicitly refers to a patent as property.  However, under the statutes in all three jurisdictions 
there are sections covering the sale or assignment of patents, and it is within these sections that 
there is direct reference to patents as property.
339
  Although the U.S. and Canadian patents lack a 
direct reference that patents entail property rights, sections of their respective patent acts refer to 
patents as property.  All three statutes indicate that the patent itself and all of the rights that the 
patent entails are alienable.
340
  Throughout each of the statutes, there is additional language 
which refers to some of the traditional rights associated with property.  A common right directly 
stated in each statute in each of the three jurisdictions gives inventors the right to exclude others 
from the marketplace for the patented innovation for a period of time.  There is also either a 
directly stated or implied right to use the patent and the patented invention in the statutes of each 
of the three jurisdictions, which combines with the common law and certain natural rights which 
exist in property ownership.  These rights exist by virtue of patent ownership (and the statutory 
and common-law rights this entails) and do not vary if the patent is owned through inventorship 
or through purchase.
341
 
U.S., Canadian, and English courts all have the power to grant equitable relief through 
injunctions, enforcing property rights.  Canadian and English courts not only have the power and 
discretion to grant an injunction but also to require infringers to “deliver up” and destroy any 
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goods in relation to the infringing innovation.
342
  Injunctions can be granted for an actual or 
implied threat to infringe.
 343
  Delivery-up and destruction are additional equitable remedies that 
the courts may apply using their discretionary powers to prevent further infringement.
344
  This is 
where the court either orders the infringer to give the patent holder the infringing goods for the 
purpose of destruction or allows the patent holder to supervise the destruction of the offending 
goods.   
A U.S. court can grant injunctions under any terms it sees as reasonable.
345
 In his study of 
injunctive powers in patent infringement cases, John Golden has indicated that there are no 
specific provisions for impounding or destruction of patented goods as in Canada or England. 
Injunction remedies have generally been narrow, with full equitable powers reserved for repeat 
offenders in contempt of an injunction order.
346
  Nonetheless, instructions for an injunction are 
made to prevent future violations.  While delivery and destruction are not generally granted, the 
courts have the power to grant such remedies if necessary to prevent future infringement.
347
 
Courts are given the flexibility to make remedies as broad or tailored as necessary.   
Until recently, there has been a perception that U.S. courts have not only been quick to 
award injunctions but that they have almost ubiquitously awarded them as a remedy for patent 
infringement.  In the 2006 eBay decision, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the equitable nature of 
injunctions and provided a test which courts should use to determine whether an injunction 
should be awarded.
348
  To receive an injunction, a plaintiff must show that: 1) he has suffered 
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irreparable injury; 2) remedies available at law (money damages), are inadequate to compensate 
for the injury; 3) a remedy at equity is warranted upon considering the balance of hardship 
between the plaintiff and the defendant; and 4) the public interest will not be “disserved” by a 
permanent injunction.  Injunction awards are still common but courts should apply the eBay test 
before awarding an injunction.  
Canadian courts note the equitable nature of awarding an injunction but are almost 
certain to award a permanent injunction upon a finding of infringement.
 349
  In Canada, s.57(1) of 
the Patent Act specifically allows injunctions as a remedy for patent holders.  Once a court has 
found infringement, there is a presumption that a permanent injunction will be awarded in order 
to prevent further infringement.  However, in Unilever PLC v. Proctor and Gamble Inc., the trial 
court refused to grant a permanent injunction, granting instead a higher royalty rate for the 
remainder of the patent term.
350
  In another intellectual property case, it has been stated that 
refusing an injunction upon a finding of infringement is equivalent to creating an unacceptable 
compulsory license.
351
 While this second case is a copyright issue, the dearth of case law on 
whether an injunction should be granted would seem to leave the definiteness of an injunction 
award open to some interpretation.  Both cases were affirmed on appeal but did not go beyond 
the Court of Appeal.  Based on the Unilever decision, granting an injunction is case specific but 
would seem to include an examination of 1) whether the patent is being practiced in Canada, 2) a 
balance of hardship upon the parties, 3) whether the plaintiff  will be sufficiently compensated.
352
  
Since the case law is limited and the decision outlined in Unilever was specific to the 
circumstances, there does not appear to be a clear rule for situations where damages are awarded 
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in lieu of an injunction.  It would seem that Canadian courts are likely to award an injunction in 
the vast majority of circumstances, with potential exceptions in extreme circumstances.   
In England, it is also very likely that a permanent injunction will be awarded once 
infringement has been found.  Under the Patent Act, s.61(1) allows an injunction as a valid 
remedy for infringement.  However, it is not an automatic grant and courts should examine each 
case on its facts to determine whether an injunction should be awarded.
353
  Thus, while the 
general rule is to grant an injunction, the courts are supposed to use their discretion.
354
  An 
injunction is not granted as of right and a court can grant damages in lieu of an injunction.
355
  
However, courts are unlikely to award damages in lieu of an injunction because 
[i]t is a working rule that damages can be awarded in lieu of an injunction if:  
(1) the injury to the plaintiff's legal rights is small;  
(2) and is one which is capable of being estimated in money;  
(3) and is one which can be adequately compensated by a small 
money payment;  
(4) and the case is one in which it would be oppressive to the 
defendant to grant an injunction.
356
 
Courts have used this test as a starting point but have amended it according to the circumstances 
of the case.  In making its decision, a court can take into account the interest of affected third 
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parties, such as the public.
357
 However, it was noted that the 1977 Patent Act has listed several 
protections for the public, as well as circumstances where compulsory licenses can be granted 
and by whom.
358
  Even though a test exists, and courts are supposed to use their discretion when 
deciding to grant an injunction, courts have overwhelmingly used their discretion to decline to 
award damages in lieu of an injunction.
359
  
English courts have rarely found an injunction to be oppressive.  While case law is 
limited regarding non-practicing entities, an injunction is still likely to be awarded, especially if 
there has been a reasonable license offer made by the patent owner.  It would be difficult for the 
infringer to claim oppression, if an injunction would be awarded, when the infringer refused a 
reasonable license offer.
360
  However, English courts are also willing to consider anti-
competitive behavior if the patent holder wants the injunction for strategic reasons.
361
  This may 
limit some strategies used by companies that wield their portfolio like a club while only 
practicing a small number of their patented innovations.  
In both Canada and England, almost all patent cases that have been decided by the courts 
have been between practicing entities.  Courts are supposed to use their discretion in awarding 
injunctions.  By using their discretion, courts could manage situations where a non-practicing 
patent holder attempts to use the legal process to drive up royalty payments.   An infringer with 
an entrenched and commercially successful technology, faced with a potential injunction, would 
have to meet the royalty demands of the patent holder or face the consequences of the injunction.  
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The court could create a remedy which prevents the infringer from facing extreme hardship but 
would still provide the patent holder with adequate compensation.  However, given that there are 
very few published cases that involve non-practicing entities that make it to a final decision, it is 
not certain how courts in Canada and England will react when faced with a non-practicing entity.  
It is likely that the case would be extremely fact-specific and the scope of the decision would be 
limited to only the parties involved.   
Preliminary Injunctions 
A preliminary injunction or interlocutory injunction is an available remedy in all three 
jurisdictions, but they are rarely awarded.  They also tend to be extreme remedies which are 
granted because, in their absence, the party suing for infringement will be faced with an 
uncompensable harm.  
In the United States, preliminary injunctions for patent suits are considered an 
extraordinary remedy and are seldom awarded.
362
  The test to determine whether a preliminary 
injunction should be granted is: 1) a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; 2) irreparable 
harm if relief is denied; 3) a balance of hardships in plaintiff’s favour; and 4) public interest is in 
favor of the grant.
363
 
In Canada, preliminary injunctions are also rare.  The test to determine whether and 
injunction should be granted examines: 1) whether there is a  serious question  to be tried (this 
standard entails only a limited review of the merits);
364
 2) whether the applicant can show it will 
suffer irreparable harm; and 3) it requires the court to perform a balancing of hardship between 
the parties pending a final decision.
365
  Furthermore, the party seeking a preliminary injunction is 
required to pay a certain amount of money to a trust account or to provide a third party bond in 
the event that a preliminary injunction is granted but patent infringement is not found.   
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In England, the court in American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd, illustrated a test to 
determine whether a court should award an interlocutory injunction.
366
  The House of Lords has 
stated that there must be a seriously arguable case to be tried.  If there is a serious case to be 
tried, the court should then examine the balance of convenience between the parties.  In 
examining the balance of convenience, if the plaintiff could adequately be compensated by 
monetary damages with a successful finding of infringement, this would be an argument against 
awarding an injunction.  If the plaintiff could not be compensated by damages, then the analysis 
would turn to examining the hardships on the alleged infringer, if the infringer were to win at 
trial.  Interlocutory injunctions are relatively seldom used or granted.
367
   
The exact analysis conducted by the court is different for each of the three jurisdictions 
but there are significant similarities in what courts examine. Irreparable harm and a balance of 
hardships are part of the analysis performed by each of the courts.  A more significant similarity 
is that all three jurisdictions consider this an extreme remedy which will be awarded only if a 
plaintiff can satisfy a significant burden.  
Injunction Summary 
The theory behind injunctive relief is that it encourages licensing negotiations, which 
more accurately reflect the market value of the invention than does a monetary remedy granted 
by the courts under a liability theory.
368
  However, it is also not uncommon for companies to use 
injunctions as a means of removing competitors, thereby leaving the patent holder with a 
monopoly.  The liability rule is further reviled by patent owners and property rights supporters 
because a monetary award granted by a court for infringement has been likened to a compulsory 
license that will generally result in a much lower royalty rate than one negotiated by the parties.  
A second theory assumes that an inventor requires injunctive relief as an incentive to try to 
recover any investment in the invention.
369
 
However, a patentee may waive the right to enforce an injunction through an agreement 
with the infringing party.  Remedies associated with tangible property entail injunctive relief and 
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normally also disgorgement of profits associated with the violation.  However, since patents are 
intangible property, these remedies are not always associated with relief for patent infringement. 
Disgorging Profits 
In Canada and England, the courts can award the infringed party a disgorgement of the 
infringer’s profits as a result of improperly using the property.  This is known as an account of 
profits.
 370
  The remedy is not available in the U.S.  This is not a damage award but an equitable 
remedy.  Courts in England do not consider an account of profits as a restitutionary remedy, 
since the patent holder may have suffered no loss; but it is nonetheless compensation for the 
infringer’s violation of the patent holder’s rights.371  In Canada, the remedy may also be 
available if the patent holder has suffered no loss, even though there may be a right to the 
infringer’s profits as ill-gotten gains. 
Disgorging Profits in the U.S. 
An accounting of profits is not a remedy available in U.S. courts. The 1946 Patent Act, 
removed infringer profits from the available remedies for patent infringement but it was not 
certain that the remedy was unavailable until the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation  that 
Congress intended that disgorgement should not be a valid remedy for utility patents.
372
   The 
Supreme Court also deemed disgorgement to be an expensive process, it was time-consuming 
and the calculations were often very complex.
373
   There is also a perception that the patent 
holder would get a windfall under such a method.
374
  This is especially true if the patent holder 
were unable to take commercial advantage of the patent or if the patent owner were taking 
advantage in one geographic region but not another.  There has also been a question whether 
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such an award is justifiable from a patent efficiency standpoint.  The patent holder would get all 
of the net profits from an infringer who may be better equipped to use the patented innovation in 
a more efficient manner.  When combined with an injunction, this is an extremely powerful 
deterrent.  If the patent infringer is a competitor, there may be some justification in this remedy.  
However, if the infringer is not a competitor this remedy may actually be detrimental to further 
innovation and general commercialization of patented innovations.  
Disgorging Profits in England 
  In England an account of profits provides compensation to the patentee by depriving the 
infringer of profits improperly made through a breach of patentee’s rights and by giving those 
profits to the patentee.
375
  The theory is based on the reasoning that the infringer’s profits are 
really profits that belong to the patentee because the patentee is the only party that could 
rightfully use the patent to make profits.  The infringer is required to disgorge all profits as a 
result of the infringement and not just profits at the time of infringement.
376
  The payout by the 
infringer may be substantial, with a potential maximum total amounting to all of the infringer’s 
profits.
 
 For complex devices, where the infringing invention is merely a part of the product or 
process, damages may be apportioned; but if the invention comprises a large part of the product 
or process then profits will likely not be apportioned and the infringer will have to disgorge all 
profits associated with the breach.
377
 To mitigate the severity of this remedy, the infringer may 
deduct costs from revenues including: research and development, financing, manufacturing 
costs, and distribution costs.
378
 The burden of proving cost deductions lies with the infringer.  
Courts will use accounting principles as a guide for apportionment and for determining revenues 
and expenses.
379
   
Justice Pumfrey of the Patents Court stated that the Patent Act 1977, should be 
interpreted so that a plaintiff can elect between an account of profits or damages but not both.
380
  
While damage awards may be claimed (as in a case where there is a patent holder and an 
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exclusive licensee), only one accounting will be calculated by the courts, and apportioned if 
necessary.
381
  To elect between damages and profits, there must be sufficient disclosure to allow 
the patent holder to choose between them.
382
  This will require disclosure of financial data, but 
the court can make estimates if financial data do not provide sufficient information.
383
 
An election for remedy or lost profits is at the discretion of the courts, but the courts 
appear to be looking to provide some guidance on how the choice between an account of profits 
and damage are made.  Recently, Justice Sales stated that the remedy should vary with the 
context, where a commercial context would create lesser protection while fiduciary relationship 
would entail greater protection.
384
  The court considered intellectual property rights not quite 
akin to a fiduciary duty but still worthy of some care and investigation that would thus require 
greater protection under the articulated spectrum.
385
  Thus if the context required greater 
protection, the plaintiff would have greater freedom to choose the remedy.
386
   
English courts have further stated that an account of profits will not apply to innocent 
infringers, although s.62 of the Patent Act also limits who is an innocent infringer.
387
  This 
mitigates the harshness of the award, against a certain class of infringers.  It also provides some 
motivation for parallel innovation by limiting innocent infringement compensation.   However, 
for this defence the burden lies with the infringer to prove that the invention was, in fact, made 
independently and without reference to the patented invention.  This must be shown as of the 
date the infringement started and that there is no reasonable ground for supposing that a patent 
exists.
388
 
Disgorging Profits in Canada 
In Canada, once infringement is determined, patentees can elect either an accounting for 
profits or for damages as generally alternate remedies.
389
  An accounting of profits is an 
equitable remedy awarded at the discretion of the court, whereas damages are statutory 
                                                          
381
 Spring Form Inc. v Toy Brokers Ltd, [2002] F.S.R. 17, para. 26. 
382
 Thorley et al, Supra note 342, at 572 citing Island Records v. Tring [1995] F.S.R. 560. 
383
 Id.  
384
 Vercoe v Rutland Fund Management Ltd [2010] EWHC 424 (Ch) para. 343.  
385
 Id. at 344. 
386
 Id. at 340. 
387
 Thorley et al, Supra note 342, at 572-73; See Also Patent Act, 1977 section 62(1). 
388
 Conditions regarding changes to a specification are also placed in s.62 of the Patent Act. 
389
 Peter Wells, Monetary Relief –Profits, Intellectual Property Disputes: Resolutions and Remedies, Vol. 2, 18-2, 
(Thomson Canada Limited 2004). 
78 
 
remedies.
390
  A successful plaintiff is entitled to damages while an election exists for plaintiffs to 
claim an accounting for profits.
391
  The discretionary nature of this remedy may result in a 
court’s denying an election of an accounting for profits.  Failure to work or commercialize the 
patented invention is a significant factor in a court’s decision to award the remedy and may lead 
to a denial.
392
  Canadian courts have indicated wariness in granting account of profit awards to 
non-practicing entities.  However, denying an election for an accounting is not certain even if the 
patent holder is a non-practicing entity.  There is further debate on the conditions for which 
accounting for profits should be granted to a plaintiff.  The two extremes of the debate place one 
faction supporting the remedy in all cases except where the infringer can show why it should be 
denied; a second faction believes that an accounting for profits should be an exceptional remedy, 
to be awarded in only the most extreme cases.
393
   There is little discussion about a middle 
solution.  However the recent Monsanto v. Schmeiser decision may temper the enthusiasm of 
plaintiffs if a possibility exists that there may be no remedy if an account of profits yields no 
profits over non-infringing alternatives.  Despite the continuing debate on the extent of 
circumstances in which the remedy should be awarded, it is still available for patent holders in 
Canadian courts. 
Courts generally require the patentee to elect either profits or damages after discovery has 
been completed but before the trial or the damage trial begins and before the court determines the 
size of the awards.
394
  However, there must be sufficient discovery to allow the plaintiffs to make 
an educated determination of damages or profits.  The plaintiff has the burden of proving the 
defendant’s revenues due to infringement, while the defendant has the burden of proving 
legitimate expenses and deductions which may minimize net profits and mitigate the award.
395
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While courts require as much information as possible to calculate the damages, estimates may be 
used to determine the final profits.
396
  
In calculating expenses, courts attempt to determine which expenses arise because of 
infringement and which expenses would exists regardless of infringement.
397
  Two distinct 
expense calculating approaches have been developed by the courts.  The “full cost” approach or 
“absorption method” considers that all expenses may be deducted from profits.398  The second is 
the “differential cost,” or “direct cost”, or “differential profit” method which considers only 
expenses which arise due to infringement, expenses which would not have occurred otherwise.
399
  
While the full cost approach tends to agree more with generally accepted accounting principles, 
recent cases have considered the differential cost method to be more just.
400
  In determining the 
differential cost method, indirect or fixed costs cannot be deducted from the profits unless they 
are directly attributable to the infringing activity.
401
   
The Supreme Court of Canada recently created what appears to be a third method based 
on income differential. It entitles the patent owner to those infringer profits which are directly 
attributable to the invention minus the profits that the infringer could have made using a non-
infringing alternative.
402
  This approach was articulated in Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, 
which resulted in an award of zero profits.  The Court reasoned that the infringer’s profits would 
have been the same had he used infringing or non-infringing products.  This would seem to be 
the currently favored calculation method.  There has also been some confusion because the 
Supreme Court termed the method used in Monsanto to be the differential cost method.  Whether 
it replaces the current differential cost calculation is not clear. 
Damage Remedies  
In all three jurisdictions, lost profits and reasonable royalties are available damage 
remedies.  Lost profits or reasonable royalty awards for infringement are more akin to a “tort-law 
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framework,” even though U.S. courts do not treat patent damages as they do other torts.403  
English courts consider a patent infringement to be an economic tort.  Canadian courts also take 
a “tort-law” approach to remedies.  The U.S. Patent Act entitles patentees to recover sufficient 
damages to compensate the patent owner, but no less than a reasonable royalty.
404
   In England 
and Canada damages are alternative remedies to an accounting for profits.  In both Canada and 
England lost profits and reasonable royalties are considered damages, distinct from the equitable 
remedy of an accounting for profits.  A patent holder can elect between an accounting of profits 
or damages.  If damages are chosen, the holder can further choose between royalties and lost 
profits if the patent holder is exploiting the invention through its own sales of either goods using 
or made through using patented invention.
405
   
Since patent laws and systems are statutory creations in Canada, England, and the U.S., 
residual authority to award damages is limited to remedies specified in the statutes.  U.S. courts 
do not have residual authority to award restitutionary damages; but under statute, courts can 
award up to treble damages for willful infringers.
406
  This is a remedy that has become more 
difficult to prove, making willful infringement an exceptional remedy.
407
  In England remedies 
are also limited by statute, and there is no cause of action for unjust enrichment outside of the 
Patents Act 1977. 
408
  Canada’s Patent Act lists remedies, but there does not appear to be a 
common law rule against remedies outside the statute.  Nonetheless, it is not likely that Canadian 
courts will go outside the statute since there are many remedies already available.  Punitive 
damages are available in Canada but are rarely awarded and only in exceptional situations for 
extreme egregious conduct.
409
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Damage awards in all three jurisdictions for lost profits or reasonable royalties are not 
defined by statute, leaving calculation methods up to the courts in each jurisdiction.
410
  
Determining the value of damages will often entail expert testimony interpreting accounting 
principles or industry standards, but courts also have discretion to make estimates, if necessary. 
Damages in the United States 
In the U.S., courts commonly use a four-factor test, established in Panduit Corp v. Stahlin 
Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., to determine whether lost profits should be awarded to the patent owner.  
These factors are: 1) demand for the patented product; 2) absence of acceptable non-infringing 
substitutes; 3) manufacturing and marketing capability to meet product demand; 4) the amount of 
profit the patentee would have made.
411
   The burden to establish these factors lies with the 
patent owner.
412
   In determining the amount of profit, courts take into account the price at which 
the patentee made increased sales as well as the costs associated with increased sales.
413
   
A variant of the Panduit test is the two-supplier market test used where there are only two 
competing suppliers in the marketplace.
414
  This test combines the demand and non-infringing 
substitute analysis of Panduit into one factor.
415
  This variant places the burden on the patent 
owner to show 1) that there are two suppliers in the relevant market; 2) that the patentee would 
be capable of making the sales taken by the infringer; and 3) that the patentee can show the 
profits it would have made from the diverted sales.  U.S. courts have further stated that it can be 
inferred that the patentee would have made the infringer’s sales or would have charged more had 
there been no infringement.
416
 
There does not appear to be a single test for determining lost profits because each case is 
fact dependent.  In determining lost profits, courts are instructed to avoid speculative 
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calculations.
417
  Some techniques used by courts include: 1) multiplying per unit profits based on 
the number of sales lost;
418
 2) calculating the gross receipts of sales absent infringement; and 3) 
finding the difference between gross receipts and the cost of sales.
419
  It is also quite common for 
courts to hire accountants to determine profit calculations.
420
  However, even though 
considerable accounting information may be put before the court, actual damage amounts are 
ultimately determined by a jury, rather than by judges.
421
   
U.S. courts use a tort law approach to lost profits, where the patent owner has the burden 
of showing that, but for the infringement, the patent owner would have made the sales.
422
  There 
is now a more flexible application of the Panduit test for situations where 1) a partial absence of 
non-infringing substitutes exists (factor two) and 2) where infringement has resulted in lost sales 
of unpatented products (factor three).
423
  Recently, courts have replaced apportionment 
calculations with a market share approach.
424
  Courts have determined that substitute products 
should no longer be measured on a technological basis but through a consumer demand basis.
425
 
Therefore, either a patented component is the reason for product demand, entitling the patentee 
to its entire market value of profits on sales, or a product without the patented component is a 
non-infringing substitute and there would be no lost profits attributed to infringement.
426
  
U.S. courts determined that patent infringement remedies may include compensation for 
lost sales of non-infringing goods as well.  The reasoning is that but-for the lost sales due to 
infringement the patent holder would have also sold the non-infringing goods.  These cases are: 
Paper Converting Machines v. Magna-Graphics; Rite-Hite v. Kelly; and King Instrument v. 
Perego.  In Paper Converting, the court found that industry standards indicated that every 
purchaser would buy an entire line of products and that patentee would have sold patented and 
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non-patented products together but-for the infringement.  In Rite-Hite the court determined that 
the sale of unpatented goods was proximately related to infringed goods, allowing damage 
recovery for “reasonable, objectively foreseeable consequences of infringement.”  In King it was 
determined that a non-practicing entity could collect lost profits due to infringement of its patent, 
even though the lost profits were for sales of non-patented products.  
Even if lost profits cannot be shown, a patentee can still be awarded no less than a 
reasonable royalty in damages.
427
  To determine a reasonable royalty, courts have relied on the 
Georgia Pacific factors and infrequently on the analytical approach.
428
  The less common 
analytical method subtracts the infringer’s rate of return using a non-infringing good from the 
return on infringing devices and multiplies this result by the number of infringing goods sold.
429
  
To help with royalty calculations, many courts have adopted the Georgia-Pacific factors 
as a means of measuring a reasonable royalty.
430
  Not all factors will always be applicable and 
the list is not exclusive.  The factors to be examined include:  
1. The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in suit, 
proving or tending to prove an established royalty.  
2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the 
patent in suit. 
3. The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive; or as 
restricted or non-restricted in terms of territory or with respect to whom the 
manufactured product may be sold.  
4. The licensor's established policy and marketing program to maintain his patent 
monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting licenses 
under special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly.  
5. The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as, 
whether they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of 
business; or whether they are inventor and promoter.  
6. The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other 
products of the licensee; that existing value of the invention to the licensor as 
a generator of sales of his non-patented items; and the extent of such 
derivative or convoyed sales.  
7. The duration of the patent and the term of the license. 
8. The established profitability of the product made under the patent; its 
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commercial success; and its current popularity.  
9. The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or 
devices, if any, that had been used for working out similar results. 
10. The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial 
embodiment of it as owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to 
those who have used the invention.  
11. The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and any 
evidence probative of the value of that use.  
12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in the 
particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of the 
invention or analogous inventions.  
13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as 
distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, 
business risks, or significant features or improvements added by the infringer.   
14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts. 
15. The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as the 
infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if both 
had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement; that is, the 
amount which a prudent licensee- who desired, as a business proposition, to 
obtain a license to manufacture and sell a particular article embodying the 
patented invention- would have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be 
able to make a reasonable profit and which amount would have been 
acceptable by a prudent patentee who was willing to grant a license.   
 
The Georgia Pacific factors are used to determine a royalty based on a hypothetical 
willing licensor and licensee at the time of infringement.
431
 The calculated rate tends to leave 
some profit for the infringer because the calculation falls between the “maximum incremental 
profit (or cost savings)” expected by the infringer and “the maximum profit the patentee could 
have expected to earn from her next-best alternative to licensing the invention.”432  It has been 
quite common to assume a 25% royalty rate and then use the Georgia-Pacific factors to adjust 
upwards or downwards to determine a final royalty rate.
433
  Recently the Federal Circuit Court of 
Appeal has stated that the 25% rule is too speculative and should not be considered a rule of 
thumb.
434
  Thus it would appear that the 25% rule is no longer applicable for determining 
royalties in the U.S. and no longer a problem for those calling for more accurate remedies.  
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Damages in the United Kingdom 
Patent infringement is considered an economic tort and damages are intended to be 
compensatory not punitive, placing the injured party in the same position the party would have 
been in had there been no infringement.
435
  The burden to prove losses lies with the patent 
owner, but damages are nonetheless to be liberally assessed against the infringers.
436
  However, 
compensation exists for any losses claimed if the patent owner’s injury was 1) foreseeable, 2) 
caused by the wrong, and 3) not contrary to public or social policy.
437
  Each infringing sale made 
by an infringer is considered a wrong; and, for the purposes of damage calculations, it is not 
relevant that the infringer could have used a non-infringing product to make sales.
438
  If precise 
figures cannot be determined, the court will still infer damages and assess estimated awards.
439
   
If the patent owner is a manufacturer, the owner can claim compensation for lost profits if 
the patent owner would have made the sales.
440
  Lost profits can include other harm from 
infringing sales, such as lost sales, loss of goodwill, losses due to price reduction, or losses due 
to parallel imports.
441
  If the patent owner is not a manufacturer, the compensation will amount to 
a royalty payment.
442
  If the patent owner had licensed the patent, damages are generally 
determined to be lost royalty and damages are calculated based on a royalty rate for each 
infringing good sold, using the license as a basis for the rate.
443
  Even if the patent holder is a 
manufacturer, the holder must have been able to make the sale in order to claim lost profits.
444
  If 
the holder could not have made the sale, damages will be calculated as a reasonable royalty.  The 
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reasonable royalty rate is determined by assessing what a potential licensee not on the market 
would pay and by ignoring an alternate use of non-infringing substitutes.
445
    
There does not appear to be a fixed standard or specifically defined set of rules which 
courts use.  Instead there is a fact dependent analysis used by the courts.  However, examining 
case law, there are certain considerations that courts have taken to determine royalty rates and 
lost profits.  As an example, in Gerber v. Lectra
446
  the court took several factors into account to 
determine lost profits from patented goods the patent holder would have sold.  These included: 1) 
Competitive tenders when competing with the infringer; 2) price differential between patent 
holder’s product and the infringer’s; 3) technical product differences; 4) marketing approach; 5) 
associated or convoyed products, equipment parts, and services; 6) price depression; and 7) 
losses due to infringer’s accelerated entry into the market.   
A reasonable royalty is determined by assuming that a willing licensor and licensee 
would agree to a license.
447
  As a first source of guidance, courts will see if there are comparable 
licenses in the relevant field.
448
  Courts can then use the “profits available” approach to calculate 
royalty terms.  This method apportions the infringer’s profits on the sale of infringing goods 
between the infringer and the patent holder.
449
  In General Tire, Lord Wilberforce warned, that 
since royalty damage calculations are very case specific and fact dependent, courts should be 
wary of transferring the conclusions of one case to another.
450
  Nonetheless, the general principle 
of calculating damages based on determining the number of infringing goods sold and 
multiplying this amount by a per-unit royalty is the basis for royalty damages.
451
  A royalty can 
be estimated if there is no existing license or royalty, but courts are to use facts that will help 
determine this rate.  In an example of factors that were considered by English courts in 
determining a royalty, the court in Cabot Safety Corp.'s Patent considered the following: 1) the 
commercial value of the invention; 2) comparable licenses; 3) the nature of the invention; and 4) 
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profits available.  These are all extremely fact dependent considerations and will generally rely 
on expert testimony.     
Damages in Canada 
If an accounting for profits is not available or the plaintiff elects for damages, lost profits 
and a reasonable royalty are the two methods of determining damages. While damages should be 
liberally assessed, they are limited to what a plaintiff may prove.
452
  Whether damages are 
assessed as lost profits or reasonable royalties may depend on the patent holder’s revenue stream.  
If a patent holder is primarily a licensor, then infringement remedies will likely come as 
royalties, while manufacturers and retailers will likely receive lost sales.
 453
  Lost profits are 
supposed to compensate for sales which would have been made but-for the infringement, 
whereas a reasonable royalty is determined by what the infringer would have paid as a royalty 
had the two parties entered into a licensing agreement.
454
 For lost profit damages, the plaintiff 
has the burden of showing that it would have been able to make the sale and its lost profits 
amount.
455
 If lost profits cannot be shown, then a reasonable royalty will be awarded; but the 
plaintiff still has the burden of showing what a reasonable royalty should be.
456
 It is clear why a 
patent owner would attempt to obtain an accounting for profits because the burden of proof lies 
with the plaintiff for damages whereas the greater burden of proof lies with the defendant if an 
accounting of profits is elected.
457
  However, as Monsanto v. Schmeiser illustrates, the choice of 
an accounting of profits may result in no award if there is no benefit to the infringing component 
versus a non-infringing alternative.   
For infringement between the time a patent is published and issued, a patentee is entitled 
to reasonable compensation from an infringer and this has been interpreted as a reasonable 
royalty by the courts.
458
 After a patent has issued, sale of patented goods, including springboard 
(sales made by the infringer after the expiry of the patent that would not have been made had the 
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infringer not been infringing the patent prior to expiry and expanding market share)  and 
convoyed sales (sales of goods sold in conjunction with or as a result of sales of the patented 
good but not necessarily covered under the patent), will generally be considered for damage 
calculations.
459
  Springboard and convoyed sale losses can be included in damage calculations as 
long as they are foreseeable and not remote.
460
 Lost profits on sales outside of Canada may be 
included but only if those sales flow from infringement in Canada.
461
  Further lost profit damages 
may arise as a result of loss of goodwill or losses due to parallel imports.
462
 
A reasonable royalty is based upon a hypothetical negotiation between a willing licensor 
and licensee. 
463
  However, the royalty rate can be determined either by reference to the 
incremental profits before taxes or by determining anticipated profits, where applicable.
464
  
Courts will first need to determine the infringer’s profits before applying any factors to adjust the 
rate. Courts may begin with a royalty rate of 25%-33.3%.  The royalty rate may be adjusted by 
reference to thirteen non-exclusive factors which were outlined in Allied Signal v. Du Pont. 
These factors are:  
1. Transfer of technology: If there is none then the rate should be reduced. 
2. Differences in the practice of the invention: If the infringer brings its own 
technology in the practice of the invention the royalty should be reduced. 
3. Non-exclusive license: Lack of license exclusivity and lack of total control 
over the market would reduce the royalty rate. 
4. Territorial limitations would reduce the royalty rate. 
5. Term of the license: a license for a limited term as opposed to the full patent 
term would reduce the royalty rate. 
6. Competitive technology: The availability of competing technologies would 
reduce the royalty rate. 
7. Competition between licensor and licensee: If they are competing entities that 
would increase the royalty rate. 
8. Demand for the product: increased demand for the innovation would increase 
the royalty rate. 
9. Risk: a low risk for lowered future sales would tend to increase the royalty 
rate. 
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10. Novelty of invention: Increased novelty would increase the rate whereas lower 
novelty would reduce the royalty rate. 
11. Compensation for research and development costs: Higher costs would 
increase the rate while lower costs would reduce the royalty rate. 
12. Displacement of business: A royalty rate will tend to be higher if it results in 
increased revenues to the licensee. 
13. Capacity to meet market demand: The royalty rate will be reduced if the 
patentee does not have the capacity to produce enough of the product to 
satisfy the market.
465
 
While Allied Signal is a significant case when it comes to determining damages, damage 
assessment is very fact specific, leaving considerable discretion with judges.  This test is also 
intended to act as a guideline and not as an absolute set of rules to be followed. 
Property/Liability Rule Considerations 
  
Summary of Damage Awards and the Liability Rules 
Attempts to balance costs and benefits should be considered by courts in light of 
increased international patent system harmonization.
466
  In awarding remedies, courts should 
take the purpose of the patent laws and the system into account.  Whether property or liability 
rules apply, or whether some hybrid application is used, courts should maintain the purpose of 
the patent system in coming to their decisions.  This is not the same as having courts apply 
policy but is concerned with applying laws in a manner that applies evenly to all stake-holders.  
This should not be an issue for courts since legislative intent is regularly used in U.S. courts to 
interpret statutes.
467
  While use of legislative intent may be less common in Canada, laws are still 
meant to be interpreted with purposive intent, ”ascertained through an analysis” 
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of statutory purpose or the purpose of the right granted.
468
  Canadian courts will use legislative 
intent to interpret laws.
469
  Within the past twenty years, English courts have begun to examine 
legislative intent in certain situations and a purposive approach to interpreting laws has become 
common when resolving an ambiguity or interpreting laws implementing European Community 
laws.
470
  Indications are that courts in each of the three jurisdictions are not only capable but 
competent to make decisions where the purpose of the statute must be taken into account. 
In each of the three jurisdictions, damage awards consist of lost profits or reasonable 
royalties.  Lost profits calculations in all three jurisdictions require that the patent holder be able 
to show that the holder would have made the profits being claimed but for the infringement.  The 
plaintiff would have to have the manufacturing capability to make the goods sold by the infringer 
and the capability of selling those goods.  Essentially, the plaintiff would have to also be a 
manufacturer and likely a competitor of the infringer.  Therefore, lost profits is likely not a 
remedy available to non-practicing entities.  It is far more likely that a reasonable royalty will be 
calculated by the courts to determine damages for such entities.
471
  It should be noted that in the 
U.S., King Instrument is likely an outlier case, but it is nonetheless a precedent for patent owners 
that do not practice the patented invention but have other competing products.  It has perhaps 
been reduced to a very specific set of circumstances, and has not been followed in a subsequent 
decision.  Nonetheless, King Instruments may still be a valid foothold for lost profits awards for 
certain business models of non-practicing entities.  When determining a reasonable royalty, 
“reasonableness” is a very context dependent term. The complexity in determining what is 
reasonable is exemplified in the Georgia-Pacific factors used in U.S. royalty analysis and the 
Allied Signal analysis in Canada.   The factors used in both jurisdictions give the courts 
instructions and guidance but there is still  considerable leeway in determining which factors 
apply and which are more significant.   
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A liability rule has similarities to the tort law “cause-in-fact” standard; applying concepts 
of but-for and proximate cause. 
472
  This particular analysis in patent law is often part of the 
analysis in Canada and England, but not in the U.S.  In Canada and England the system seeks to 
make inventors no worse off and infringers no better off due to the patent infringement.  
However, judicial discretion may result in potentially punitive damages and may result in an 
award of costs.  This could create a windfall rather than just compensation, but the “reward” may 
actually make the inventor no worse off, when interest, time, and costs are taken into account.  
The courts in either country perform their remedy analysis by determining whether the patent 
owner would have made sales and not lost profits, but-for the infringement.  However, Canada 
and England expand on the “but-for” analysis by including injunctive relief and an accounting 
for profits as a means of making the patent owner whole.  Yet, both jurisdictions note that it is 
possible that solely monetary compensation may make a party whole without requiring an 
injunction.  Damage awards in a liability based system are based on a tort theory, providing 
monetary compensation to restore the patentee to the position the patentee would have occupied 
but-for infringer’s wrongful acts.473 
By contrast, granting an injunction forces the parties to negotiate. Negotiations after 
courts find for the patentee potentially create unequal bargaining power lying in favor of the 
patent holder.  An agreement may or may not arise out of negotiations, and the consequences for 
the infringer are complete cessation of infringing activities with patent inventory seizure or 
destruction.  Nonetheless, negotiation is the preferred solution in a free-market economy because 
this allows the parties in dispute to define their own agreement rather than having the court, as an 
entity of the state, impose a remedy.
474
  The negotiation may end in an unfair result because of 
the leverage held by the patentee with the right to exclude; but general social policy in Canada, 
England, and the U.S. is against awarding the equivalent of compulsory licenses.  Unfair results 
are both valid and acceptable in a market system. 
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Courts in each of the three jurisdictions are most likely to award damages as 
compensation for infringement taking place up to the end of the trial, as well as an injunction 
preventing the infringer from continued activity.  These damages may include lost profits or 
reasonable royalties in all three jurisdictions, or the infringer’s profits in Canada and England.  
Another reason to consider pure liability rules rather than property rules is because the 
patent may be more akin to a contract between the patentee and the government rather than an 
actual property right.  A patent is a legislatively created right whereby an inventor is granted a 
patent from the government if the inventor meets the required criteria.  In exchange for meeting 
the patenting criteria, the inventor is awarded a right to exclude others.  Infringers would be 
interfering with the contract right and would be liable for compensation arising from that 
interference.  Thus damage remedies can easily be associated with a breach of contract, allowing 
liability rules to be applied to patents.  While scholars such as Vaver have stated that the view of 
patents as contracts with the state do nothing to further legal analysis, this view does not seem to 
go away.
475
  In fact, despite views to the contrary, U.K. and Canadian courts nonetheless appear 
to still perceive patents as a contract with the state.
476
 
In the U.S. there are calls by a few academics, notably Blair & Cotter, to bring back 
disgorgement as a remedy.
477
  There are several reasons why this may actually be feasible.  
Given the complexity involved in economic calculations for both reasonable royalties and lost 
profits, the disgorgement calculation is not significantly more complicated.  Extensive discovery 
rules should allow patentees to obtain the necessary profit information from infringers.  Since the 
King case, it has been shown that there may be a need for damage awards that are not as 
extensive as lost profits but are more generous than those available through a reasonable royalty.  
Disgorgement is also seen as less like a compulsory license. However, while disgorgement may 
work as a remedy for past infringement, a court would still have to either impose an injunction, 
or award some form of continuing license, if the infringer wishes to continue using the patented 
invention.
478
  Blair and Cotter indicate that disgorgement may be an alternative to a compulsory 
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licensing issued by the court, but it would only be viable if the potential remedy would be 
onerous enough so as to encourage a licensing agreement between the parties.  The authors also 
indicate that disgorgement has its limitations and is not onerous enough without further 
remedies.    While there is some support in the U.S. to return disgorgement,  it seems that Canada 
and England are making it more difficult for a patent holder to receive disgorgement, despite the 
popularity of the remedy with plaintiffs.  Unfair results, windfalls, a lack of burden on plaintiffs 
and a heavy burden on defendants all factor into attempts to limit access to this remedy.  If patent 
infringement is to be treated as a remedy to make whole rather than a penalty or punishment for 
infringers, this should be a major consideration in any policy shift to allow disgorgement as a 
remedy. 
While patents are considered property, property remedies would normally be expected to 
be applied.  However, patents are very different from tangible property because of their 
intangible nature.  Patent remedies are not strictly property remedies since they also involve 
damages, which is normally a liability remedy.  Liability elements are part of the available 
remedies for infringement allowing compensation for the harm suffered by patent holders, while 
tempering some of the harshness of injunctions ( and where allowed, an accounting) and 
providing courts some flexibility on how to best compensate injured parties without harming the 
system or patent beneficiaries.  Liability rules also provide some protection for patent owners 
where the infringer can easily design around the patented innovation, making injunctions 
powerless.  A patent holder will be able to receive some compensation for infringement, even if 
that compensation may not be as high as the patent holder had anticipated.  Through the 
implementation of a hybrid remedy system, a patent infringer will be required to provide some 
compensation for infringement but courts may still allow the infringement to continue if deemed 
beneficial to society.  In many situations the patent holder does not have a manufacturing or 
competitive reason to demand an injunction but realizes that an injunction can be used as 
leverage in any royalty negotiation.  This leads to a debate whether an injunction is justified in 
all situations.  Without an injunction, it is likely that a court will impose a significant royalty 
payment on the infringer.  This leads to the question of whether a patent holder should be entitled 
to enforce a property right, in the form of an injunction, to obtain as much money as possible in 
all situations. 
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Chapter Three 
What is a Troll? 
Since a patent owner will not always be able to practice the invention, the limited right to 
make and use includes the right not to make or not to use the patented invention.  In combining 
the right not to use with the right to exclude, a patent owner can prevent others from using the 
patented invention despite not practicing the invention himself.  There is no “working” 
requirement in Canada, the U.S., or England.
479
  Thus, in all three jurisdictions an entity can 
obtain a patent and enforce the right to exclude against an infringer even though the entity does 
nothing other than retain ownership of the patent.  Any entity that holds a patent but does not put 
it into practice is a non-practicing entity.   However, it is a particular segment of non-practicing 
entities, pejoratively labeled as “patent trolls,” that have achieved the enmity of manufacturers, 
legislators, scholars and many lawyers. 
Trolls have been more of a concern in the U.S., but there is evidence that the trolling 
business model has achieved some success in Europe, as well as in Canada.
480
  This concern may 
amount to no more than intellectual curiosity in smaller economies, but the success of the 
business model in the U.S. and its potential for success in Europe have raised questions about the 
ability of current patent systems to operate effectively.  This is the case especially because the 
new business models operate outside the traditional models which were envisioned when the 
patent systems were created.  Despite the negative publicity received by trolls, there is also a 
segment of manufacturers, legislators, scholars and lawyers that hail the rise of patent trolls as a 
boon to the effective working of the patent system.
481
  However, both supporters and detractors 
have had difficulty in identifying who, exactly, is a troll.  Even if identified as a troll, it is not 
clear whether such entities are detrimental to the system.  It is difficult to draw a line marking 
where trolling behavior begins and where legitimate behavior ends.  This makes distinguishing 
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trolling behavior from “legitimate” non-practicing behavior problematic.  Part of the problem 
exists because patent owners, academics, and businesses, are not in agreement as to whether 
trolls are actually a benefit or a detriment.  Some see no reason to discuss trolls, as long as those 
entities are operating within the legal confines of the patent system and merely enforcing valid 
property rights.  A further problem is that “trolls” often have “legitimate” patent uses while 
“legitimate” businesses often exhibit trolling behavior; trolls may actually practice patents that 
they hold while businesses will find ways to make money from patents that they do not practice.  
The perception of legitimate behavior has also been extremely subjective and even malleable, 
depending on who is affected and how.     
Trolls have been defined as: “individuals or firms that seek to generate profits mainly or 
exclusively from licensing or selling their (often simplistic) patented technology to a 
manufacturing firm that, at the point in time when fees are claimed, already infringes on the 
[troll’s] patent and is therefore under particular pressure to reach an agreement with the 
[troll]”482; or entities who engage “in inefficient, socially wasteful patent transactions”;483 or 
entities involved in transactions that negatively impact the patent system.  These definitions do 
little or nothing to clarify matters.  They merely take the segment of non-practicing patent 
holders attempting to enforce their patents and label these entities and their practices in unclear, 
subjective, and derogatory terms.  Often these labels are applied with ideological motives and 
usually by an entity that is being sued for patent infringement. 
484
  Large manufacturers often use 
these labels when small, non-practicing entities attempt to enforce their patents against large 
entities.
485
  It does not help that terms like” efficient”, “wasteful”, or “negative impact” are 
extremely subjective terms over which differences of opinion arise.  These definitions could just 
as easily describe IBM as they could Intellectual Ventures because they describe strategic 
behavior exhibited by every company which uses the threat of a suit to extract royalty payments.  
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However, a patent owner has a legal right to demand royalties from any infringer and can 
attempt to exclude anyone from further infringement.  Thus despite any negative connotations 
regarding “trolling” practices, their practices are within the legal rights of patent ownership.  
Trolls are often viewed as patent speculators who exploit and coerce the system.  The 
general objection to trolls is that they actively purchase patents with the intent to enforce the 
patents against current and potential infringers in order to obtain licensing royalties or a larger 
payout through litigation.  It is not their enforcement of the patent that is troubling but their 
motivation for acquiring the patent and the impact on parties who are the targets of troll patent 
enforcement.  Patent trolls have no interest in actually using or commercializing the underlying 
invention or ensuring that the innovation is commercialized.  Their interest is to obtain royalties 
from alleged infringers who appear to be using the invention. The major distinguishing feature 
between a troll and other non-practicing entities is that trolls will wait to purchase a patent or 
will keep a purchased patent shaded from public scrutiny until another entity has infringed upon 
the patent before attempting to enforce its patent rights.  There is no interest in purchasing the 
patent in order to use the underlying technology and there is little interest in attempts to license a 
patent before it is actually infringed.  The infringer will often be a company that has developed 
the invention independently of the original inventor or a company unaware that its use is 
infringing an existing patent. Fischer and Henkel summarize trolling behavior characteristics: 1) 
trolls use surprise in an effort to catch infringers unaware that they are infringing and 2) trolls 
have no interest in the underlying invention but only in the patent rights associated with the 
invention.
486
  These characteristics distinguish trolls from other non-practicing entities, such as 
pure research firms or licensing firms that seek to find licensors before any infringement is 
detected.
487
 
 
In Canada and England a patent application is made public within eighteen months of 
application filing, regardless of whether it is filed solely within the country or if it is intended for 
multiple jurisdictions.  If a patent applicant has filed in the U.S. with the intent to file in another 
jurisdiction, that application will be published within eighteen months, acting as notification for 
any would-be infringers.  This creates notice for potential infringers and eliminates most surprise 
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filings.  However an exception within U.S. patent law may still allow for surprise.  A patent 
applicant can delay publication until the patent has issued, but only in circumstances where the 
patent applicant is filing only within the U.S. and no other jurisdiction.       
Surprise is likely to occur because of the often unclear boundaries of a patent.  Unlike 
real property or personal property, the actual boundaries of an intellectual property can be murky 
territory.  The difficulty infringers have in identifying boundaries is illustrated by the fact that, in 
the U.S., willful infringement has been found to have occurred in very few cases.
488
  Independent 
parties can easily differ on the extent of patent boundary.  In all three jurisdictions the patent 
boundaries are open to interpretation and are not definitively determined until a patent dispute 
reaches the courts.  This can potentially force parties into protracted litigation in order to 
determine disputed boundaries.
489
  Additionally, each of the three jurisdictions has a different 
method of determining the extent of the boundaries.
490
  Confusion may exist within a 
jurisdiction, but there is even more uncertainty when trying to market a product in multiple 
jurisdictions.  Thus, a party may infringe on a patented innovation without being aware that a 
patent exists. 
Another difficulty in identifying trolls is the development of new business models, 
especially ones concerned with the property rights that come with the patent but not the 
underlying innovation.  These business models include firms which are strict research and 
development firms that license their patented inventions and outsource manufacturing.  There are 
also firms which purchase patents solely for licensing purposes.  Licensing companies may also 
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include standards organizations and patent pools.
491
  Non-practicing behavior would also 
encompass portions of the common practices of cross-licensing and in-licensing.  Furthermore, 
many companies employ defensive patenting as a means of extending existing patent rights, 
preventing competitors from creating competing products, or merely defending against suits.
492
  
Furthermore, trolling behavior could also encompasses not only failed licensors who later may 
enforce patent rights once the invention is infringed, but also entities that actively purchase 
patents in order to enforce them.
493
 
Yet another business model includes market makers or middlemen. These entities 
purchase patents with the intent of reselling them or licensing them to other entities that can 
better use them, or with the intent of merely creating auction platforms.  Such non-practicing 
entities will naturally seek to profit on these transactions.  These transactions may even involve a 
form of arbitrage, where the purchaser buys from an inventor at a lower price, and, by virtue of 
its position as a market maker, will resell the patent to a buyer at a much higher price.  Such 
practices help provide “liquidity” by connecting buyers and sellers and they help provide a 
“clearing” function for patents.494  In providing liquidity and clearing functions, these companies 
help facilitate the buying, selling, and licensing of patents by bringing buyers and sellers together 
or by merely helping to market and commercialize patents.  Without these services, the small 
entity inventor would have a more difficult time finding buyers or licensees.  
The line between middlemen and patent enforcers is not a clear one.  In some cases, these 
entities will not only be resellers but also licensors looking to sell to parties who are already 
engaged in making goods or providing services that infringe the patent.  Infringement may occur 
either due to lack of knowledge that a patent exists, or it may be intentional.  In either case, some 
of these middlemen are adept at finding infringers from whom royalty payments can be claimed.  
An alternative tactic is to purchase a patent that has the potential to be infringed in the future.  In 
either situation a middleman moves from being a reseller to a patent rights enforcer.  The 
                                                          
491
 Technology companies have been banding together to purchase patent of mutual interest for licensing among 
themselves and to prevent others from purchasing these patents.   Standards organizations have also created 
pools so that manufacturers can have reasonable fee access to patents involved in standards compliance.  This 
includes .mp3 files, 3G and 4G wireless networks and other communication and data protocols.  
492
 This last practice may raise anti-trust or anti-competition issues but this is left to competition law for 
enforcement and is only indirectly a concern of the patent system. 
493
 Fischer & Henkel, Supra note 22, at 4.  
494
 Shrestha, Supra note 280, at 130. 
99 
 
middleman no longer acts as a technology access facilitator but rather as a licensor and patent 
enforcers.  Commercializing patented technology is not part of the business model.  Yet it is not 
easy to definitively say whether even these middlemen, as final licensors, are trolls.  
Nonetheless these demands for after-the-fact licenses are considered inefficient and a 
socially wasteful practice when a patent owner does not seek to find new licensors or purchasers 
for the patent or patented invention but rather seeks royalties from a patent sale to an already 
practicing entity.  These owners do not seek out new users or uses for the patent nor is there an 
attempt to commercialize the patented innovation.  They contribute nothing new to society.  
Thus, like the Fischer and Henkel definition, one of the key characteristic of these entities is that 
they seek to purchase patents that are already infringed or likely to be infringed.  The key is that 
innovation use or patent resale to someone who can use it, is not usually part of the business 
activity. They typically seek patent enforcement for royalties. 
In their research, Fischer and Henkel lump middlemen or patent enforcers into the troll 
category but admit that they may also have a positive effect on the patent system.  Attempts to 
enforce patents may be quite expensive, and small entities and individual inventors may lack the 
financial resources to pursue legal action against a large entity infringer.  Patent trolls may have 
the financial resources and the legal expertise necessary to enforce their patents.  Thus by either 
selling the patent to the troll or agreeing to a contingency fee arrangement, “trolls” force large 
corporations to respect the rights of small or financially constrained inventors.
495
 
A further problem with identifying trolls is that it is assumed that manufacturers do not 
engage in trolling behavior.  It is also assumed that the troll will be a small company that seeks to 
unfairly force deep-pocketed companies into licensing agreements.  The image of trolls has been 
painted by the companies affected by them.  However, both large and small manufacturing firms 
will often employ licenses to reach markets or products they normally do not deal with and
 
manufacturers of all sizes commonly use their patent portfolios and the threat of litigation to 
force licenses upon other firms by collecting their share of what is perceived to be wrongfully 
obtained revenues.
496
  Since manufacturers accumulate patents covering products and processes 
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which they may not actually be practicing, these manufacturers may be non-practicing entities in 
some situations.   
Despite the difficulties in determining who exactly is a patent troll, or who exhibits 
trolling behavior, vocal opponents will generally consider trolls to be entities 1) that purchase 
patents solely for the property rights and not the underlying invention; 2) that use a form of 
arbitrage by leveraging information, financial expertise, and legal expertise to obtain patents that 
are already being infringed or are likely to be infringed; and 3) that have a business model that 
involves purchasing or licensing patents for the purpose of obtaining royalties and litigation 
damages. 
Mark Lemley has pointed out that universities are research and development institutions 
active in the transfer of technology to entities that can commercialize the patented invention.  It 
appears, however, that U.S. universities have started to favor short term licensing revenues over 
legitimate technology transfer.
497
  This caused frustration in industry and has created a 
perception that some universities have become rent-seekers rather than innovators.
498
  Recently, 
universities have been accused of acting like trolls.  Universities help fund research but they tend 
to act as middlemen in transactions between researchers and actual patent users.  However, 
schools may seek out infringers much in the way that alleged trolls do.  There have been 
indications that universities have started filing paper patents in an attempt to obtain greater 
licensing revenues, thereby increasing rent-seeking accusations against them.  Paper patents are 
patents obtained by an inventor with no intention of putting that patent into commercial use. 
While universities, like many manufacturers, may exhibit some behavior which may be 
considered troll-like, it is difficult to discern whether an entity that actually conducts 
considerable research and attempts to find methods of commercializing inventions can be called 
a troll.  
Even companies that are considered patent trolls cannot easily have their practices 
defined as detrimental to society, nor are their practices merely the purchase of patents to enforce 
and sue.  Acacia Research Corporation, Rates Technology Inc., and Ronald Katz Technology 
Licensing Inc. have been involved in over five hundred lawsuits between them in the U.S but 
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each company claims to conduct considerable research.  Intellectual Ventures denies being a 
patent troll and claims to be a research facility that provides beneficial services, especially for 
small inventors.  There are no numbers for troll involvement in England, but RIM v. Inpro 
Licensing was a failed attempt by an alleged patent troll to obtain licensing revenues.
499
  This 
case indicates that the patent troll business model has potential for success in England.
500
  In 
Canada, Mosaid Inc. and Wi-Lan Technologies conduct some research, but they have also been 
called patent trolls for their operations in the U.S.  In Canada, Wi-Lan appears to be the only one 
of the two involved in a patent infringement suit.
501
  U.S. research and patent holding company 
DataTreasury recently settled its suit in Canada against several major banks.
502
  This may 
indicate that patent trolls may be finding business opportunities in Canada.  Actual infringement 
suits in Canada and England have not appeared before the courts, but private settlements outside 
the courts may be happening. Since agreements are private, court cases would help to illuminate 
whether trolling practices have managed to gain traction in either jurisdiction.  
Among manufacturers who license, cross-licensors, research entities with aggressive 
patent portfolio management departments, middlemen, and pure research facilities, the line 
between trolling and non-trolling behavior has become very blurred.  This creates a very fuzzy 
way of defining what it means to practice a patented invention.  
Motivation to Patent, Trolls, Other Non-Practicing Entities 
As stated earlier, the purpose of a patent system is to encourage innovation, 
commercialization of the innovation, and follow-on inventions for the benefit of society.  The 
current systems in Canada, the U.K. and the U.S. offer protection for the inventor through a 
limited property grant.  However, it should not offer so much protection that follow-on 
innovation, commercialization, and public access are curtailed.  Thus a patent system becomes a 
balance between protections for inventors and the freedoms of invention users.  
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The grant of a monopoly and the subsequent right to exclude others from making, using, 
selling, or importing a patented invention or products made using the patented invention are 
considered to be the motivation for an inventor to invent.  By providing incentive in the grant of 
a limited monopoly, the belief is that an inventor will be motivated to patent the innovation and 
will use the right to exclude to commercialize the invention.  That is not to say that there will be 
no invention without the property rights offered in a patent.  It says only that innovators are 
being encouraged to invent and to make public their inventions in exchange for the right.  
However, just because a patent owner has a right to exclude, the owner may not want to or may 
not be able to commercialize the invention.  A person may seek a patent for reasons completely 
unrelated to commercializing the invention.  A recent study by Stuart J.H. Graham and Ted 
Sichelman indicates that there are at least ten reasons entrepreneurs choose to patent. 
Manufacturing the invention or using a process is only one reason. Other reasons include: 
licensing, defensive strategies, cross-licensing, financing and acquisition, bullying competitors 
and pre-empting market entry, and blocking competitors.
503
  
These are all common reasons but some clarification and explanation for each term is 
necessary.   Licensing usually involves a mutual agreement or contract between parties where the 
patent owner agrees to allow the other party certain patent rights in exchange for consideration 
(generally royalty).  A defensive patenting strategy can be implemented in several different 
ways.  This strategy includes obtaining a patent so as to control the area around an existing 
product with the purpose of extending the patent monopoly; or controlling that area around 
patents in order to prevent similar products from being created by competitors; or merely owning 
patents in areas of art where they can be used against a competitor should the competitor decide 
to use its own patents to sue for infringement.  Cross-licensing is the grant of a license where 
parties agree to allow each other access to all of the patents they own, usually with some 
payment going to the company with more patents to make up any deficiency in patent numbers.  
Financing is always important for a company, particularly for startup companies.  Financial 
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institutions are more likely to give loans to companies that own patents because the patents are 
viewed as an asset which can be used as collateral.  Patents also tend to give legitimacy to the 
technology being developed by the company, something investors like.  Bullying involves 
obtaining patents, usually weak ones, in an effort to be a nuisance to competitors and increase 
costs.  A blocking patent is similar to a bullying or a defensive patent, but it is generally a strong 
patent that is obtained to prevent a competitor from using its own invention without paying a 
license to the owner of the blocking patent. 
It appears that motivation for obtaining a patent, in several situations, actually aims to 
prevent practice rather than encouraging it.  Several other inventors seek to extract a payment 
from already practicing entities or entities that independently develop the patented invention.  
There are practices that seek payments from companies to actually increase costs and avoid 
lawsuits.   There are further practices which are designed to actually suppress innovation so that 
existing products can remain on the marketplace. 
Richard Posner and William Landes question whether the patent is necessary in order to 
encourage innovation.
504
  They indicate that the protection, while valid in cases where it is cheap 
and easy to copy an existing innovation, will not be as needed in industries where the innovation 
is complex and copying is both difficult and expensive.  Furthermore, strategic reasons have 
possibly eclipsed innovation as the major motivator to patent applications.
505
 
Stuart Graham, Robert Merges, Pam Samuelson, and Ted Sichelman used data from the 
2008 Berkeley Patent Survey to conclude that patents actually created a weak incentive to 
innovate.
506
  This conclusion seems to disprove years of economic assumptions about patents.  
They find overall incentive to patent is relatively weak, and this applies not just to companies 
that do not patent but to those that patent as well.
507
  However, the incentive will also depend on 
the industry.
508
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The major motivator to patent is more to prevent copying than for financial reasons.
509
  
Entrepreneurs are likely to license a product but it is often so that they can avoid a lawsuit.
510
  
Nonetheless, patents also play a role in helping startups find angel investors and venture 
capitalists.
511
  The number of patents for startups has greatly increased while the traditional 
incentive motivator seems low.
512
  Incentives to patent include securing investment, increasing 
chances of achieving an IPO, using patents as strategic negotiating tools, and defending against 
suits by others.
513
 
The cost of prosecuting and enforcing patents is a barrier for entrepreneurs and was not 
considered an incentive to patent.
514
  This was actually a reason that entrepreneurs opted against 
patenting.
 515
  Patenting was also considered detrimental because of the desire to keep any 
disclosure secret and because patents provided weak protection, especially if other forms of 
protection might be available.
 516
 
Thus it may be helpful to look at some of the problems existing in separating “legitimate” 
from “illegitimate” patent behavior and transactions.  It may also help to look at some of the 
standard strategic practices used by patent owners in light of the “legitimate” versus 
“illegitimate” debate over patent use. 
Amy Landers indicates that the patent system has several goals, some of which are 
diminished or ignored through current policies.  While the current approach has created an 
incentive to innovate, it has been less effective at encouraging commercialization.  She notes that 
the motivation to innovate is strongly supported by current laws and policies but that the 
commercialization incentive is small compared to the relatively risk free incentive to license and 
trade in patents.  The recent increase in patent liquidity is a direct result of strong property rights 
and an acceptance of anti-competitive behavior in patent accumulation.  The result has been an 
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increase in offensive and defensive strategic behaviour that involves patent trade and litigation 
rather than commercialization.  
Practicing a Patent: What Is It and Why It Is Not Always Viable 
Determining whether an innovation is being practiced is significant because a patent right 
entitles the holder to prevent others from making, selling, importing, or using the patented 
invention with the goal of commercializing either the innovation or a by-product of the 
innovation.  Through an examination of what gets excluded in the patent right, it can be inferred 
that all these actions by an infringer are “practice.”  Licensing is not really using an innovation 
since the licensor is merely providing conditions where the licensee may potentially gain some 
rights in the patent or patented innovation.  But once the licensee practices the patent, then that 
can be considered use, and the licensor’s royalty demands can be justified in exchange for 
enabling another to make commercial use of the invention.  However, there are a significant 
number of licensing situations where the innovation will ultimately not be used other than as 
leverage in another transaction, leverage to prevent certain behavior, or leverage for more 
money. These situations are not necessarily encouraging product commercialization, follow-on 
innovation, or public benefit.   
Practicing the patented innovation entails making a product which is either the underlying 
innovation or involves use of that innovation with the goal of either commercializing the product 
or for use in research with potential commercial uses.
517
  If the underlying innovation of the 
patent is a process, practice will involve use of the process to make a good or as part of research 
for some commercial purpose.  There is, however, a very grey area where patent practice is not 
clear.  The questions is relatively simple when the underlying innovation is a physical product or 
process but becomes less clear when it is something less tangible like an algorithm or business 
method.  Also, patent commercialization is more difficult to determine since the patent is treated 
as property that can be traded, licensed, and used as collateral in financing.  While trading 
patents involves a commercial transaction, in many instances the underlying innovation is 
insignificant except as a basis for enforcement against others.  The power of a patent lies in the 
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breadth of the description of the underlying innovation, but practice still involves the underlying 
innovation and not just patent trades or licensing without innovation use.  
Of all the reasons to patent, only making, using, selling, leasing, or any commercial 
activity that involves use of the patented innovation or process can be considered actual 
“practice” of the patented invention.  Making and using a patent invention will generally 
translate into manufacturing the patented invention, or using the invention as part of a 
manufacturing process.  It will also cover the importation of patented items, if there is a 
commercial purpose.  The term practice generally involves some use which leads to innovation 
commercialization.  All uses which do not lead to commercialization may fall under the category 
of strategic use.   
Practice also entails conducting research using the patented product or process with the 
goal of developing a commercial application for a subsequent outcome product.   It may not rise 
to the level of “practice” if the research is done strictly out of curiosity since that may be outside 
the proximate scope of use with commercial intent but it may nonetheless lead to follow-on 
innovation at a future time.  If the research involves a commercial context it may be considered 
practice for the purposes of compensation to the patent holder.  The level of research amounting 
to practice varies in the three jurisdictions being examined.  In Canada and England some 
research is allowed even if a commercial purpose may be the end result.
518
   The U.S. has a much 
stricter rule which limits patent invention use to research that is done for curiosity and where no 
commercialization is intended.  Thus in the U.S., a researcher will most likely have to obtain a 
patent or licence before commencing research, but in Canada and England, the researcher may or 
may not have to obtain a license.  In the U.K. and Canada, whether a license is necessary will 
largely depend on the industry, the nature of the research, the commercial aspects of the research, 
potential competition, where the research is conducted, and other factors.  Generally, there is a 
greater tolerance of patent infringement in Canada and the U.K. when research is involved.  
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After this brief explanation of practice, it should be noted that it may not always be 
possible to put the patent into practice.  Even if a patent owner wants to use the invention, other 
obstacles must still be overcome. Using a patent for manufacturing, commercialization, or 
further research and development (R&D) may be possible for many patentees; but each of these 
functions requires a source of funding.  Small companies and sole inventors may lack the money 
and resources to put a patented invention into practice or to develop the invention further. 
Financing may also be unavailable to such patent owners.  Patents may also fail to be practiced 
because there may not be a market for the patented invention, or there may be no demand for it, 
or the inventor may be unable to develop a marketable embodiment, or the innovation may not 
be viable within the patentee’s area of business expertise.  There is a myriad of reasons why an 
invention may not be practiced.  Even the largest companies with significant resources may not 
be able to put all their patents into practice, forcing these companies to choose another means of 
recuperating the cost of time and expense required to make the patented invention.   
Even if there is demand for an innovation, there may be a lack of commercial value in 
making it.  A patented invention may also be less viable than the holder’s other technologies. 
Further use of the patented innovation or commercializing the invention may not be desired 
because the new invention would compete with patentee’s existing products.519  Supply, demand, 
scarce resources, personal preference, existing products, cost effectiveness, potential profits, and 
many other factors can play a role in whether a patent holder will choose to commercialize an 
innovation. 
If a holder cannot practice the innovation an alternate means of commercialization is by 
issuing a license.  Licensing may enable an inventor to recover the costs of making an invention 
plus some profits.  A patent holder may issue a license to another party who may be better suited 
to using the patented invention.  Economic theory indicates that a party will license the patented 
invention to a party that is capable of more efficient use.  A patent holder that is also a 
manufacturer may also issue a license to another entity looking to use the innovation.  It is 
possible, but not likely, that the manufacturer will license to a competitor; but it is likely that a 
company will license to a non-competitor if the opportunity arises.  Additionally, the patent 
holder may issue a license to another manufacturer operating in a geographic region the patent 
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holder would normally not access.  In this manner, the patent holder is compensated for creating 
the invention while the licensee obtains compensation for the cost of the license through 
commercializing the underlying invention or by using the patented invention to develop and 
commercialize other innovations.  However, for practice to take place, the licensee must actually 
make or use or attempt to make or use the patented invention.   
Certain licensing practices also raise the question of what exactly is meant by 
“practicing” a patented invention.  It is hard to understand how a patent can be considered to be 
“in use” if the licensee is content to sit on the patented invention, even if consideration is paid for 
the license.  Determining whether an entity is practicing its patented invention may lead to some 
confusion.  As an example, once the patent holder licenses the invention to a non-competing 
manufacturer or to a manufacturer operating in a region where the patent holder would normally 
not operate, the patent holder may become a non-practicing entity even if the patent holder is 
actually using the innovation in its own region or its own industry.  A patent holder who 
manufactures and sells in Canada but licenses the invention to a manufacturer in the U.S. and 
does not directly sell or manufacture in the U.S. is a non-practicing entity in the U.S.  The same 
would apply if the patent holder used the invention in making mobile phones but the licensee 
used the patented invention to make lap top computers.  In both examples, a manufacturer has 
become a non-practicing entity.  Nonetheless, in both cases, while the patent holder is a licensor 
and not directly putting the innovation into practice, it is ultimately being practiced by the 
licensee. 
Not all licensing attempts are made just to recover costs or to seek licensing revenues.  
The proliferation of patent applications is encouraging strategic behavior.  This is behavior 
where commercialization and direct licensing revenues are secondary to protection, 
inconveniencing competitors, and other strategic goals.  For example, cross-licensing may not 
always result in practice.  There are also entities that purchase patents solely for the purpose of 
licensing to others or for the purposes of litigation.  Both practices may involve using a patented 
innovation but both strategies may want the property rights associated with the patent rather than 
a desire to use the underlying innovation.   
All the other reasons to patent generally do not involve putting a patented innovation into 
practice.  These other reasons are strategic in nature and may sometimes be contrary to the goals 
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of the patent system.  Often patent owners obtain a patent for the purpose of preventing others 
from using the invention rather than actually using the invention themselves.  Since there is no 
requirement that a patent holder or even a licensee actually use a patented invention, some 
actions may have a dampening effect on innovation.   
Market Inefficiency and Non-Practice 
It has been assumed that a patent system is necessary to help encourage innovation, to 
help disseminate information, and to bring innovation to the marketplace for consumption.  
Without the protections offered by the current system it may also be assumed that copyists will 
prevail by taking advantage of the labors of innovators.  The assumption further continues that, 
without protection inventors will be less likely to publish materials and innovation will become 
secretive.  It is the lack of protection for innovation in the free market that has led to the creation 
of a patent system.   However, in trying to correct a free-market failure other inefficiencies have 
come to light in the current system.  There are gaps in the system where strong protection is 
encouraging new and unforeseen business models which may actually discourage innovation and 
subsequent commercialization.  Creative people have used these inefficiency gaps to create 
successful business models that do not necessarily focus on innovating for commercial purposes.   
In a system where a limited monopoly is incentive to invent, system inefficiency exists 
because firms that conceive and practice an invention without obtaining a patent do not need the 
patent as incentive.  Clearly the incentive was not the limited monopoly granted by the patent.  
This would also indicate that the patent should not have been granted because of the easy 
duplication of an invention.
520
 A market system inefficiency also exists because firms that 
independently reinvent a patented invention show that it may be easier to reinvent an invention 
than to find the patent.
521
  Just because a patent exists, it does not mean that an infringer would 
have been aware of the infringement even after a diligent search.  This indicates a problem where 
independent researchers may not be able to determine a patent’s boundaries. 
Because the boundaries are often unclear, it is difficult to determine whether a new 
device or process is actually infringing an existing patent.  Determining the boundaries and 
potential infringement will increase the cost of research due to the administrative task of 
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performing patent searches.  These unclear boundaries may end up increasing research costs 
because companies, large and small, will be forced to expend resources to conduct in-depth 
patent searches.  Infringement which may not be present upon initial review of a patent may end 
up having a latent impact at a later time.   
Boundaries are further blurred because of marking requirements for some innovations but 
not for others.
522
  The lack of marking requirements may be the result of impracticability, as in 
processes, methods, or bio-chemical innovations, and it results in uneven notification 
requirements and hidden dangers for the unwary.  It is often assumed that researchers are aware 
of technological innovations in their field, but they are also forced to be aware of all patents in 
their field and even those that may indirectly touch on their field.  While patents searches may 
provide beneficial information for researchers, constant searches to determine whether current 
research is infringing take away from time and resources devoted to the innovation process due 
to bureaucratic compliance requirements to ensure non-infringement.   
An entity which owns property but does not exploit the property through use may try to 
exploit it by renting the property to others.  It is known as rent-seeking when renting the 
property, rather than using it, is the property owner’s strategy.  More broadly speaking, rent-
seeking is where a person tries to increase existing wealth but does nothing to create it, or more 
directly, when an entity seeks economic gain from society but does nothing to benefit society.
523
  
Rent-seeking may be a potential inefficiency in the patent system.  The patent owner does not 
himself make, use, or sell the invention but actively seeks to collects payments (rent) from others 
who do use and exploit the invention.  It is not that rent-seeking of itself is “bad” but there has 
been an increase in patent trade for rent rights and this may become a problem for innovation 
when a company obtains and purchases patents solely to collect payments from existing 
practitioners.  This can be an impediment to innovation and subsequent commercialization 
particularly where the infringer independently developed the patented technology or a segment 
of the technology.   
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There are companies that have taken advantage of the strong property rights associated 
with patents.  Since patents can be bought and sold, these entities have acted as middlemen in 
transactions.  They create a marketplace for patents by buying and selling patents.  However, 
these middlemen also enforce the patents that they hold in between purchases and sales.  Often, 
these “middlemen” may only purchase a patent for the right to enforce and not with an intent to 
sell.  In the patent world, rent demands are backed up with litigation threats.  There is nothing 
wrong with this business model per se, but these entities have created a niche that was not 
foreseen when the patent laws were developed.  These are patent traders and enforcers rather 
than inventors and innovators. 
On one hand, some of these entities may create a valid market for patents, increasing 
their liquidity by connecting buyers and sellers.  This is a beneficial niche which did not exist 
before.  It creates a notification platform for patent sellers, and it creates notice to buyers of 
patents available for sale.  These markets allow small inventors to receive compensation for their 
patented innovation while providing larger companies with a way to find and connect with 
smaller inventors.  This process may actually aid in commercializing innovation and can play a 
beneficial role for the public. 
On the other hand, there are middlemen who do not create a market for buyers.  They are 
patent holding companies or licensing companies, deriving their revenue from royalty collection 
rather than from creating liquidity.  It is unclear whether - and to what extent - they have a 
positive or negative impact on the patent system.  It is also clear that many of these companies, 
regardless of what name is given to them, are using the threat of legal action to obtain these 
royalties.  The property rights associated with the patent are the goal of these companies, while 
the underlying innovation is only significant insofar as someone is infringing it.  However, many 
businesses have taken notice of these companies and labeled them as patent trolls. 
Still other companies who have long criticized trolls for their behavior have “spun-off” 
their patent portfolios to subsidiary companies or to special purpose entities.  Others have created 
joint ventures or partnerships with other companies to purchase and enforce patents.  In the spin-
off model, the spin-offs have given the parent company a non-exclusive license and have enabled 
them to act as patent licensing and enforcing companies.  In the latter situations companies have 
created specialized ventures with other companies to obtain patents, to license these patents to 
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the parent companies, and to enforce the patents against competitors or others not part of the 
venture.   
Trolls: Good or Bad? 
Robert Merges indicates that the most threatening non-practicing entity is one that not 
only seeks to exact royalty payments, but also use the threat of litigation and potential injunction 
awards as leverage to demand exorbitant sums which may be out of proportion with the patented 
invention’s worth.524  However, demands for these royalties are only possible if the troll 
purchases a patent which has already been infringed and the infringer is either unaware that it is 
infringing or has done so intentionally.  An alleged infringer will likely pay the royalty if there is 
a chance that it actually infringed the patent and the potential cost of litigation and remedy 
awards will be more than the royalty payments.    
Under this business model, the actual underlying invention is of no concern to the troll.  It 
has no desire to actually make or use the patented invention but purchases a patent solely for the 
property rights in the patent.  These rights are significant because they allow the holder to 
enforce those rights against an infringer.  The innovation upon which the patent is based is only 
significant if there is another entity using it or using a similar innovation.  In these licensing 
transactions, the patent is not being used to create further innovations; nor is it being used to 
commercialize the underlying innovation.  No one is being encouraged to license the patented 
innovation in order to further research or to produce new products or to make products more 
efficiently.  The underlying innovation is only relevant insofar as it is used as a basis for 
enforcement, and the patent’s only purpose is to obtain rent. 
It is believed that trolls are responsible for an increase in rent-seeking since they have 
created markets and exchanges that encourage this behavior.
525
  The transactions in question not 
only do not contribute to the innovation process, but they may actually impede innovation 
through the rent-seeking behavior.  A whole business model has been created around an 
instrument which can force users to make payments in exchange for nothing other than owning 
the instrument.  Thus an accused infringer is either forced to incur the expense of litigation or to 
pay the demanded royalties.  An alleged infringer may also be forced to find a non-infringing 
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alternative, or attempt to design around the patented innovation.  This will add cost to the 
infringer, which will ultimately be passed to the consumer through higher priced goods.   
Since a purpose in creating a patent regime is to foster innovation, Robert Merges has put 
forward that transactions solely for the purpose of getting rent or acts which use the threat of 
litigation would seem contrary to this goal and more akin to blackmail. A party uses resources to 
get information; and, in exchange for suppressing that information, receives a payment from 
another party. Thus blackmail is considered a wasteful economic transaction. The net result is 
that society is poorer for it, since information is suppressed through a financial transaction.   Just 
as blackmail has a negative impact on society, trolling provides no benefit to the patent 
system.
526
  However, unlike blackmail, the threat is not to suppress information for payment.  
The threat is to the continued use of an invention.  In exchange for royalty payments, the 
infringer can continue to use the patented invention. 
A patent holder further has a right to exclude others from using the invention, and patent 
owners can seek damages from infringers whether they are practicing the invention or not.  
Patent owners can demand royalty payments, and they can even seek an injunction while 
refusing to license a patent.  This even entails not allowing anyone to use the patented invention 
throughout the life of the patent.
527
  Since each of the three jurisdictions recognizes that patents 
can be bought and sold, why should the patent holder not profit by selling his patent rights to 
another?  Patent ownership rights are transferable to subsequent owners, and the right to exclude 
is one of those rights.  While trolls appear to be within their legal rights, this behavior may 
actually be worse than blackmail because the threat is not to prevent dissemination of 
information of dubious value but to prevent useful products and information from being on the 
market unless royalty fees are met.  The potential injunction can deny the public and other 
significant stakeholders access to innovations that may already be on the market as well as to 
potential new innovations.   
While the government in all three jurisdictions under examination can limit patent rights, 
limiting acts are the exception and not the norm.  In Canada and the U.K. the statutes indicate 
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that a compulsory license may be granted if patent rights are abused.  However, for abuse to 
exist, demand for the patented innovation must exist, no one can currently be practicing it, and 
the party wishing to use the innovation must have attempted negotiations to get a license.  The 
patent owner cannot refuse outright to license, and royalty demands cannot be outrageous.  
While the threshold may not seem particularly high, this is a rarely used remedy in both 
countries.   
It is further believed that innovation will be impeded because companies will be wary 
about venturing into new technologies for fear of facing litigation.  Companies will face 
increased patent search costs to determine whether any newly created technology will infringe on 
an existing patent.  As it is, the median cost of formal validity and infringement opinions is 
$15,000.00 in the U.S.
528
  When complex devices, involving multiple patents, require a search 
the cost to perform a search can be extreme.  Even if a search is conducted and a company deems 
it is not infringing, the potential lack of clear boundaries may still result in an infringement 
claim.  Unclear boundaries require greater cost to accurately determine their extent.  Even if 
resources are expended to perform a thorough search, the patent boundaries may be interpreted 
incorrectly and parties will often differ.  
Despite some negative impact on the patent system, it can also be argued that middlemen 
and trolls have also benefitted many inventors.  These entities actually create markets for patent 
trade and licensing. These markets make it easier for parties to trade patents by matching buyers 
and sellers.  It allows the innovator to focus on his area of expertise while allowing the 
middlemen to engage in the act of buying, selling, licensing, and even suing.
529
   
It can also be argued that trolls create a beneficial service for small inventors because 
they enable patent enforcement by entities lacking resources to find infringers and lacking 
resources to enforce patents.  Finally, society may benefit because infringers will be forced to be 
creative and flexible in trying to avoid paying ongoing royalties to patent holders.  Rather than 
paying a royalty once infringement is discovered, an infringer can also design a work-around or 
find a non-infringing alternative.  This may actually increase innovation by forcing the infringer 
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to come up with other inventive solutions.  This may not be the most tenable benefit, but an 
extremely flexible and responsive company may be able to achieve this.  However, many 
companies will likely not have the resources or the ability to alter designs of products that are in 
mid-production.  
Another issue when looking at the impact of non-practicing entities is that there are no 
clear figures to calculate the number of suits filed by these entities.  Estimates in the U.S. 
indicate that non-practicing entities are responsible for between 2% and 17% of all patent 
infringement suits but a recent government study in the U.S. indicated that patent monetizing 
entities were responsible for as much as 20% of all suits.
530
  This is a large disparity in the 
numbers, indicating that trolls may have some impact; but it may also indicate that the danger 
posed by trolls is greatly exaggerated.  The numbers are likely smaller in Canada and England.  
Factors in this assumption include their respective market sizes, the smaller number of patents 
issued, and the general profit potential of royalty awards versus cost of litigation.
531
  However, 
any assumptions about troll pervasiveness are unclear and lack empirical support.   
Nonetheless, concern over the negative impacts of the patent troll business model may 
have brought to light issues greater than the direct impact of trolls themselves.  There has been a 
larger increase in the interest in property rights of patents than in the inventions which spawn the 
patents.  This interest has led to questions of whether the patent system is actually achieving the 
goals which it was designed to address and of what can be done, if anything, to alleviate any 
shortcomings in the goals or purpose of the patent system. 
Other Non-practicing Transactions Compared to Troll Behavior 
   It has already been shown that manufacturing and licensing are just two of many 
reasons to obtain a patent.  There are also many sub-categories within the scope of “licensing” 
which are actively used by companies to for both strategic and profit oriented reasons.  While 
licensing is a commonly believed to be a form of patent practice, there actually appears to be a 
fine line between licensing practices that tend to commercialize innovations and those that are 
merely created for strategic purposes.  For example, it may be hard to consider an invention as 
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being “practiced” if there is a cross-licensing agreement where the entities may or may not be 
using any of the patent inventions in the other party’s portfolio.  There are still other patent 
transactions that are common but are not “practice.”  These transactions are considered to be 
legitimate and there has been very little commentary on their impact on the patent system.  There 
has been no outcry over their inefficiency or the need to protect companies from such waste.  
Many of these transactions have also been ignored because they are commonly used as 
motivators for patent application filings.  Nonetheless, while applications may be increasing, 
there are serious questions about whether these transactions are truly helping innovation.   
There are still other business decisions that involve patents but not the practice or 
attempted practice of the patented invention.  Some include both offensive and defensive tactics 
either to protect existing products or to prevent competitors from invading the patent owner’s 
territory.  It is also not uncommon for a company with a large patent portfolio to wield its 
portfolio as a club against startups and competitors by threatening to sue startups and companies 
with weaker portfolios for infringement if they do not pay a royalty to continue operations.
532
  
Many companies operate aggressive licensing departments that seek to obtain patents for the 
slightest innovation in an attempt to use their patent portfolios to obtain as much licensing 
revenue as possible.   It has also become a practice that some large practicing entities have 
started to use non-practicing entities to enforce their patents against infringers but to avoid public 
backlash from the enforcement.
533
  Such companies are generally very large companies which 
innovate, but it is questionable whether their tactics can be considered “practicing” their patents; 
these patents are not really used except for licensing or litigation leverage.  Some of these 
companies will not use their patents but will just accumulate patents covering loopholes in 
existing patents or loopholes in competitor patents.  This results in a stockpile of paper patents.  
The innovations coming out of such practices are often relatively weak, while nevertheless 
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allowing the patent owners to wield the full power of patent exclusion and the threat of 
litigation.
534
  Discussing patent office standards for obviousness and novelty are beyond the 
scope of this work but low standards encourage application filing to gain property rights over 
unclaimed patent territory, rather than for actual innovation.  It has also become a trend for 
companies to band together in an effort to create a partner company to seek out and buy patents 
which may be potential patent troll targets.  The parent companies would receive a license from 
the subsidiary under extremely favorable terms.   
Obtaining patents for defensive purposes raises the question whether defensive measures 
are actual practice.  It also raises questions over whether infringement is easy to identify and 
whether rudimentary searches are sufficient to discover patents which may be infringed.  This 
may also indicate that determining the boundaries is more difficult than merely conducting a 
scan of available patents which may require specialized skills.  Another issue concerns 
companies that are buying patents primarily out of fear of being sued.  The chance of 
infringement may be remote, but a triable issue may still arise before the courts and lead to 
protracted litigation for strategic reasons or a nuisance settlement. 
Some companies with large patent portfolios, such as IBM, have embraced the idea of 
creating a special purpose entity (SPE) to whom the patent portfolio is sold.  The SPE would 
grant a non-exclusive license on all of the company’s patents, allowing full use, but would 
pursue an aggressive licensing and enforcement strategy.  Investors finance the SPE, which uses 
the money to pay for the patent portfolio.  In this manner, the company obtains a large payment 
for its patents while investors are generally compensated through portfolio royalties.  There is 
great similarity between this practice and that of a patent troll.   
The recent U.S. GAO report on patent litigation noted that many operating companies 
(practicing entities) partner with non-practicing entities for enforcement purposes or they have 
subsidiaries that perform litigation on behalf of the operating company.
535
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To obtain full value from a patent some licensing may be involved.
536
  Attempts to 
receive royalties may be difficult for most practicing entities.  Competing entities will generally 
have patents that cover their own and competitors’ products making some infringement likely.  
Companies often come to an amicable agreement because, without it, competitors may get into 
battles over multiple patent infringement claims.  Another complication exists because the 
attempted licensor may be in an existing business relationship with the potential licensee.
537
  A 
true patent troll is not likely vulnerable to either counter-suit.
538
  The SPE, like the troll, would 
likely remain immune, but the company that originally sold the portfolio to the SPE may be 
vulnerable to retribution suits from competing company SPEs.  
A common way around a licensing impasse between competitors is a cross-licensing 
agreement.  This is a form of license where two companies agree to exchange patent portfolios 
(or a portion of their portfolios).  The company with fewer patents pays royalties to the company 
with more patents.  These agreements often allow the company holding more patents to demand 
royalties from the competition.
539
  Cross-licensing has a further purpose as a protective measure 
to ward off countersuits by these same competitors.   
The economic efficiency of cross-licensing is questionable; and, despite the general lack 
of concern over this practice, its positive effect on innovation in the patent system is less than 
clear.    Since not all patents in the agreement will be practiced, the threat of litigation will 
nonetheless force the company with fewer patents to pay a royalty to the company with more 
patents.  This does not necessarily encourage inventiveness.  It does encourage companies to 
accumulate patents for every small innovation or variation no matter how trivial.  This also 
encourages companies to find holes in their competitor’s patent portfolios to strengthen 
bargaining positions for cross-licensing, rather than for putting an invention into practice.  Weak 
obviousness standards, particularly in the U.S., and the fact that almost “anything under the sun 
that is made by man” is patentable further contribute to this situation.540  In Canada and England 
the obviousness and subject matter standards seem to be loosening as well.  Canada currently 
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recognizes business method patents and software patents.
541
  While England officially follows 
E.U. patent standards denying business methods and software patents, there is a push to allow 
these types of subject matter.  In England, whether a business method or software patent is 
granted often depends on claim construction.
542
   
A further issue with cross-licensing is that the parties exchange portfolios, finances, or 
other resources without necessarily practicing a patent which is part of the exchange.  The 
accumulation of patents forces another party to pay for patents they may not be infringing.  It 
also forces a party to pay for a patent which neither party to the cross-licensing agreement may 
ever use.  Thus there is an exchange of money for potential use of a patent, not for actual use.  
This is akin to paying for a potential trespass or potential liability prevention – almost like a kind 
of insurance.  Cross-licensing has not been questioned because parties to a cross-licensing 
agreement find it cheaper to just agree to the license rather than face litigation over potentially 
hundreds of patents in a cross-licensor’s patent portfolio.  Perhaps such royalty payments can be 
favorably compared to a type of insurance or as nuisance avoidance due to the exclusionary 
property right granted in a patent.  The practice has helped spur patent accumulation but it is not 
clear whether these transactions actually encourage innovation or whether cross-licensing 
benefits the patent system.  The practice has resulted in the proliferation of both paper patents 
and practiced patents.  This has been described as the “nuclear option” of the patent world.  
Since a single patent suit can be very expensive, the prospect of battling over several or several 
hundred patents is something no company is willing to accept.  Since cross-licensing is a practice 
used by companies to avoid litigation, changes to remedies will have little impact on cross-
licensing practices.  Furthermore, cross licensing will occur regardless of the obviousness 
standard or the strength of patents.  A tougher obviousness standard may limit the number of 
patents accumulated by companies, but it will not limit the practice of cross-licensing.   
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Despite some of the inefficiencies existing in cross-licensing, there are some benefits.  In 
a market economy, cross-licensing is a market solution where parties agree to a transaction 
between themselves and without legislative intervention.  Companies prefer this solution because 
agreement terms are generally secret and offer agreement structure flexibility.  The transaction 
costs of making a cross licensing agreement are clearly seen as being cheaper than litigation, and 
without the uncertainty of anticipating a court decision.  Another benefit to cross-licensing is that 
a company will have access to a competitor’s patents which it would not have had otherwise. 
This may encourage research and development into areas that a company had not considered 
prior to receiving access to a competitor’s patents.   Transaction costs are also lowered because 
negotiations are not for each individual patent but merely for access to the accumulated total of 
patents.  A final benefit is that companies are encouraged to publicize innovations through 
patenting in order to maintain a competitive balance with other companies in the industry.  Thus 
a company is encouraged to publish even the most insignificant innovation in an attempt to 
accumulate patents.  
A cross licensing agreement can be considered a market remedy rather than a legal 
remedy.  As has been seen, while it may not necessarily be the most efficient method of 
encouraging the goals of the patent system, it does provide benefits for patent holders, follow-on 
innovators, investors, and even consumers.  Innovators are encouraged to publish their 
innovations, no matter how meager, and decisions are made by the innovators themselves rather 
than through government and judicial intervention.  However, these benefits may not necessarily 
result in a net benefit when compared with the detrimental aspects of cross-licensing practice.   
Defensive patents and pre-emptive patents may also have more questionable net 
contributions to the goals of the patent system. Yet these reasons to patent are also considered 
acceptable patent uses by both patent applicants and even many commentators.  They are useful 
methods that a manufacturer can employ to protect itself from competitors.  The defensive patent 
is normally not intended for practice but only as a shield to protect against competing 
manufacturers.  Most often the defensive patents will not be used except as a means of 
countersuing a competitor who decides to assert its own patent exclusion right. 
Pre-emptive patenting is a defensive situation wherein a company decides to patent an 
invention, which it may or may not be using, merely to prevent its competitor from either using 
121 
 
the innovation or acquiring a patent on the innovation.  Pre-emptive patenting can take another 
form, where an inventor with a patented invention, patents a subsequent invention in an attempt 
to extend the monopoly on the first invention.
543
  The invention covered by the second patent is 
suppressed rather than commercialized, in an effort to thwart competition against the first 
invention.  
A blocking patent is an offensive form of patenting which Posner and Landes believe 
results in a net social cost.  A blocking patent comes into being when a competitor obtains a 
patent on an improvement to the existing technology, but the existing technology is in a patent 
owned by the technology producer.  The original patent owner and improver are both unable to 
use the improvement.  The original owner is blocked because the improver owns the patent on 
the new innovation.  However, the improver is unable to use the new innovation because he 
cannot use the original patented invention.   Landes and Posner believe that the negotiation costs 
are often lower than the potential royalty benefits that could be obtained by developing 
improvements. 
544
  This would indicate that there is a financial incentive to adopt a strategy to try 
to obtain a blocking patent against competitors, whenever possible.  The blocking patent merely 
increases the cost of competitor improvements, because a royalty must be paid to the improver.  
The potential royalty also encourages non-use by the improver.  However, this is accepted as 
perfectly valid strategic behavior which encourages negotiations between parties.  Since 
negotiations are a market solution, it is one preferred by many companies and commentators 
despite a net social detriment.
545
   
There is really nothing in the patent laws that will prevent the practice of pre-emptive 
patenting or of blocking patents.  Both practices use the right to exclude to gain a competitive 
advantage.  Patent accumulation is encouraged in all three jurisdictions.
546
  This is a form of non-
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practice which has a net social detriment because new innovations are not being practiced and 
old ones are continued beyond patentable period.  Competition is also being prevented because 
the patentee is not making the new innovation nor is the newer patent being licensed to another 
willing to practice the innovation.  Anyone looking to practice the innovation will be limited as 
to any improvements and will have to obtain a license from the innovator to use the 
improvements.  The original patent owner will have a significantly superior market position and 
will be able to obtain royalty payments with significantly less effort and solely through the 
mistakes or oversights of initial patent owners.   
There are also some positive aspects to pre-emptive patenting as well.  Pre-emptive 
patenting may not actually encourage innovation but it still encourages the inventor to make 
public the invention details.  In a system that denies injunctions unless the innovation is 
practiced, it is believed that the patent owner would be more likely to suppress the new 
innovation rather than allowing another to bring a competing product to market.  There is also a 
question about the extent to which society would benefit if a manufacturer were forced to market 
two similar and competing products just to maintain a patent right.  However, none of these 
reasons to patent appear to work towards actively putting innovations into practice.  Rents, 
extending original innovation terms, and competition harassment raise the price of final products 
without necessarily providing anything new for consumers or follow-on innovators.   
Patent bullying may be another tactic used by manufacturers.  The purpose may be to 
increase costs for competitors, to gain competitor technology, or to push someone out of the 
market.
547
  This is most effective when the party obtains a weak patent and uses the threat of 
litigation as leverage in its negotiations to obtain a nuisance settlement.  Again, this tactic does 
not increase innovation, except where the “patent bully” gains access to a competitor’s 
technology.  However, the licensing fees will raise the cost of production by increasing costs or 
pushing a competitor out of the market.  This makes the consumer poorer, while doing nothing to 
encourage innovation.  Because patents are obtained to inconvenience competitors and to gain 
royalties, this practice differs little from trolling practices.   
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Clearly, “trolls” are not alone in perpetrating wasteful and inefficient transactions.  
Defensive patents, pre-empting patents, bullying competitors, and cross-licensing are all reasons 
for patenting that involve patented rights but not the underlying invention. The common 
characteristic among these transactions is that the rights are significant while the underlying 
technology may be utterly insignificant to the party obtaining a patent.  
Given the variety of business practices involving patent transactions, it has become 
increasingly difficult to distinguish “legitimate” from “illegitimate” practices.  However, none of 
the transactions are illegal.
548
  Using the term “troll” further obfuscates legitimate discussion 
about the patent system since it immediately assumes that entities labeled trolls are involved in 
“illegitimate” patent use while other uses are legitimate.  All the transactions described are 
actually legitimate, but the question is whether they actually meet the goals of the patent system. 
Competition laws may also find these transactions acceptable but delving into that area is beyond 
the scope of this work. 
549
  Even if competition laws become part of the analysis, an accused 
infringer must go to court to resolve these issues and may face a preliminary injunction until 
these issues can be resolved.  These are all practices that use the threat of litigation to force 
royalty payments.  For all but cross-licensing, remedy decisions may encourage or discourage 
recourse to the courts.  Thus preoccupation with the impact of trolls on the patent system may 
actually be somewhat moot. 
Since it is not easy to identify the “evil troll”, it is still worth examining the powers that 
courts have when awarding patent infringement remedies.  Analyzing remedies will allow insight 
into whether courts have difficulty reaching reasonable decisions when dealing with non-
practicing entities.  Remedy analysis can also reveal whether any distinguishing characteristics 
of such decisions are justifiable under the goals of a patent system. 
Why Trolls Succeed in the Current Systems – Strong Propertization? 
Fischer and Henkel concluded that: 1) patents obtained by trolls are generally broad and 
have a high likelihood of being infringed; 2) the patents are generally part of “thickets” and have 
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a high substitution cost; and 3) the patents tend to be of higher quality than those of practicing 
entities, leading to a higher probability that patent validity will be upheld by a court.
550
   
Patent trolls are active buyers and sellers of patents, purchasing or in-licensing patents in 
an effort to obtain revenues through reselling the patent or through licensing agreements.
551
  
These transactions are only helped by a system that encourages strong property rights and a 
system that separates rights in the patent from rights in the invention.  Trolls purchase patents 
solely for their exclusion rights and not for the underlying technology.  They then use the patent 
in transactions to sell or license patent rights to an entity already using the patented technology.  
These patent-only transactions are a key part of the business model used by trolls.
552
  However, 
there is nothing illegal about transactions that are concerned with patent rights as opposed to the 
underlying innovation.  Buying, selling, and licensing patents and the rights to use the underlying 
technology are perfectly legitimate actions.  Wi-Lan, Mosaid, Inpro, and Intellectual Ventures all 
conduct some form of research and development.  These are all perceived patent trolls but they 
are not merely buyers, sellers, and licensors of patents.  However, buying, selling, licensing, and 
litigation are a significant portion of business for each of these companies.  
There has been a general belief that patent trolls purchase patents of dubious quality; 
however, Henkel and Fischer conducted a study that determined that this was not the case.
553
  
Three business strategies or combinations of strategies indicate that trolls are more likely to 
pursue higher quality patents.  The first strategy is an injunction-based strategy.  Only the 
injunctive strategy can successfully induce an infringer to settle based on a low-quality patent.  
The threat of an injunction could result in an immediate impact on the infringer while invalidity 
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proceedings to overturn the patent could take years. Thus the threat of an injunction may result in 
a nuisance settlement.  The second strategy is a damage-based strategy.  A damage-based 
strategy requires a higher quality patent since the troll is going after a monetary award from a 
court, and invalidity proceedings are generally part of litigation.  Not only will a troll have to 
show that there is infringement, but it will also have to overcome an invalidity defense by the 
infringer before being able to collect monetary damages.  The third strategy is a cost-switching 
strategy.  A troll uses a cost-switching strategy because it would be too costly for the infringer to 
switch to a non-infringing strategy.  This strategy requires a high quality patent so that it is either 
apparent that the infringer’s product or process is part of the patented innovation, or that the 
patent is strong enough to overcome an invalidity proceeding.  The latter two strategies take 
time, and higher quality patents are required to overcome an invalidity proceeding in order to 
obtain a monetary remedy.  
Henkel’s and Fischer’s study has flaws due to a relatively small sampling of patent trolls 
that fall under their definition.  If trolls were always purchasing high quality patents, there would 
be less of a debate against trolls.  Plaintiffs, armed only with a patent and little other assets make 
reprisals and countersuits difficult.  Furthermore, they ignore the cost-benefit analysis that many 
companies perform on whether to pay a royalty or litigate.  They do not take into account the 
impact of litigation costs versus royalty demands which has led many companies to pay the 
royalty demand rather than litigate.   
A recent report published by the U.S. Government Accountability Office on patent 
litigation indicates that patents of dubious quality are in fact the source of much litigation.
554
  
Patents with overbroad claims and unclear boundaries are the source of most disputes, whether 
involving non-practicing entities or not.  While the report minimizes the impact of non-practicing 
entities, it also notes that a consistent twenty percent of all litigation in the United States is the 
product of non-practicing entities.
555
 
Other commentators have held that patent trolls tend to focus on software, electronics, 
and other high-tech devices because of the complexity of the devices and because the devices are 
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composed of parts covered by several patents. 
556
  In the U.S., forty-six percent of all patent 
lawsuits involved software.
557
  Mobile phone devices may be covered by several hundred 
patents, with smartphones involving between 50,000 and 250,000 patented technologies.
558
  This 
is also an area of prolific patenting because of high competition, changing consumer tastes, 
changing consumer usage, and rapidly changing technology.  Trolls have much less of an impact 
in areas outside of electronics.  Nonetheless, it is within these areas that trolls seem to thrive. 
Business methods are yet another area where trolls seem to be thriving.
559
  This area has 
been controversial but also appears to be ripe for litigation, usually because of the dubious 
subject matter to which patents are being awarded.  Nonetheless, Canada and the U.S. allow 
these types of patents.  
Furthermore, a review of companies with troll-like behavior indicates that trolls tend to 
purchase patents from smaller firms and not from large, practicing firms.
560
  Trolls also tend to 
purchase older patents 1) with more forward citations, 2) with few family members, 3) that are 
related to complex and crowded technology fields, 4) with many claims, and 5) with more non-
patent literature references.
561
  These factors make it less likely that such patents will be found 
invalid.  Patents are also selected if they have a high probability of being infringed focusing on 
high quality (legally defensible) patents in dense technology fields.
562
  These patents will 
generally have underlying innovations with high substitution costs.
563
   These findings indicate 
that trolls search for more obscure patents that cover innovations that have not been successfully 
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marketed, but which cover areas where existing technologies are likely to infringe the patent.  
Trolls operate in areas where the cost of coming up with an alternative is prohibitive.   
Trolls have an advantage over practicing entities when it comes to identifying and 
purchasing patents.
564
 Patent trolls hire people with the expertise to identify suitable patents and 
to extract value from patents.
565
  The business model also involves a willingness to have courts 
settle disputes.  By contrast, practicing firms are generally in the business of using the patented 
invention and will extract value through the patents by practicing the invention, by preventing 
imitation, cross-licensing, or potentially by licensing the innovation.
566
  Companies will 
generally try to avoid settling disputes in court.  Even if some of the research they conduct is not 
traditional, they have a significant expertise in researching patents. 
Yet another advantage that trolls have over manufacturing entities is that patent trolls are 
immune to a countersuit.
567
  This is because a non-practicing entity that is awarded an injunction 
against a manufacturer can prevent the manufacturer from making the invention while a 
countersuit by the manufacturer will have no effect because the non-practicing entity does not 
make anything.   
Patent trolls would seem to have developed a sustainable business model.  Trolls provide 
smaller companies with a willing buyer, something that the seller may normally not have.  Trolls 
are also willing to enforce their patent rights.  Strong property rights encourage trolls to use the 
threat of an injunction or litigation, especially since high substitution costs provide leverage over 
potential infringers.
568
  Finally, trolls have created a business model which uses technical 
expertise to pursue patents that are likely to be infringed, and they use legal expertise to drive 
litigation. 
Trolls can be difficult to identify.  Information on actual trolls tends to be limited because 
of several factors.  Most companies are very quiet and few are public companies.  Rarely do 
                                                          
564
 Id., at  6.  
565
 Id., at 6. 
566
 Fischer & Henkel, Supra note 22, at 6. 
567
 Nicholas Varchaver, Who's afraid of Nathan Myhrvold?, FORTUNE MAGAZINE, (June 26, 2006), 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2006/07/10/8380798/index.htm (Last visited October 
24, 2011). 
568
 Fischer & Henkel, Supra note 22, at 19.  
128 
 
infringement suits proceed to trial.
569
  Even if a trial commences, patent trials often end when 
infringement is found and the parties negotiate their own licensing agreement.  Many patent 
cases end up being settled between the parties and do not reach final judgment.
570
 Settlements are 
not part of the public record, and this limits understanding of how the system works in 
practice.
571
 
Another significant issue, when assessing the viability of a patent troll business model, is 
the existence of a “working requirement.”  In Canada, the U.S., and the U.K there is no 
requirement to use the patent.  Even if such a requirement existed, it is often quite difficult to tell 
whether a patent is actually being “used.”  A company may be conducting research with a patent 
invention.  It is also not easy to decide on the number of produced products which would 
constitute manufacturing.    
Abuse laws in Canada and England exist but they are applicable in very narrow 
circumstances and come with very stringent criteria.  To take advantage of these abuse laws, 
applicants must make significant attempts to negotiate a license and no non-infringing 
alternatives can exist.  Finally, consumer demand must exist for a product that is being prevented 
from being used in the marketplace.  
Despite the lack of a use requirement, patent holders are still entitled to some 
compensation under current laws when they do not use their patented innovation.  Nonetheless, 
non-practicing entities will likely not have recourse to an accounting for profits in Canada and 
the U.K., and the non-practicing-entities will not have recourse to lost profits in any of the three 
jurisdictions.  Furthermore, while injunctions are commonly awarded, they are still equitable 
remedies in all three jurisdictions and can be awarded at the discretion of the courts. 
It has been shown that the patent troll business model will likely continue to be 
successful. The business model will continue because 1) determining patent boundaries is 
complicated, making it difficult for inventors to determine whether a new product will infringe; 
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2) there are an ever increasing number of patent application filings; 3) not all countries have 
made legal changes to curb trolls; 4) laws requiring patent practice may easily be circumvented 
by creating nominal production facilities; and 5) the switch-cost based strategy is not affected by 
any of the current legal changes.
572
  Other reasons that trolls have found success is that 
technology is rapidly changing; thus, small innovations to existing technology become 
patentable.  This creates a low barrier to competition entry but has also led to patent thickets.  
The electronics field has many small companies competing for an advantage or for a niche in the 
marketplace.  Business methods and software patents could increase trolling behavior.  The 
barriers to entry in these fields are relatively low, allowing individuals and small investors to 
enter the marketplace.  Electronics, business methods, and software sectors have relatively low 
barriers to entry, making these areas popular for trolling.  By contrast, the chemical, 
pharmaceutical, and biotech fields have high barriers to entry because of high research and 
development costs and heavy regulation.  Thus certain technological areas are more amenable to 
trolling than others.   
The trolling business model has been so successful that large technology companies such 
as IBM, Microsoft, Apple, and others have started to develop aggressive patent purchasing and 
enforcement strategies to compete with trolls for technology, while at the same time developing 
defensive strategies to mitigate the success of trolling against them.  IBM has become a 
forerunner in adopting trolling practices into its business strategy.  Recently, IBM established an 
SPE to which it sold its patent portfolio.  In the transaction, IBM maintains a non-exclusive 
license to all patents it sells to the SPE, while the SPE pays regular royalties from the patent 
portfolio.  The SPE completely focuses on licensing and litigation while IBM maintains its core 
business.  Other companies such as Apple, Research in Motion, EMC, Ericsson, Sony, and 
Microsoft have purchased Nortel’s patent portfolio and licenses from bankruptcy court in a 
consortium called Rockstar.  Rockstar has now become an enforcement company, searching for 
infringers or potential infringers.
573
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Patents, Non-Practicing Entities and Property Rules 
While increased innovation is the goal of the patent system and propertization is believed 
to create a significant incentive for inventors to innovate, it is not quite clear whether the 
incentive helps achieve the system’s goal.  Under the current patent systems in Canada, England, 
and the U.S., there appears to be great motivation to patent but less motivation to commercialize 
the innovation.  Stronger patent rights have encouraged patent applications and resulted in a 
steady increase in patents issued.  While innovations are still coming out of these patents, and 
some of these innovations are being marketed, not all patents can successfully be put into 
practice.  The combination of patent volumes and limited resources has also created other 
business niches and an increase in strategic behavior.  Patent applicants have numerous 
motivations for filing a patent.  While protecting a practiced innovation may be one reason to 
patent, there are a number of other common motivators that merely increase costs through 
royalty demands and the threat of litigation.  A robust marketplace for patent transactions has 
evolved as has the litigation market.  The patent transaction marketplace indicates that there is 
significant trade in patents and portfolio licensing, but there is no clear indication that these 
increased patent transactions are actually leading to increased practice or innovation application.  
Furthermore, the incentive offered by a patent may be working to increase paper patents and 
royalty revenues rather than actual innovation.  Patent accumulation rather than innovation 
acquisition has become common and appears to be a side effect of patenting incentives.  
Accumulation is also a by-product of the view that patents are valuable assets.  This view 
has led companies to create strategies where patents become used to generate regular revenue 
streams.  With some non-practicing entities, investor demand for returns has helped fuel 
litigation.
574
  
With the increase in patenting motivators, patent use or practice becomes a concern as 
other revenue generating strategies are employed by patent owners.  Resource limitations are one 
reason why patent holders may not choose to market their patented innovations.  However, 
strategic reasons are also a consideration as to why technological innovations may not be 
entering the marketplace.  Active attempts to recover research and development dollars have 
created a niche for patent trolls. These attempts have also caused companies with large research 
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and development expenditures to create intellectual property departments that aggressively seek 
royalty revenues.  Some companies have learned from patent trolls, spinning-off their intellectual 
property portfolios into aggressive enforcement and licensing companies.   
Both trolls and enforcement and licensing companies have discovered that litigation 
threats can be used to obtain royalties, regardless of whether there is actual infringement or not.  
Their goal is to resell patents or obtain licensing royalties.  It is not to practice the innovation.  
Their interest in a patent is solely for its exclusion rights which may generate royalties. Trolls 
and enforcement licensing companies are not interested in the underlying technology.  These 
companies rarely engage in transactions involving technology transfer.  The property right to 
exclude creates an incentive in transactions involving the patent itself, not ones concerned with 
the underlying innovation.  Furthermore, the right to exclude creates greater incentive to enforce 
the patent than it does to make or use the patented innovation.  This behavior challenges the 
belief that increased patent rights improve market functions for technology and calls into 
question the wisdom of strengthening property rights.
575
   
Current market theory assumes that a patent and the underlying technology are tied 
together, so that a benefit for sellers, buyers, and society exists as the technology is transferred to 
the more efficient user.
576
  Trolls, however, create a market for patents but not for the underlying 
technology.
577
  Their business profitability relies on rents or reselling the patent, with no use for 
the underlying technology.  Cross-licensing is another transaction which may involve both the 
patent and innovation but often involves only the patent, not the underlying technology.   
There is a separation between the patent as a thing and the underlying innovation as a 
thing.  This presents a problem because a patent creates a property right, but the underlying 
invention can be created independently of patent ownership.  The two are not necessarily tied 
together, and a property right can exist in both the patent and the invention.  Owning a patent 
will not prevent another from independently coming up with the innovation.  It is also possible 
for patent owners to have no knowledge of the underlying technology or who practices it.
578
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This last point further illustrates the indifference to innovation that comes with some forms of 
patent ownership.     
A troll’s interest in a patent is to obtain royalty payments.  In many cases, trolls seek 
these payments from companies that were aware of the patented innovation; but, due to patent 
enforcement costs, the patentee sold the patent to trolls for enforcement.  These situations tend to 
get resolved through negotiations.  There are also many situations where royalty payments are 
being demanded from parties who developed an innovation independently of the patent and were 
unaware that a patent existed.  The innovation user has developed it independently of having a 
patent or a patent’s incentives.  This may result in a court battle.  A third situation in which trolls 
purchase patents occurs because the patents cover technologies similar to existing technologies.  
In this third case, determining non-infringement will require a long, protracted court case, and 
alleged infringers are likely to pay a nuisance royalty rather than await the uncertainty of a court 
decision.  These latter two situations are the ones that seem to fly in the face of the goals of the 
patent system.  Without adding any kind of new innovation to the marketplace, both tactics 
generate revenue for the patent holder, while increasing costs for the technology user and the 
ultimate consumer.   
The right to exclude can be wielded with considerable power.  With complex 
technologies, a purchaser that obtains a patent for a relatively minor part can threaten the already 
producing technological manufacturer with an injunction unless the manufacturer agrees to pay a 
substantial royalty.
579
  People who argue that trolls are performing a genuine market-making 
function by acting as middlemen to transactions between sellers and buyers ignore the impact of 
these transactions. These middlemen do not perform their own research and development, nor do 
they add to the existing innovative pool. They merely increase the volume of litigation. Some 
have likened trolling behavior to a form of blackmail, an act with no social virtue or benefit.
580
  
However, in all fairness to that assessment, alleged trolls do provide a means by which inventors 
and innovators, who put in the time and labor to develop the innovation, can collect royalties 
from entities that use their patented innovations.  In particular, these entities may help small 
companies and sole inventors against infringement from large companies.  
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Cross-licensors do not really care whether or not a patent is being infringed.  They 
exchange money solely based on patent numbers.   There is no indication that either party to the 
agreement is actually infringing the other’s patents.  Money is exchanged as a form of mutual 
insurance and to prevent a legal battle that may cover hundreds of patents.   A cross-license 
appeals to businesses because it is a privately negotiated settlement.  This solution also prevents 
even greater resources from being devoted to legal battles.  Nonetheless, despite its appeal to 
businesses, a cross-license creates a situation where money is being spent for technology that has 
already been created, or for technology that will not be used, or for paper patents.  Many 
businesses are willing to enter into cross-licensing agreements, but these agreements do not 
necessarily increase innovation. 
Strategic filing should also be more of a concern.  While strategic tactics generate 
revenue for patent holders through royalty demands, these patents tend to stifle innovation or,  at 
the very least, increase competitor costs.  Despite being legal, these strategies do not increase 
innovation nor do they help market an innovation.  In the battle against trolls, these strategies 
have largely been ignored as being an impediment to innovation.  Increasingly strong property 
rules have led to an increased effectiveness of the exclusion powers of patents.  
Growth of patenting and propertization has increased rent-seeking behavior.  The right to 
exclude is used as a threat to motivate alleged infringers into signing licensing agreements.  
While rent-seeking is not necessarily bad, rent-seeking combined with transactions that diminish 
and suppress innovation seems to have a negative impact on society and goes contrary to the 
goals of a patent system. 
581
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Chapter Four 
As a result of the outcry over patent trolls, there has been much analysis, particularly 
economic analysis, to either support or condemn the practice.  Economic analysis has also been 
applied to determine potential consequences of remedies in this field.  A significant portion only 
focuses on the incentive aspects: whether or not a particular damage remedy will provide 
sufficient incentive to encourage inventors to innovate and make their innovations public.  
Another portion of the analysis focuses on compensation.  One group of researchers attempts to 
determine the optimal compensation an inventor should have while other researchers take an 
ideological propertization approach to compensation.  Both seem to make the assumption that 
patent protection exists to encourage innovation without looking at the greater question of why 
and for whom?  Neither view seems to take into account the impact on the greater patent system, 
including follow-on inventors and the general public.  There appears to be very little examination 
of who the beneficiaries are under any remedy analysis.  There is also very limited analysis of 
how remedies encourage innovation marketing.  Whether greater protection actually leads to 
greater innovation is questionable.  Furthermore, greater innovation does not necessarily entail 
greater commercialization or public benefit.  
There are many reasons for an inventor to obtain a patent.  If the purpose of patent 
protection is solely to encourage innovation, then the current system appears to offer some 
incentive in all three jurisdictions.  However, if the goal is to encourage innovation marketing, 
then patent remedies may not be sufficient and the debate among U.S. scholars between property 
and liability rules is too narrow.  Remedies are merely the final stage in a patent infringement 
dispute, and other factors may be playing a role in limiting effectiveness of the current system to 
encourage innovation and commercialization. 
Outside the United States, the approach to patent trolls has been more measured.  
Commentators, such as David Vaver, have not been nearly as alarmed as U.S. commentators 
have been in regards to non-practicing entities.  The injunction is a standard remedy in both 
Canada and England, and there is no reason why a court is unable to examine the situation 
without ignoring the impact on parties beyond the ones directly in dispute.  There has also been a 
reluctance to embrace an economic analysis of patent remedies.  This section will examine some 
of the most prominent commentators who used law and economics theory to support a particular 
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remedy approach and will indicate some of the limitations of their analysis.  Much attention has 
been devoted to remedy analysis, but there are other areas of patent systems which may need 
further examination to encourage them to better meet their goals.
582
  
Lemley and Shapiro take the approach that current remedy systems amount to a “holdup” 
that unfairly burdens infringers, particularly when alleged patent trolls and non-practicing 
entities are the patent owners.  They believe that not only are royalties awarded by the courts too 
high, but that an injunction should be denied for the entire class of non-practicing entities.  Sidak 
and Golden disagree with the “holdup” view and believe that an injunction is an essential part of 
the remedy in order for inventors to receive the appropriate value for their innovative 
contributions.  Without the incentive of an injunction, innovation will decline and inventors will 
attempt to keep their creations secret.  Robert Merges also indicates a preference for injunction 
awards especially in a situation where, like the eBay decision, courts have the responsibility of 
analyzing a situation and tailoring the award to fit the harm.  He believes that legislators should 
stay out of the patent debate and let the courts create appropriate remedies.   
Economic analysis often fails because it is not used to look at the purpose of a patent 
system, beyond the incentive to innovate.  A true economic analysis should examine the impact 
on each of the parties or stakeholders in a system.  That is, it should look beyond the benefits or 
detriments suffered merely by patentee and infringer.  The general public or consumers are often 
neglected parties in a patent system analysis, as are follow-on inventors who build on existing 
inventions.  Trolls and troll-like practices focus on the patents themselves, divorced from the 
underlying innovation.  There should also be some examination as to why an approach that 
works for physical property should be applied to intangible property.  When absolute property 
rights are discussed, confusion over patent boundaries is often ignored.  Boundary confusion is 
common and it is often used to extract royalties from independent inventors.  An additional 
aspect of remedies is the means of redress.  In order for a party to obtain a remedy a patent 
owner must use the courts.  This may seem obvious but the process entails costs and procedures, 
which are part of the remedy analysis.  Finally, several patent strategies raise the cost of 
manufacturing and research because they involve paper patents and litigation.  The current policy 
to encourage patent applications may help to encourage some innovation but it has also come 
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with a significant number of paper patent applications, not patent innovation commercialization. 
This is common in electronics.  Paper patents are part of a strategy used to extend the monopoly 
of existing products by capturing the surrounding area and preventing others from using 
innovations that fall into that intellectual territory.  Paper patents are not put into practice.  These 
strategies are often ignored in economic analysis that focuses on trolls; but this too creates great 
inefficiency.  Cost and increased litigation arise as a consequence of such strategies.  Also, such 
strategies entail anti-competitive behavior.  While, anti-competition laws are beyond the scope of 
this work, the exclusion rights created by a patent may often limit competition.  
A significant assumption that law and economics analysts seem to make is that a patent 
owner intends to commercialize the patented invention.  Economists concede the deadweight 
costs due to a monopoly, but the cost of using a patent merely to exclude is often ignored as part 
of the economic analysis.
583
  Purposeful non-use is perfectly valid in the U.S.  Non-use is also 
valid in Canada and England, however, a patent misuse process exists to prevent abuses.  Even if 
patent misuse is pursued, the requirements are relatively narrow and may frustrate pursuers 
rather than encourage patent use.  Actually using a patented innovation is not so simple and use 
requirements or minimal thresholds can lead to remedy complications.  It is also very common 
not to use the innovation but to pursue only licensing opportunities.  Thus it seems that patent 
non-use and rent collection should also be considered as part of the economic analysis.  
The law and economics approach to patent remedy analysis may provide some interesting 
insight for patent policy development.  However, examining patent remedies with an eye towards 
justifying legal approaches through the lens of economics creates a distorted view that highlights 
certain elements but ignores others.  If one is to develop an economic analysis of patent 
remedies, then analysts should include all factors and not resort to short-cuts that ignore many 
significant elements.  Commentators should also indicate which factors could not be quantified 
or which factors were ignored for economic analysis when presenting their final findings.  
Finally, given all of the analysis based on economics, the theoretical approaches used by many 
analysts require support from empirical data.  
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The eBay v. MercExchange Decision 
One of the cases that caused an outrage over automatic injunctions upon finding 
infringement was the highly publicized Research in Motion (RIM) v. NTP case.
584
  The 
settlement was made under the threat of an injunction which would have shut down the entire 
Blackberry e-mail network in the U.S., crippling not only corporate messaging but also some 
government communications.  Ultimately, RIM paid over six hundred million dollars to clear all 
claims by NTP.   
Following closely on the heels of the RIM decision, was eBay v. MercExchange.  The 
eBay decision stemmed from another situation where a non-practicing entity, MercExchange, 
was suing eBay, a practicing entity, for infringement.  It is well known that eBay is the largest 
online auction site and a sizeable company.  An injunction against eBay would have potentially 
shut down the website, affecting millions of users.  The trial court refused to issue an injunction, 
while the appeals court said that injunctions were the standard remedy upon a finding of 
infringement.  The Federal Circuit Court issued an injunction order, leading eBay to appeal.  The 
Supreme Court agreed that an injunction is a standard remedy but reaffirmed that it is an 
equitable remedy which requires some analysis by trial courts before being granted.   Upon 
remand to the trial court, an injunction was not granted and only damages were awarded to 
MercExchange.  
The Supreme Court’s decision in eBay v. MercExchange had a significant impact on the 
debate as to whether patents deserve an absolute property right.
 585
  In recent times, U.S. courts 
have generally granted injunctions as a remedy for patent infringement, without considering the 
implications of the decision.  The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has generally supported an 
absolute property rights view.  However, in the eBay decision, the Supreme Court pointed trial 
courts away from precedents leaning towards an absolute property right and back to a 
discretionary standard based on the rules of equity.  Patents are still considered property, but 
eBay is significant because the court reaffirms that while an injunction is an appropriate property 
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remedy, such a remedy is nonetheless an equitable remedy.  The eBay opinion stated that courts 
should use a four factor test to determine whether a permanent injunction is warranted.  While 
the eBay factors have been mentioned earlier, it bears repeating here.  To receive an injunction, a 
plaintiff must show that: 1) it has suffered irreparable injury; 2) remedies available at law 
(money damages), are inadequate to compensate for the injury; 3) considering the balance of 
hardship between the plaintiff and the defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and 4) the 
public interest will not be “disserved” by a permanent injunction.  Since a permanent injunction 
is an equitable remedy such awards are made at the discretion of the court.
586
 Through the 
concurring opinions of Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy, the court indicated that there is a 
preference for awarding permanent injunction but that the right to exclude does not necessarily 
dictate that the remedy will follow that right.   Justice Roberts indicated that, for the purpose of 
decision consistency, courts should follow precedent; and, since patents are property, an 
injunction should still be the norm.  Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion supports a 
presumption against granting permanent injunctions to non-practicing entities, because even if a 
dispute involved property, a property remedy will not always be appropriate.  Justice Kennedy 
indicated that patent trolls are a sufficiently large problem in the United States that they 
warranted exceptional treatment by courts.   
Throughout the twentieth century, patents have, for the most part, been treated as if they 
were property.  Within the last thirty years there has been a dramatic increase in the number of 
patent filings in the U.S., Canada, and in England (this includes both direct filing through the 
United Kingdom’s Patent office and filings through the European Patent Office which come into 
force due to the United Kingdom being a contracting party to the European Patent Convention).  
When patent systems were originally developed the patent subject matter consisted of machines 
and processes to build machines.  More recently, there has been an increase in filings within new 
subject matter categories such as software, business method, bio-chemicals, and genes.
587
  With 
the increase in patentable subject matter, a patent owner’s compensation for infringement may 
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come in the form of money damages; but a property remedy in the form of an injunction is still 
considered the norm.   
The concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy indicates that patent trolls were a significant 
factor in his decision to recommend equitable considerations when awarding damages.  The 
increase in patent applications and patent awards has led to a trade in the patents themselves, 
rather than the inventions underlying the patent.  Furthermore, there has been an increase in 
transactions involving patents where the purpose of the transaction is to get licensing income or 
to obtain licensing income through a lawsuit.  This has led to the legitimate question as to 
whether an injunction should always be awarded upon finding infringement.  There is a further 
question regarding incentives that exist to encourage patent applications.   
The eBay v. MercExchange (eBay) decision caused concerns around the patent world 
because an injunction is a standard remedy in most countries.  As has been seen, Canada and 
England have denied injunctions only in the most exceptional situations.  While the legal 
precedents in both jurisdictions are firmly entrenched and there is a competent judiciary capable 
of understanding patent lawsuits, there was still a fear that, because of market demands and 
growing patent transactions, the courts would adopt a more flexible approach to damages in lieu 
of an injunction.  However, initial fears about diminished property rights and injunction denials 
have not come to fruition.   
The fallout from this case has been considerable debate about whether injunctions should 
be awarded when the patent holder was a non-practicing entity.  One side provided economic 
analysis to show that non-practicing entities would be overcompensated relative to their 
contribution if an injunction were granted.  The other side provided economic data to show that 
injunctions rarely overcompensate patent holders and denying injunctions to non-practicing 
entities would create a slippery slope towards compulsory licenses and working-requirements for 
patents.  There has been much discussion on the impact remedies can have towards evolving 
non-practice business activities.   
Liability Calculations and the Pros and Cons of a Liability Rule System 
A question raised by many commentators is whether a liability based system is superior 
to a property based system, especially if non-practice is an issue.  If liability rules are to be 
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effective, they must result in calculable awards by the courts, they must adequately compensate, 
and they must create a disincentive for infringement while creating an incentive for inventors.  In 
a pure liability system, the right to exclude would not be applicable.  Instead, the patent owner 
would be financially compensated for the infringement but the infringer could continue using the 
innovation.  However, this completely eliminates the property right preventing others from using 
the patented invention or the right not to use the invention at all.  This gives companies with 
great resources an enormous advantage over smaller companies with limited resources.  Well 
funded companies could just infringe if they had the means to pay.  The injunction could no 
longer be used as leverage in negotiations.  Also, small companies would have to chase large 
companies through the courts to receive compensation, making legal costs the biggest 
impediment to recovery for patent owners and those same costs as the largest source of leverage 
in negotiations. The leverage would only be powerful if profits from using the patented 
innovation were smaller than the potential legal costs or if those costs would sufficiently impact 
the infringer’s use or profits if legal fees were required.   
Liability based systems also seem to ignore the difficulty in making a party whole in 
certain situations.  It may not be possible to make a party whole when the economic fallout 
includes loss of market share, loss of goodwill, falling stock prices and financial losses related to 
the stock price, loss of convoyed sales, or even bankruptcy.  There are also other innumerable 
financial issues which may arise when a company is unable to sell a patented invention because 
an infringer is stealing sales.   Even with a financial infusion that could compensate for 
infringement losses, a company may never recover because of other business factors.  This also 
raises the question of whether a liability rule may end up destroying two companies.  The loss of 
sales due to infringement or loss of profits due to pricing may be so great that a patent-owning 
company may not be able to recover even with a damage award.  It is also possible that the 
damage award be so great that the infringer may not be able to survive paying damages.  These 
issues are far more significant for competing practicing entities and are not really an issue for 
NPEs. 
Blair and Cotter examined three types of infringement behavior in an attempt to 
accurately model infringement damages and determine whether courts could competently and 
accurately apply disgorgement calculations in the event of infringement. These examples are 
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briefly covered below.  Blair and Cotter show how infringement affects the profits of both the 
patent owner and the infringer.  While their examples all reflect the impact of infringement on 
practicing entities and not non-practicing entities, these examples are nonetheless significant 
because they show how patent owners are affected by infringement.  Their examples also show 
how disgorgement can actually undercompensate in certain situations.   
 The first behavior is known as Cournot behavior, where the patent owner and infringer 
compete as a result of an increased quantity of patented goods on the market.
588
  Short-term 
losses are the result of price erosion due to the increase in goods on the market, while over time 
losses result because of lost sales and price erosion.  
The second type of infringement behavior is known as Bertrand Behavior, where patentee 
and infringer compete on price.
589
 A lower price set by an infringer will result in lost sales by the 
patent holder.  Over time, the holder will be forced to lower price in order to compete and will 
lose both sales and profits due to lower pricing. 
Both these types of behavior result in lower profits than could be obtained if the patent 
owner were the sole patent user.   
Finally, Chamberlain behavior is a situation in which the parties do not compete but split 
sales between them.
590
 This results lost sales for the patent holder.  
These three models indicate that damages are calculable and that differences between 
actual profits and profits “but-for” the infringement can be determined.591  Calculations may be 
complicated, but courts in all three jurisdictions are capable of calculating damages based on 
these models.  In all three jurisdictions, losses due to price erosion are understood to be part of 
lost profit damage calculations. Courts are competent to determine damages due to price erosion, 
entitling the patentee to receive damages from sales it would have made at its original selling 
price but-for the infringement.
592
 Courts in all three jurisdictions are capable of handling burden 
shifting issues, such as price erosion losses.  The burden rests with the patentee, who must prove 
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that losses were due to price reductions because of competition from the infringer and no other 
factors.
593
   
These three models also indicate that profit disgorgement will only effectively 
compensate a practicing patent owner if the infringement fits the Chamberlain model.  A lost 
profit analysis or a reasonable royalty would be better suited to monetarily compensate the patent 
holder. Assuming there are no other considerations in selecting a remedy, the competing entity 
might better seek a lost-profits remedy which would more closely approach its actual losses.  
This would also meet the liability rule goal of compensation and would make the infringed party 
whole again by awarding the profits lost to infringement.  
Blair and Cotter indicate that an idealized reasonable royalty calculation would lead to a 
license agreement where 1) a patentee would not agree to a royalty less than the potential profits 
the inventor could make manufacturing the invention himself; and 2) the infringer would agree to 
a royalty that was no more than potential profits from using a non-infringing alternative.
594
  This 
calculation assumes that the patent owner is either a practicing entity or one contemplating 
practicing the innovation.  If a patentee can earn higher profits manufacturing the invention, then 
the patentee would not grant a license and this would result in a lost profits calculation, or a 
disgorgement calculation outside the U.S.  Under this reasoning, an NPE would not agree to a 
royalty less than the profits that could be made licensing the patent to others.  However, this 
would also require that a minimum royalty increase profits over, or in addition to, existing 
licensing royalties. The calculation assumes that the profit motivation is the reason for obtaining 
a patent.  However, as has been shown, there are a number of reasons to patent and a number of 
reasons which could increase royalty demands or lead to outright denials of licenses.  
As has been shown through the three models, the lost profits remedy will more accurately 
compensate the patent holder in most situations whereas disgorgement will likely 
undercompensate.  However, if lost profits and disgorgement cannot be calculated, a reasonable 
royalty calculation still exists to serve as a deterrent.
595
  In Canada - despite the shortfall shown 
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in two of the three models - strategic reasons, financial document exposure, and burdens of proof 
are the major reasons why a company might consider an accounting of profits.  The same reasons 
also apply in England.  Despite the models shown by Blair and Cotter, there is a perception that 
an accounting of profits will actually yield larger returns for the patent owner in both Canada and 
England.
596
 
These three models apply to practicing entities.  NPEs will suffer none of these losses 
because NPEs do not make profits from the sale of patented goods, or from innovations using the 
patent good, or from any practice of the patented good or process.  Disgorgement will likely 
result in a windfall for a patent owner.  Reasonable royalties are the method by which NPEs will 
receive compensation without unduly burdening the infringer.  This is also a method which will 
likely allow parties to present the least amount of information to the courts, to infringers, and 
potentially to the public.  In England infringing an NPE’s patent is treated as an improper 
infringer gain which can require disgorgement of lost royalties to the patent owner.   
The benefit of relying on a liability rule is that courts can act to more fairly distribute 
damages, eliminating the need to remove goods from the marketplace, while still compensating a 
licensor.  If damage awards are supposed to compensate the infringed party and not necessarily 
to punish the infringer, then liability rules remove personal motivation which would be present if 
an injunction were granted.  It also creates a system where infringement may be tolerated in 
exchange for payments.  This may amount to the dreaded compulsory license, but it is hard to 
argue that this is necessarily unfair since the licensor is primarily seeking monetary 
compensation.  The difference would be between a court determined sum of money and a 
negotiated sum of money.  (The amount may actually be more or less than the court award).  The 
public may benefit because products already available on the market will remain on the market 
after court proceedings have concluded.  This would not be so in a property system.   
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While liability rules cover compensation for patent infringement, a difficulty arises 
because there is really nothing to prevent further or continued infringement without an 
injunction, other penalties, or oversight.  The inventor would not have the option of using an 
injunction as leverage in negotiations prior to litigation.  Currently, the motivation to come to an 
agreement exists because of the double leverage of litigation costs and a potential injunction.  
Avoiding the cost of litigation would be a potential reason for an infringer to agree to a 
negotiated license but the threat of an injunction would be a missing compulsion.  A further 
drawback to a liability rule system is that this could encourage inventors to suppress innovations 
and not make patent applications until there is marketing evidence of commercial viability.  
Also, innovations that would compete with an inventor’s existing products would likely also be 
suppressed rather than patented because there would be no way to prevent infringement.  
Disgorging Profits - Concerns 
Disgorging profits stems from the legal theory that ill-gotten profits attributable to the 
infringement are held in trust for the patentee.  Ordinarily, this is a remedy associated with 
violations of tangible property rights.  If intellectual property and tangible property are the same 
when it comes to remedies, it would seem to follow that an award of infringer profits should be 
given to the patent holder.  An award of infringer profits can still be granted to a wronged party 
in Canada and England and courts in both jurisdictions feel comfortable making these decisions. 
Awarding the infringer’s profits to the patent holder was rejected by U.S. courts.597   
Calculation complexity, the time-consuming nature of the award process, the expense of 
obtaining valid accounting data for the calculations, and the belief that disgorgement amounted 
to a windfall for the patent owner were all considerations.  These concerns are still valid and are 
factors which regularly raise questions about the validity of profit awards in Canada and 
England. 
A drawback to allowing an accounting of profits is that estimates are legally acceptable in 
determining profits and adequate compensation based on those profits.   This not only creates a 
great uncertainty for parties in a dispute but can lead to awards that will overcompensate or 
undercompensate parties.  From a practical standpoint, an accounting can end up being a gamble 
for the parties.  A patent owner that elects for an accounting of profits may end up with nothing; 
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or the owner may end up with all of the infringer’s profits; or he may even end up with an award 
in between the actual profits and no profits.  Furthermore, Blair and Cotter have shown that 
under-compensation is often likely when infringer profits are the award.   
Some of the concerns about improper calculations and estimates may be allayed due to 
the existence of specialized courts in the United Kingdom.  England’s patent courts are capable 
of handling complex disputes.  Such courts have some familiarity with accounting principles and 
have the capability of dealing with complex financial records.  Also, because these trial courts 
have such specific jurisdiction, judges in these courts devote all their energy to patent 
infringement issues.  
While Canada does not have such specialized courts, patent disputes are most often 
handled by federal trial courts with limited subject matter jurisdiction.
598
  Federal courts 
regularly handle patent disputes and are thus capable of managing complex technological and 
financial information presented to the courts.  Furthermore, Canadian patent trials are usually 
bifurcated into infringement disputes and damage disputes.  If the parties do not come to an 
agreement after infringement is resolved, damage awards fall to a tribunal dedicated to analyzing 
damages.  In theory, an experienced patent arbiter decides infringement damage awards or 
disgorgement.  The presence of specialized tribunals designed to assess the financial information 
of the parties should work towards allaying some of the fears that the calculations will be wildly 
speculative.   
A further concern about disgorging profits is the potential for disproportionate damage 
awards where NPEs are concerned.  Given how uncertain patent boundaries are, even a diligent 
party may fail to notice that the party’s actions may infringe on an existing patent.  The potential 
exists for an entity which sits on its patent to reap all of an infringer’s profits.  Requiring an 
infringer to disgorge all profits creates a very severe penalty for the infringer and will likely 
increase the cost of a patent search before commencing any future technological endeavors.   
Canadian courts have indicated wariness about granting an accounting of profits to NPEs.  
In extreme cases an NPE may be able to make a compelling argument to receive all of an 
infringer’s profits.  Offsetting some of the concerns is that Canadian courts have made choosing 
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an accounting of profits potentially risky because of the decision in Schmeiser v. Monsanto.  
Courts can limit the remedy through a comparison of profits made using the patented product to 
potential profits made using a non-infringing alternative.  Thus even if an NPE is allowed to 
choose an accounting of profits, its potential award may depend on the presence of non-
infringing alternatives.  It should also be remembered that an accounting of profits is an equitable 
remedy, leaving courts with discretion over whether to grant the award. 
In England, there appears to be no official limitation to awarding an account for profits to 
an NPE. However, since it, too, is an equitable remedy, courts have discretion as to whether to 
allow a patent holder to elect it. Furthermore, an accounting of profits is considered an extreme 
remedy
599
, but an award of a reasonable royalty may still flow from an account of profits through 
a loss of royalty rather than a loss of profits.  
Because an account of profits is an equitable remedy, the various equity maxims should 
apply.  However, in Canada, a court recently stated that since an election for an accounting of 
profits is statutorily available, the maxims of equity need not apply to the court’s discretion on 
whether to allow a party to elect.
600
 This leaves a great deal of power in the hands of the judges 
to decide whether or not to agree to an election for an accounting.  Nonetheless, it is still 
considered an equitable remedy and equitable results are part of the court’s discretion.   
There are several arguments which fall on either side of the accounting of profit 
argument.  An absolute property view awards the infringer’s profits under a theory that gains 
made illegally by using the property of another are really the rightful profits of the infringed 
party.  The absolute property view would seem to allow this award even for NPEs.  Courts 
consider non-practice when deciding whether to allow a patent owner to claim infringer profits.  
But unlike lost profits, there is no need to show that the patent owner could have made the 
infringer’s profits but for the infringement.  An absolute property argument would allow 
infringer profits to be collected by a non-practicing patent owner, since these profits were ill-
gotten gains from improper property use.   
                                                          
599
 James Edelman, The Measure of Restitution and the Future of Restitutionary Damages, (26 April 2010)  (the 
remedy will generally involve some kind of wrongdoing). 
600
 Beloit Canada Ltd. v. Valmet-Dominion Inc., [1997] 3 F.C. 497 (C.A.) paras. 116-17. 
147 
 
While an accounting of profits may not cover losses by a practicing entity, an NPE will 
suffer no actual losses from diminished sales or price lowering, as described by Blair and Cotter.  
The non-practicing entity will only have royalty losses as a result of these sales.  Since current 
patent policy in Canada, England, and the U.S. is to compensate and not to punish, this would 
make disgorgement an unduly harsh remedy and a windfall for licensing companies or patent 
trolls, since these entities are looking for royalty payments.  This remedy would be even more 
extreme if an infringer developed the invention independently of the patent and then faced a 
claim for disgorgement by an NPE.   
A final concern about disgorgement is apportionment.  When a patented item is a small 
part of the infringer’s innovation, determining what part of profits are the result of the infringing 
item is a complex process.  Estimates are common, and commentators seeking accurate or exact 
calculations will have issues with calculation assumptions and methods.  
Issues with Royalty Calculations 
The willing licensor/licensee assumption or hypothetical negotiation and the 25% rule 
pose problems for determining an accurate royalty rate.  The first issue is that a valid patent 
exists to determine this rate, whereas a real negotiation would assume uncertain patent validity 
and infringement.
601
  The second issue is that courts, to determine the royalty rate, may end up 
using or being influenced by events that occur after infringement, thereby removing further 
uncertainty which would exist in a real negotiation.
602
  Both issues would seem to inflate the 
royalty rate beyond an actual negotiated royalty.  Removing uncertainty would also appear to 
favor the patent owner, since patent uncertainty is expected as part of any licensing agreement.    
While a reasonable royalty may leave the infringed party no worse off than before the 
infringement, infringers still face a significant penalty because of litigation costs and the general 
coupling of an injunction with a royalty payment for infringement.
603
  The injunction becomes a 
greater factor when the injunction is wielded by an NPE to obtain royalties that are likely in 
excess of those awarded by the court.   
In the U.S. each party pays its own court costs and lawyer’s fees.  However, an inflated 
royalty may actually off-set some of the expense of enforcing a patent.  If a royalty is actually 
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inflated because uncertainty is eliminated, infringers in Canadian or English courts may face a 
significant burden, since the loser pays most or all of the costs (although in practice, this will 
likely be significantly less than the total legal costs).
604
   
A third issue with the reasonable royalty calculation is that a willing licensor and licensee 
may not actually reach an agreement, making the royalty calculation a substitute for lost profits 
of an NPE.
605
  All three jurisdictions assume that the parties would willingly come to an 
agreement at the time of infringement.     
A final issue is determining royalty rates when the patented innovation is merely a part of 
a product versus royalty rates when the patented innovation is the reason for market demand.  In 
the former situation apportionment is used to determine the royalty rates while in the latter 
situation, an entire market calculation is used to determine rates.
606
  Apportionment can become 
very complicated when the patented component is but a small part of the complete product and is 
not necessarily a significant factor in driving market demand.  
Despite the fact that royalty calculations are neither easily calculable nor necessarily an 
accurate reflection of a non-adjudicated negotiation, they meet the legal requirement that the 
royalty be reasonable and that the royalty attempts to compensate rather than punish.  The 
attempt is what is significant and a perfect remedy is not necessary.  The lack of perfection in 
these calculations is still within the legal goals of the remedies and part of the three approaches 
taken by the courts towards compensation.   
Strong Property Rights 
There are reasons why the current system maintains property remedies when dealing with 
patents.  A significant reason is that they can be a good solution to a problem and should not be 
discounted.  Strong property rights, and thus injunctions, encourage private solutions through 
negotiations between the parties rather than public solutions created by the courts or 
governments.  All three jurisdictions under examination support free-market systems.  Such 
systems encourage negotiations between disputing parties and discourage government 
intervention.  There is clearly a place for property remedies.   
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In a system where the patent owner and infringer are competitors, the patent system goals 
of increased innovation and public access to the innovation would still be maintained.  If the 
patent owner and the infringer are competing entities, an injunction may be suited to allow the 
patent owner to prevent competition in its effort to market the innovation to the public.  Any 
compensation that would come in the form of disgorgement would be justified since these would 
be the profits made using the property of the patent owner, and would, thus, be profits which 
should belong to the patent owner.  Disgorgement is a relatively large penalty and is intended to 
make the infringer wary of infringing on the technologies of its competitors.  In both Canada and 
the U.K. disgorgement is not considered part of the damages remedy.  Despite the unavailability 
of disgorgement as a remedy in the U.S., injunctions are often awarded in conjunction with 
damages in all three jurisdictions.  However, if the focus of property remedies remains on the 
injunction, since it is common to all three jurisdictions, the remedy will not remove the 
innovative product from the marketplace.  Even if the infringer is prevented from using the 
patent innovation, the patent owner will still practice the innovation and produce goods for the 
marketplace (although the patent holder may be less efficient or less able to produce in the 
volumes demanded).  
An injunction award may actually increase public access because an infringer will be 
willing to negotiate to still be allowed to use the patented innovation; and the patent owner, for 
additional profits, may allow use of the innovation.  Lemley and Shapiro have illustrated how 
detrimental market absence can be for a company facing an injunction.
607
  The infringer can 
negotiate to maintain market share that it has already established or it can negotiate alternate uses 
which the patent owner may allow for a royalty payment.   
There is one school of thought that believes that without a right to injunctive relief, a 
patent will be worth considerably less.  Robert Merges has stated that because of the loss of 
value, the incentive to invent would not only be diminished but might disappear.
608
  Using 
injunctive relief as a bargaining chip in negotiations may sometimes lead to overcompensation 
when compared to the actual worth of the patents; but court-imposed, money damage systems 
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will likely undercompensate inventors, thereby removing the incentive to innovate.
609
  This 
reasoning only focuses on the patent goal of encouraging innovation.  Furthermore, a slippery 
slope argument does not lend itself to a moderate solution but encourages a solution embracing 
one of the extreme situations proposed.  The patent is also but one incentive to innovate.  Prior to 
patent protection, people were still innovating and it is likely that alternative innovation 
strategies will also arise if an injunction disappears.   
From a cost/benefit standpoint, Landes and Posner indicate that it is not clear whether 
patent protection in fact creates a net benefit.  They recognize that there are economic factors 
which require some form of protection.  While they provide reasons that support creating 
property rights in inventions, they also indicate that propertization creates significant social 
costs.
610
  Economic dead-weight is one significant social cost.  A second cost is the arbitrariness 
of the patent markup, especially for a successful product.  A patentee’s monopoly markup is 
influenced by the degree of patent protection but has no bearing on the actual fixed costs 
incurred in making the invention.  Potentially, a patentee will be able to charge higher prices, 
relative to marginal cost, resulting in profits that will be significantly higher than the costs 
incurred in making the invention.  This will likely be the case for a particularly successful 
innovation.  Property rights will restrict access to the patented invention more than is actually 
necessary to create incentives.  Landes and Posner also point out that such circumstances will 
create an incentive towards rent-seeking behavior because of the windfalls arising out of over 
protection and monopolistic behavior. 
611
  They also believe there is a disincentive to 
commercialize the patented innovation and a greater incentive to license.
612
   
The rise of patent trolls or other non-practicing entities is a direct result of the incentive 
created by strong property rules.  Amy Landers uses the term “liquid patent” for patents that are 
being treated as assets.  Liquid patents are patents that are being traded as commodities, not 
agreements which provide protections as a reward for innovation and the subsequent 
commercialization of the innovation.  The statutes in all three jurisdictions will allow a non-
practicing entity, just like a practicing entity, to seek an injunction.  These strong property rights 
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encourage innovation; but patent accumulation, rather than commercializing innovations, has 
been the result of these policies.  A focus on innovation has increased the number of patent 
applications and patents granted, but there is less of an incentive to market innovations.
613
  
Through an injunction grant, a non-practicing entity may exercise the right to exclude a patent 
infringer from practicing the innovation.  The injunction creates an incentive to obtain a patent 
but it does not necessarily provide an incentive to take on the risk of marketing the innovation.  It 
is cheaper and potentially more profitable to wait for someone to infringe the patent.  The social 
cost in this situation could be as high as removing the innovation from the marketplace.  
However, while a non-practicing entity will attempt to seek as high a rent as possible, it is not 
likely that it will demand rent that is so high as to have the infringer shut down production.   
Severin De Wit points out that patents are actually illiquid assets since they are not easily 
tradable and inventors generally have to discover markets for these assets.
614
  It is for this reason 
that trolls and other NPEs become important.  Such companies actually create markets in their 
search for patents which can be used in their business model.  However, NPEs are not the only 
bodies which create markets.  While patents are not easily tradable, there is an increase in patent 
auctions, at least in the U.S.
615
  Furthermore, while patents may not be easily tradable, their trade 
has increased, particularly for the rights that come with patents rather than for the underlying 
innovations.    
While property protection plays a role in fostering progress and invention, over-strong 
protection could stunt innovation which is dependent on the cumulative nature of knowledge.
616
  
Since exclusion power belongs to the patent holder, a broad application of this power can be 
used to prevent patented technologies from being commercialized.  These strong rights might 
also prevent optimal use of IP resources because of the high transaction costs in obtaining 
licenses.
617
  In Coase’s transaction theorem, if the transaction costs are zero, property rights 
allocations will eventually be transferred “to their highest-value use through private bargains.”618  
However, if transaction costs are greater than zero, the costs may prevent property from being 
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transferred for its highest price and greatest use.  Transaction costs can involve elements such as 
negotiation time and effort, contract costs, appraisals, and boundary surveys.  These costs can 
often be very high and will result in less efficient or non-existent property transfer and use. If the 
purchaser finds property that may be ideal for her purposes, transactions costs may be so high 
that the purchaser will seek less ideal property or not purchase any property at all.  
Coase’s theorem was initially applied to physical property but it can be applied to patent 
transactions where it is certain that either a patent right exists or does not exist.  However, 
applying the theorem to intellectual property rights creates a problem because of a patent’s 
intangible nature.  It is the intangible nature of patents which makes infringement detection 
difficult because infringement, boundaries, and patent validity are often unclear or in dispute. 
The value of prior patented creations on a current invention and the uncertainty over whether an 
independently created invention infringes a previous one are further issues.  Patent valuation is 
also complicated as patented works can be cumulative and even interdependent.  Neither 
strategic behavior nor the use of blocking patents is part of the Coasian consideration. All these 
complications indicate high transaction costs which will prevent efficient transactions.
619
 
The Calabresi/Melamed model expanded on Coase’s theorem and may apply to patents.  
The Calabresi/Melamed model advocates property rules as a default.  However, if there are many 
parties involved in a property transaction or the transaction is particularly complicated, raising 
transaction costs, a liability rule may be better suited.  Initially, a property rule would seem to 
apply to patents because there are two parties to a transaction, transaction costs affect the two 
parties, and courts have a difficult time properly determining the value of the patented invention 
because of the complexity of the patented invention and specific market conditions.
620
   
Furthermore, the property rule allows individual parties to negotiate in coming to a deal.  The 
parties are the most knowledgeable about their property and they can structure a deal that is best 
suited to the two parties.  However, transaction costs are not necessarily clear and there are often 
situations where multiple parties are involved in patent transactions (non-exclusive licensing, 
industry pools, and patents related to standards).  Even in negotiations between two parties, 
patent licensing can be complicated, often tying in to other patents held by the parties or other 
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goods being sold.  The transaction cost is increased if parties disagree on the extent of patent 
boundaries or whether there is infringement.  Disputes that involve the courts greatly increase the 
transaction costs.  When these transaction costs become high, it may be better to adopt a liability 
rule.  However, once the patent validity, boundaries, and infringement are made clear, the 
transaction costs have been spent and further negotiations should theoretically be simple enough 
to entail a property rule.  Common opinion holds that the parties to a patent transaction are best 
suited to accurately value the technology while courts are not well suited to determine the value 
of complex, intellectual property transactions.
621
  This would indicate that courts should always 
grant an injunction and then let the parties negotiate a settlement.  However, if transaction costs 
are taken into account because of unclear boundaries, validity, and infringement disputes, it 
would seem to indicate that a liability rule is better suited than a property rule.  Thus, the 
Melamed/Calabresi rule seems to indicate that property rules should apply if the parties do not 
have to resort to the courts to determine boundaries, infringement, and validity; but a liability 
transaction may be better if the courts have to get involved.  The economic analysis becomes 
even more complicated when multiple parties are involves in disputes, leading to the conclusion 
that perhaps a liability rule would be better suited and property rules should only apply in limited 
situations. 
There is a strong belief that the presence of strong property rights will actually facilitate 
patent transactions rather than preventing them because private parties will force institutional 
changes to lower transaction costs.
622
  Others argue that the pervasive transaction costs should 
lead to a use of liability rules and even of compulsory licenses.
623
  Robert Merges has argued that 
the current presence of high transaction costs in the emerging technological industry should not 
be changed through government intervention but should be allowed, for the time being, to 
resolve high transaction costs through private transactions.
624
  Strong property rules should 
continue even in the face of high transaction costs because these property rules have led private 
contractors to establish private liability rules through creation of patent pools.  High tech 
companies have had some moderate success in creating successful patent pools.  Standards 
organizations have also started creating patent pools in an effort to create a standard and to 
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provide user companies with access to patents for a reasonable royalty.  It is generally believed 
that statutory liability rules enforced by courts lack the flexibility of private institutions and 
institutional agreements, such as patent pools.  This reasoning applies to all 3 jurisdictions, given 
the power of the courts.   
There is some merit in applying property rules to intellectual property.  An injunction 
award or the threat of an injunction encourages disputing parties to negotiate a solution rather 
than have a court decide for them.  A result is that those parties with the most information and 
the most understanding of the issues being negotiated can custom tailor a solution to their needs.  
A court imposed solution may be fair, but it may also favor one of the parties, or it may alienate 
both parties. The uncertainty about transaction costs related to patents also indicates that liability 
rules may be necessary to clear disagreements.  There is further concern that a property rule, 
particularly the threat of enforcing an injunction, can provide the patent holder with a great deal 
of bargaining power.  A non-practicing entity could end up with a windfall settlement from the 
infringer.  This is especially true for a patented component that is but a small part of a complex 
device.   
Compensation, the Holdup, Royalty Stacking and Non-Practicing Entities – The 
Economic Debate 
There is a school of thought led by Lemley and Shapiro that claims that injunctive relief 
leads to a holdup and overcompensation.  A patent holdup occurs when a patentee uses an 
injunction award or the threat of injunction to gain exorbitant royalties, well in excess of the 
value of the invention, from an infringer who is heavily invested in the use of the patented 
technology.
625
  It is a form of blackmail that results in an economically inefficient transaction.  If 
a court awards an injunction upon finding infringement and patent validity, the patentee’s 
bargaining position is extremely strong.  The patentee can approach negotiations with the 
infringer knowing that, if negotiations between them fail, the infringer must stop using the 
patented innovation.
626
  Thus the infringer will have little choice but to agree to the royalty 
demands of the patentee unless the infringer decides to leave the market to redesign the product 
or the process to avoid infringement or decides to wait until the patent term expires.  For an 
infringer heavily invested in using the patented technology, the prospect of having to stop using 
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it is costly.
627
  Thus the infringer will likely pay more than the actual value of the patent in order 
to keep using the innovation. 
Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro developed a benchmark for licensing royalties to 
determine whether post injunction negotiations and court awards are excessive compared to pre-
litigation negotiations.  U.S. law deems that a reasonable royalty should be the minimum damage 
award and that damages should be based on a hypothetical negotiation by a willing licensor and 
licensee at the time of infringement.
628
  Their benchmark royalty rate is an attempt to take into 
account the patent infringement and validity uncertainty that a hypothetical licensor and licensee 
face in coming to a royalty agreement.  They found that negotiations prior to litigation 
incorporate outcome uncertainty as part of the patent’s valuation, resulting in a rate proportional 
to the patent strength.  Since patent validity and infringement prior to litigation are uncertain, 
royalties would be considerably lower than those negotiated with a clearly determined patent 
validity and infringement outcome.  
When the infringer gambles on winning in court without redesign and loses, the infringer 
faces costs for redesign, plus lost sales due to market absence or the cost of meeting the patent 
owner’s post-verdict royalty demands.  Lemley and Shapiro calculated that the royalty rate in 
this situation will be considerably higher than the benchmark rate.  If the infringer chooses to 
redesign during litigation, the infringer not only incurs the litigation costs but the redesign costs.  
In situations where the patented invention is merely cosmetic or is not a significant sales driver, 
all royalty above the benchmark rate can be considered a holdup and makes no economic 
contribution.  
Lemley and Shapiro have defined royalty stacking as the situation where the components 
or manufacturing methods of a company’s single product are covered by several patents, leading 
to multiple royalty payments to multiple parties.
629
  Royalty payments to multiple licensors cut 
into the licensee’s profit margins and have a trickle-down effect in raising the cost of 
downstream goods.   Royalty stacking may also result in a net social detriment because price 
increases for downstream products lower demand as well as output, resulting in larger economic 
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deadweight losses.
630
  Such royalty stacking effects can be seen with electronic devices and 
complex technologies that involve many components.   
Since reasonable royalty calculations in the U.S. are supposed to be based on 
hypothetical negotiations at the time of the infringement, Lemley and Shapiro theorize that a 
court’s damage award is higher than the benchmark royalty. They support their theory by noting 
that a considerable amount of risk and uncertainty, present in a real negotiation, are not present 
when a court actually calculates reasonable royalty damages.  Even if a court were to be able to 
ignore its validity and infringement finding, the precedential damage findings, expert testimony, 
and court calculation capability limitations have skewed royalties upward.
631
  A fourth factor to 
consider is the presence of juries in U.S. patent infringement and damages trials.  Juries are 
believed to be more likely to award high damage awards rather than a judge or damages expert.  
This suggests that court awards are also in excess of the benchmark rate. 
Infringement can result from an overt act to use a patented technology or it can result 
from completely independent development.  Patent infringement is a strict liability wrong, 
because knowledge of infringement is not a factor in determining whether there is infringement.  
The point in a product’s development timeline is also a significant factor in establishing the 
strength of a patentee’s bargaining position.  The threat of an injunction early in product 
development will have little effect, as the infringer can design around the patented invention.  
However, once the product is developed and on sale, the threat of an injunction can be extremely 
effective due to the potential cost of production shutdown and the cost of designing around the 
patented invention.  These circumstances clearly make it more profitable for a patentee to engage 
in strategic behavior, waiting until an infringer is already in production before a patentee notifies 
the infringer. 
632
  This creates a holdup situation because of the time and expense invested in 
using the allegedly infringing technology.  Such practices are commonly used by patent trolls.  If 
there are multiple patents covering the invention, this will lead to a royalty stacking situation. 
This imposes costs on the infringer that are disproportionate to the actual value of the patented 
inventions.  These increased costs are ultimately borne by consumers.   
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The solution proposed by Lemley and Shapiro is to have courts exercise their 
discretionary powers to deny injunctive relief for potential trolls in order to prevent a holdup.  
Licensing negotiations should be conducted with the threat of a potential grant of a compulsory 
license rather than an injunction.  This solution has essentially been described in the eBay 
decision in Justice Kennedy’s opinion.  
The Debate 
Scholars such as John M. Golden and J. Gregory Sidak have indicated that the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. was influenced by Lemley and 
Shapiro’s holdup rhetoric. Golden and Sidak are very critical of Lemley and Shapiro’s article 
and the court decision.   
Golden states that as a result of the eBay decision, trial courts have begun to deny 
injunctive relief, as a rule, to a class of patent holders.  He questions whether the holdup actually 
exists and he examines the impact of denying injunctive relief to NPEs who are not trolls.  
Golden points out that the vague definition of a patent troll is broad enough to cover small 
inventors, universities, start-up firms, research oriented firms, and patent holding companies.
633
  
It is likely that these companies will be treated as patent trolls by the courts.  
Golden has stated that there are three conclusions which can be made as part of an actual 
bargaining process: 1) uncertainty related to the potential value of court damages, the potential 
injunction threat, and potential litigation costs may lead to a settlement substantially larger than 
the value of the patented invention’s contribution; 2) uncertainty about damages, court costs, 
resource limitation, and “information asymmetries" may result in a settlement for much less than 
the value of the patented invention’s contribution; and 3) litigation costs may become a greater 
consideration when the chances of showing infringement are low.
634
   
From the perspective of the infringer, if the cost of a license is less than the cost of going 
to court and the cost of potential damages and an injunction, the infringer will pay for a 
license.
635
  Since a significant portion of the litigation costs are attributed to discovery in U.S. 
litigation proceedings, the probability of a court finding infringement may be less of a factor in 
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the infringer’s decision to agree to a license than the discovery costs.636  In essence, it becomes a 
nuisance settlement.   
Golden is critical of the benchmark calculation because a reasonable royalty is supposed 
to be the “floor” for damages in the U.S., while the benchmark derived by Lemley and Shapiro 
would amount to a royalty ceiling.
637
  Furthermore, royalty calculations are highly speculative 
and apportioned damage values to match the contribution of the patented invention create further 
complications. Courts can use estimates but these may be far removed from the market-value of 
the royalty rate.
638
   
Golden also illustrates that Lemley and Shapiro’s economic model has flaws, because 
several other factors were not considered, especially ones that would have a downward effect on 
negotiated royalty rates.  When parties begin the bargaining process information asymmetries 
result in risks for both sides. Infringers face the prospect of litigation costs, redesign, damages, 
and a potential injunction while patentees face litigation costs, uncertain damage awards, 
potential patent invalidity, and potential for an ineffective injunction due to re-design.
639
  
Potential litigation costs become a bigger threat or nuisance for infringers than an injunction if 
the patent is weak or easily designed around.
640
  If the patent is a strong one, the holdup situation 
may occur but there are several reasons why the number of holdup situations will be limited.
641
 
The patent holder also faces high litigation costs, and since it is a long process it gives the 
infringer time to redesign the product.
642
  A successful redesign before the end of litigation 
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nullifies the threat of an injunction as a bargaining tool.
643
  It is also likely that infringers will 
have a greater information advantage than patentees. 
644
  Finally, there are other business factors 
that can limit the patent holder’s ability to pursue litigation.645  These reasons show that patentee 
under-compensation is a likely possibility even with the power of an injunction.
646
   
Golden criticizes Lemley and Shapiro’s benchmark calculation because: 1) their royalty 
calculation takes into account bargaining skill, which has no relation to invention worth; 2) 
marginal per-unit value is a calculable value nullified by a redesign; 3) patent term length is 
neglected; 4) litigation costs are ignored; 5) their assumption that patentees are likely to have 
better financial data about infringer redesign costs, infringer customer desires, and profit margin 
for the infringing invention; and 6) it ignores the impact of a potential protracted litigation on the 
patentee’s willingness to settle.  All these factors lead to a benchmark which is likely to 
undercompensate holders, making a reasonable royalty award by courts a ceiling rather than as a 
floor required by U.S. law.
647
  Courts often use estimates, making it unlikely that courts can 
easily determine an accurate marginal per-unit value, essential in determining the benchmark rate 
as a damage award.
648
   
Injunctive relief has historically been a remedy in patent law.  Courts, politicians, and 
scholars should not be too swift in removing the injunctions as a remedy for patents or in shifting 
from a presumption for injunctive relief to a presumption against.
649
  David Vaver has suggested 
that removing the presumption for injunctive relief does not necessarily entail a presumption 
against injunctive relief and that courts may possibly make decisions with no presumption at all, 
as proposed by eBay.  Permanent injunctions can not only prevent patent holders from being 
under-compensated but also provide a social benefit by encouraging private settlements between 
parties rather than forcing settlements in court.
650
  A liability based system would actually be 
meaningless because without an injunction there would be nothing to compel an infringer to 
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negotiate a royalty.
651
  This would move royalty negotiations to the courts rather than between 
the parties.  It would also potentially create a downward spiral for royalty values since negotiated 
royalties would become rare, leaving a limited basis for comparison and leaving market value of 
an award as a cap.
652
  Golden theorizes that if court awards were greater than market value, the 
infringer would stop using the patented invention; if court awards were less than the market 
value of the invention infringers would resort to the courts.  Market value would act as a cap, 
limiting court awards and depressing royalties.
653
  This theory is largely based on the U.S. 
perspective where damage awards are to be no less than a reasonable royalty.  In Canada and the 
U.K., a market-based royalty may be less of a floor and more of a “median fair-value” but 
Golden’s reasoning would still depress this value, theoretically lowing patent value.  This view 
appears quite alarmist and presumes that courts are so tied down with precedent that they will not 
be able to make a case-by-case decision.  Furthermore, if damages were created to not just 
compensate but also to penalize for “bad behavior” then damages could fill the void from 
remedies.  The downward spiral proposed by commentators like Golden, presumes that a liability 
based system would not be changed to compensate for the lack of an injunction.  
If a presumption against awarding injunctions is put in place for only certain patent 
holders that would essentially create a “working requirement” for patent owners if they want to 
receive injunctive relief.  This creates a discriminatory environment that essentially allows courts 
to award compulsory licenses.
654
  Patent holders who directly compete with the infringer or 
holders who exclusively licensed their inventions to the infringer’s competitor would get the 
benefit of injunctive relief, while a holder who did neither would have to accept a compulsory 
license.
655
  However, the statutes in each jurisdiction do not necessarily require courts to treat all 
patent holders equally.  In light of Lemley and Shapiro’s suggestion that negotiations with NPEs 
should take place under the threat of a compulsory license rather than an injunction, 
commentators argue that there would be no incentive for infringer to bargain in good faith.
656
  
However, the cost of litigation, as well as the protracted nature of a patent trial and the patent 
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uncertainty that trial creates, may actually be a sufficient threat to compel negotiations.  It may 
also be possible to award additional damages or to even award punitive damages for infringers 
who do not bargain in good faith.  
Golden believes that the concern over combating patent trolls and other NPEs may be 
overblown.
657
  While it is a concern that NPEs might obtain high royalties, many firms hold 
patent portfolios and can often create private settlements through the threat of countersuit against 
noncompeting entities.
658
  Small research and development firms would also suffer if there were 
presumptions against injunctions since a common business practice is to license patented 
inventions until sufficient funds can be accumulated to start production or to use the patents as 
leverage to enter a market.
659
  The lack of an injunction as leverage may force R&D firms to use 
the courts to determine royalties and face the downward spiral of royalties.  Large companies, 
who are the targets of trolls, are established companies capable of fending for themselves.
660
  
Large companies likely do not need the protection that a presumption against royalties might 
grant them.  
Lemley and Shapiro countered criticism from John Golden by noting that their 
benchmark calculation may not be applicable in all situations, but nonetheless several studies 
show that patentees are overcompensated when a holdup occurs.
661
  Holdups are most likely to 
occur between a non-practicing patent owner and an infringing practicing firm.  Furthermore, 
they point out that overcompensation is particularly high in situations where a firm 
independently develops an invention without knowing it was patented, resulting in a skewed 
social contribution by the patentee.
662
 
In a further criticism of Lemley’s and Shapiro’s views on the holdup, J. Gregory Sidak 
points out that even if from an economic standpoint overcompensation is undesirable, the U.S. 
Supreme Court accepts that holdups occur and that a monopolist can charge as high a price as the 
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monopolist wants.
663
  Courts have noted the powerful impact of an injunction on negotiations 
and the potential for a holdup.  However, empirical studies show that holdups and royalty 
stacking are less of a problem in practice.
664
  While holdup potential may be more severe for 
weak patents, it is odd to argue that valid patents are subject to overcharge, since there is no 
requirement for a patentee to charge only a reasonable royalty.
665
  U.S. courts are only required 
to award no less than a reasonable royalty but patent owners can ask for whatever price they 
choose.  It is rare that a non-practicing entity will be able actually get any price demanded. 
Market factors will compel an infringer to stop negotiations and seek alternatives if the patent 
holder demands too high a price, with such a situation benefitting neither party.  Even if 
negotiations take place under an injunction, the royalty may be higher than fair market value but 
a rational patent holder will ideally seek compensation that will be high enough so that the 
infringer can continue production and yet pay.  
Sidak argues that performing a real option analysis of infringement indicates that weaker 
patent protection will lower investment into further research and development and limit 
innovation.
666
  The patent holder has a real option (the right to do something but not necessarily 
the obligation) once the patentee has sunk costs into an uncertain technology; while this option is 
also conferred on the infringer freely in the absence of injunctions.
667
  Thus infringers have the 
advantages of copying a patented invention without the burden of sunk costs of research and 
development.
668
 If an inventor cannot recover sunk costs, this will increase the risk for investors, 
making investment more costly for patentees and limiting research and development.
669
 
The option indicates the infringer and the patentee have an incentive to wait and see 
whether further investment in the patented technology is desirable.
670
  There is an advantage if 
the cost of production and marketing is delayed until the technology can be determined to have 
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commercial acceptance.  Also, by not being first into the marketplace the potential exists to take 
advantage of mistakes made by first marketers.  
Sidak further criticizes the Lemley and Shapiro model because it only examines factors 
that inflate royalties but ignores strong deflationary factors.
671
 The model not only has 
inflationary flaws but actually indicates a downward bias in its benchmark for reasonable 
royalties.
672
  Part of the downward bias results from not recognizing the patent holder’s sunk 
costs in developing the invention, and by not recognizing the holder’s incentive for potential 
future investment.
673
   
Under the real option analysis of patents, Sidak estimated that an investment return 
should be above 200% of the sunk costs in order to recover those costs. 
674
  Investing in any 
patent creates uncertainty about whether or not there will be an adequate investment return or 
any return at all.
675
  By delaying production investment the patentee and infringer can test the 
market.
676
  Infringement limits investment returns to recover sunk costs and limits incentive for 
further investment into R&D.
677
  Also, even if an invention will be successful, a patent holder 
will make less of a return commercially developing the technology than an infringer because the 
infringer does not have sunk costs.
678
 
Sidak concludes that the holdup has no effect in many cases because many patents have 
little or no commercial value.
679
  These patents would likely have little holdup value as well.  
However, these patented inventions were still the product of research and development and were 
not valueless when developed.
680
  The Lemley and Shapiro model ignores the real option risk in 
their calculation, focusing on the strength of the patent and its probability of success in court.
681
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Despite the extensive debate between various academics over whether a holdup exists, all 
parties appear to have been somewhat vindicated by the recent GAO report on patent litigation.  
The report actually showed that awards given the NPE’s were actually higher than the awards 
given to practicing entities.
682
  While the report concluded that the awards were higher, it did not 
indicate that the awards were disproportionate or excessive. 
Litigation Cost 
Golden indicates that cost may be a greater factor in settlement rather than the threat of 
an injunction.  Whether it is a greater reason for settlement is debatable, however comparing 
litigation costs versus the cost of remedy payments is a consideration.  While cost is not a direct 
factor in the remedy, the costs must be borne in order to reach a remedy in all three jurisdictions.   
Litigation costs are a significant issue for all entities in the United Kingdom, as the total 
cost of litigation is comparable to U.S. costs.
683
  In Canada, litigation is still an expensive 
endeavour.
684
  However, unlike the U.S. where each party pays its own costs, litigation costs are 
generally awarded to the winning side in Canada and England.  This may not help with the initial 
litigation costs but a party with a strong chance of success can look forward to compensation for 
having to resolve issues through the courts.  Cost apportionment is a general rule in Canadian 
and English courts but discretion to award costs resides with the courts and is not guaranteed.
685
  
If litigation costs are significant, strengthening or weakening a court’s power to grant equitable 
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remedies will do nothing to curb alleged holdup situations.
686
  Golden argues that litigation costs 
may be more influential at driving infringers to settle in the case of weak patents, but an 
injunction is likely to be more effective when strong patents are involved.
687
  Litigation may be 
the largest potential cost for infringers and patentees alike, since litigation costs in the U.S. may 
run several million dollars for the average patent case and are comparably high in Canada and 
England.
688
   Litigation cost awards may not be nearly as helpful in the presence of a willing 
patent troll since both sides of a dispute will still have to pay their lawyers during the trial; and, 
only when a final decision has been rendered, will a party be compensated.  Small companies 
and sole inventors still face high trial costs and may even face a double payout of legal fees for 
an unfavorable decision.  Thus the threat of litigation rather than the threat of an injunction may 
initially be a bigger source of leverage. 
High litigation costs are more likely to encourage settlements between parties while 
lower costs are likely to encourage litigation.
689
  However, higher costs are likely to limit access 
to the courts when the patent owner is a small entity with limited resources, while lower costs 
will increase access.  Policy-makers face a balancing issue between allowing access to the courts 
and preventing excessive litigation.  High costs create a market for patent sales to parties willing 
and able to sue.  Tempering the effects of limited court access due to high litigation costs is a 
benefit that patent trolls give to small companies and sole inventors.  In the U.S., the recent GAO 
report indicates that non-practicing entities have helped small inventors and even Universities 
cover the upfront cost of expensive litigation.
690
  Access to courts also encourages inventors to 
seek patents because they can see merits in the protections afforded by a patent.  Patent trolls 
actually provide a benefit because they create a market for infringed or likely-to-be-infringed 
patents.   
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In the U.K. the existence of the Patent County Courts and a small-claims track within the 
Patent County Court have attempted to alleviate some of the access to justice burdens.
691
   These 
courts have simplified procedures but they also have limitations on the monetary size of damages 
(although there is leeway when it comes to complete remedies).  These courts may help the small 
inventor with small damages, but it will not help small inventors with potentially large damages.  
Nonetheless, a similar “small claims” edition of patent courts or streamlined procedures with 
capped damages within a regular court may be a potential solution to reduce litigation costs in 
Canada and the U.S. for many inventors.  While these courts may provide access, they may also 
create more litigation due to lowered costs and may increase nuisance suits. 
High litigation costs can create a nuisance settlement situation, one in which a settlement 
is paid to make the issue disappear rather than to resolve infringement through the courts.  This is 
something that not only trolls have taken advantage of.  It is also something that large companies 
with aggressive patent portfolio management divisions have used.  Sir Robin Jacob has opined 
that contingency fee suits which remove litigation costs from patent owners may be a significant 
driver for patent litigation and troll-like behavior.
692
  Often, the suit will involve a patent that 
may not actually be infringed or that may only be marginally infringed.  The availability of 
nuisance settlements encourages patent accumulation, but innovation encouragement is highly 
questionable.  The nuisance threat neither promotes innovation nor does it promote innovation 
commercialization, but it does create an incentive for small companies and sole inventors to 
patent and enforce their patents. 
A patent infringement suit will generally involve a claim that there is infringement along 
with an invalidity defense.  Only if the patent is deemed valid and infringed will the court 
proceed to determine a remedy.  Validity and infringement determination can be a protracted and 
costly affair.     
There are multiple issues involved when examining litigation costs.  Access to the courts 
must be balanced against increasing use of the courts to settle disputes.  Another consideration is 
that companies with large resources are using their financial or legal expertise as a form of 
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blackmail to force other companies into settlements.  Lowering legal costs may remove threats 
from alleged trolls, but even reasonable costs can escalate when a company with an aggressive 
portfolio management division threatens a smaller company with infringing several hundred 
patents.   
Nuisance settlements may actually aid small inventors by creating a market for their 
patents.  A small inventor may not be able to commercialize his patented innovation, but he may 
be able to recover any research and development costs and even profits if he sells to someone 
capable of making infringement claims against alleged infringers.  It is the high cost of fighting a 
patent infringement claim that makes nuisance suits potentially profitable.  Alleged infringers are 
willing to settle to avoid litigation costs.  However, while this tactic may benefit small inventors, 
it is also used by both IBM and Intellectual Ventures. 
Economic Considerations for Damages and Remedies 
Scholars who apply an economic analysis to patent systems fall within an ideological 
spectrum.  On one end of the spectrum are the pure property rights supporters; on the other end 
are the liability rule supporters.  The property rights movement naturally advocates a system 
where strong property rights are applied to intellectual property.  Adherents believe strong 
property rights are better suited to a free-market system and to personal liberty ideals, because 
they encourage parties in an infringement dispute to negotiate between themselves in order to 
come to an agreement.  When an injunction is granted, the parties are forced to decide on the 
value of property through negotiations and not through outside intervention.  Pure liability rules 
actually allow infringement but will compensate the infringed party based on an objective 
standard enforced by an outside regulatory or judicial party.  Advocates of liability rules argue 
that economic considerations support returning the patentee to the position she would have 
occupied but-for the infringement because it achieves the goals of the patent system by 
promoting invention and increasing disclosure while still allowing competition and consumer 
benefits through lower costs.
693
      
Current property rights supporters lean towards protecting the inventor while liability 
rules supporters tend to lean towards compensating inventors while also limiting harm to 
infringers.  Property advocates believe that a liability based system will lead to compulsory 
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licenses which will undercompensate patent owners, discourage future R&D investment, and 
lead to less innovation.  Liability rule supporters indicate that property rules are also inadequate 
because they may overcompensate patent owners while potentially choking follow-on innovation 
and stifling R&D investment.  Both groups have economic models that mention follow-on 
innovation and R&D investment, but their models are only marginally supported by empirical 
data.
694
  How much patents encourage innovation is questionable, but the data, nonetheless, 
indicates that startups use patents to gain investors.  Actual impact on follow-on inventors and 
the public are not really considered or are a distant, secondary concern in theoretical models.  
Both property and liability rules assume that an entitlement to the fruits of an innovation exists in 
the patent grant as part of the incentive.   
In both the property and the liability arguments, the stated main goal of the patent system 
is assumed to be innovation.  However, innovation is just one goal and the debate often ignores 
other goals.  The debate between the two extremes also focuses on how the patent owner and 
infringer will behave but ignores or minimizes the significance of other stakeholders.  The 
question being asked during these debates is whether a patent owner will be more likely to invest 
in the innovative process if there are strong or if there are weak property rights.  The underlying 
thinking is that society will benefit if the innovator is convinced to increase investment in the 
innovative process and to make public, through patenting, the results of the innovation 
investment.  The other stated goals of the patent system are either not part of the consideration or 
are only peripherally considered.  Social benefits seem to be assumed merely by the increased 
innovation and publication of inventions.  However, social benefits are rarely a direct 
consideration in economic analysis and often that analysis does not extend to commercialization, 
non-practice entities beyond trolls, strategic behavior, job creation, consumer benefits, or the 
impact of increased patent liquidity.  
Innovation is not an end in itself but is a step towards commercialization.  It cannot be 
assumed that incentives to innovate will ultimately lead to commercialization.  This is especially 
true since there has been an increase in strategic behavior, patent-only transactions, and rent-
seeking.  It is not that these transactions are necessarily bad or detrimental to the patent system, 
but there has been a proliferation of such transactions which use the property rights of a patent 
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but fail to commercialize the underlying innovation or fail to encourage follow-on innovation.  
This requires analysis that looks beyond the patent owner and the infringer only.  
Another concern within the property/liability debate is the patent troll.  Some believe that 
the patent troll is actually beneficial to the system while others try to show that trolls will destroy 
the patent system.  Analysts fail to recognize that there are separate categories of patent owners 
and the debate seems to conflate all owners into one group while keeping trolls as a separate 
group.  Small, medium, and large companies that put their patents into practice each have 
different motivations to patent.  Trolls, licensing companies, and portfolio management 
companies also have different motivations to patent.  Finally, the particular industry in which the 
patent owner is involved will also affect inventor behavior.  Of course, there may be categories 
of patent owners other than the ones noted above.  In addition there may also be an overlap 
between the categories, as well as no explicit dividing line between the categories.  As has been 
shown, the patent owners in each category can also be NPEs or even trolls.  Patent enforcement 
ability will also affect the approach an entity takes to manage its patent holdings.  These 
categories make economic considerations more complicated, and there are significant differences 
that merit consideration when remedies are examined under the goals of the patent system.   
When the categories and patenting motivations are considered, many assumptions made 
in determining economic validity to support a particular remedy rule seem flawed.  Strategic 
considerations further complicate economic analysis, making absolute remedy determination 
difficult and even undesirable based on the reasons for creating a patent system.  Judicial 
flexibility may be desirable in tailoring remedies to compensate for the harm, while still 
maintaining patent system goals.  
Recent concerns about NPEs have raised questions about the property/liability 
ideological divide and its impact on the goals of the patent system.  As has been indicated by 
Landers, there is also the issue of liquid patents, patents traded for their property rights but not 
for the underlying innovation.  Economic analysis of remedies and patent enforcement by NPEs 
has raised concerns that inventors who do not commercialize their patented inventions yet still 
enforce their patents may be detrimental to the patent system.  Scholars in the U.S. note the lack 
of a working requirement but there is tension between the patent system goal of encouraging 
commercialization and the right to dispose of property as the owner sees fit.  While there is a 
170 
 
loophole in Canadian and U.K. law which creates a limited working requirement, there have 
been considerable complaints in both countries about access by companies trying to take 
advantage of this section of patent law. The tension between property rights and patent system 
goals seems to exist in all three jurisdictions.  Nonetheless, commercialization has clearly 
become something that U.S. courts are willing to consider when granting a remedy.   
NPEs also raise questions about the appropriate compensation an innocent infringement 
should pay.  While the NPE may have been first to patent the innovation, the innovation clearly 
did not aid the innocent infringer and resulted in duplicated effort.  Such results call into question 
the innovative nature of the patent, the motivation provided by the patent, and the benefits 
patenting provides for follow-on inventors.  This is an economic waste which calls into question 
the notice provided by the patent grant and any litigation to resolve the dispute.  General 
consensus seems to indicate that research is not necessarily wasted even if there is duplication.  
However, from an economic standpoint, there is waste because two inventors have expended 
resources towards the same goal but only one has reaped the benefits, while the other has 
expended resources for no gain.  Economic waste may be a consideration that should be in the 
purview of lawmakers rather than courts, but it illustrates some of the economic inefficiencies 
that exist in an absolute property system.  While it is likely that an innocent infringer or 
independent developer will have their work considered by the court when remedies are 
determined, the U.K. has actually codified compensation limitations due to innocent 
infringement.   
Examining economic efficiency is admirable but it cannot offer insight unless all 
stakeholders and system goals are considered.  Unfortunately, not all inventors are the same. 
Access to patents, patent protection, the courts, and remedies are not the same for all inventors.  
Furthermore, strategic use of patents that skew economic models is assumed to happen 
infrequently, and some models ignore it.  Despite commercialization being a stated goal, there is 
a reluctance to encourage working requirements because it is assumed that anyone willing to use 
the patented innovation will pay reasonable consideration to gain access, while a property owner 
will best understand how to use his property.  Nonetheless, a combined system of property and 
liability rules, as exists right now,  along with judicial flexibility, are better suited to allow courts 
to maintain the goals of the patent system – encouraging innovation by creating an incentive, 
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limiting strategic behavior through limiting exclusion powers, and encouraging 
commercialization by granting damages in lieu of injunctions when non-practicing entities are 
involved.  The current system may be far from perfect but removing tools from the judicial 
remedy arsenal only serves to limit the flexibility courts have in resolving extremely fact-
dependent disputes.  Patent disputes rarely fall into a one-size-fits-all resolution.   
There is also the issue of litigation costs which is a factor (along with an ultimate 
injunction), in encouraging alleged infringers to agree to patent-owner licensing demands.  Given 
the high litigation costs in all three jurisdictions, especially when viewed in relation to potential 
awards in each jurisdiction, this should also factor into the debate on remedy systems.  Litigation 
is a necessary step in order to receive the ultimate remedy in an infringement situation.  High 
costs are what encourage predatory practices by aggressive portfolio management firms.   
Within patent law, there are many supporters who lean to one side or the other but few 
who preach an absolute property or liability approach.  There appears to be recognition that 
patents are different from other property and require different treatment.  However, there is also 
recognition that current liability elements of patent remedies may not only lead to unfair, 
inadequate, and potentially inaccurate results but also may create great difficulties for the courts.  
To that end, there has been considerable analysis to find more accurate remedies that reflect real 
damages or real harm rather than approximations currently in use.  Complete accuracy is not 
really necessary, although its lack poses difficulties to the courts.  The laws in all three 
jurisdictions call for reasonable royalties, or for mere royalty payments, and not completely, 
objectively determined, exact royalties.    
The current system of property rights combined with remedies, including damages, 
injunctions, and profits, has been in place in all three jurisdictions for a long time.  All three have 
employed a combination of property and liability remedies.  All three jurisdictions are market 
economies with a strong sense of property rights.  The next section will detail the remedies in all 
three jurisdictions but with an eye towards all stakeholders.  Some of the limitations of remedy 
analysis will also be discussed in the next section, followed by a proposal of potential systemic 
changes to better address some of the issues within the current system.  Addressing these issues 
is an attempt to find ways to encourage commercialization.   
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Commentary and Critique 
While Lemley and Shapiro should be applauded for their efforts to establish a benchmark 
and to quantify the impact that trolling behavior has on the patent system, their theory has 
significant flaws as pointed out by both Golden and Sidak.  Lemley and Shapiro highlighted the 
effect a presumption towards awarding injunctions can have on the patent system, especially 
when non-practicing entities are the patent owners.  They focused heavily on practicing and 
competing entities to show how infringers are affected by injunction remedies, but they included 
information on non-practicing entities as well.  As Golden points out, they failed to distinguish 
between different types of NPEs when calling for damages in lieu of an injunction for all non-
practicing entities.  Nonetheless, Golden and Sidak call for approaches that presume an 
injunction award, even if the patent owner is a non-practicing entity, again without examining 
distinctions.  In their stated positions, there are a several flawed assumptions which seems to 
make their models and critiques valid; but they are so only within their limited scope and 
because they ignore externalities to their assumptions.  
Each of these commentators looks at the patent system as having the purpose of 
encouraging innovation.  While this is true, this is just one of many reasons why a country 
establishes a patent system.  In creating their economic models they failed to examine other 
purposes behind establishing a patent system.  There is also an assumption by Sidak and Golden 
that a patent owner, motivated to innovate by a potential patent grant, will market the innovation 
after obtaining a patent, secure in the knowledge that the right to exclude will prevent others 
from practicing the innovation.   
The patent system is also established to protect interested parties.  Each of these 
commentators examines only relations between the patent owner and the infringer. They ignore 
follow-on inventors, investors and the public.  Additional studies have shown that, even among 
patent owners, there are a plethora of reasons for obtaining a patent, of which motivation to 
innovate is one of the lesser reasons.    
Some of the economic models used to gauge the effectiveness of remedies will be 
examined in this section.  All models currently have limitations.  To ensure accuracy, any 
economic model should apply many more factors than are currently used.  In this section, 
remedies which have been shown to exist in the three jurisdictions will be revisited.  This will be 
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followed by an examination of the impact of these remedies on the interested parties when a 
patent owner is an NPE.  The examination will also look at factors in the remedy process that 
will encourage or discourage settlement.  
Patent owners are an extremely varied group.  An owner can be an individual operating 
out of his garage or a corporation the size of Apple.
695
  A patent owner is not necessarily the 
inventor of the underlying innovation.  The owner may be using the underlying innovation or the 
owner may be accumulating patents for licensing or other purposes.  There are also universities 
and R&D companies that do not actually make or commercialize the underlying innovation but 
merely sell or license the patent to others.  There are companies that practice some of their 
patents but accumulate other patents as part of their offensive or defensive strategies to gain 
further revenue.  Companies, like IBM, which have created subsidiary companies to manage 
their patent portfolios.  Some of these groups may actually be trolls.  Yet there are still other 
motivations for obtaining a patent that do not involve practicing the innovation.  These groups 
were mentioned in chapter III and - other than companies that actually practice the innovation in 
a particular geographic region - they are non-practicing entities. 
Each of these groups has the right to enforce the patent against an infringer.  However, 
the motivation to enforce may vary.  Practicing entities either have put in the time and effort to 
develop the innovation or have paid to purchase a license or the patent.  These entities have also 
invested in commercializing the innovation.  The successful practicing entity actually achieves 
all of the goals of the patent system.  They publish information about their innovation, allowing 
follow-on inventors to examine the innovation.  They make something that benefits or is desired 
by consumers.
696
  Since consumers are willing to buy and the company continues to produce 
goods, it is presumed that the company is making a profit.  The profit is compensating the owner 
for the expended resources and generating a reward for the innovation.  Investors are also 
presumably sharing in the profits generated as compensation for their investment.  The higher 
costs for the duration of the patent may have a social detriment, but it is part of the price of 
maintaining a patent system.  On the whole, this system encourages innovation and brings the 
                                                          
695
 Apple is currently worth approximately $600 billion USD, http://www.google.com/finance?q=aapl (September 
1, 2012).  
696
 Benefitting consumers is intended to mean that there is consumer demand for the innovation or subsequent 
product and consumers are willing to purchase it.  
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innovation into the marketplace.  Practicing companies are likely to enforce their patents against 
competitors, but this will also depend on how aggressive its patent management department is.   
Licensing starts the process in which the patent is treated as property and may be separate 
from the underlying innovation.  Licensors who allow another to practice the innovation in 
exchange for royalty payments may be working to meet the goals of the patent system.  For the 
time and effort expended in creating the innovation the licensor receives compensation through 
either a royalty or sale.  The practicing entity that purchased the right to make or use the 
innovation is presumably making a profit from selling goods to consumers.  Consumers are also 
benefitting because they are interested in purchasing the good from the maker.  Licensing entities 
will usually enforce their patents to pursue royalties and not necessarily to prevent others from 
practicing their innovations.   
In the above two cases, infringement is actually detrimental to the patent owner and any 
potential licensees.  The economics of how infringement affects patent owners has been 
documented and losses are quantifiable and compensable through lost profits or an account of 
profits.  There is a greyer area where a patent owner is trying to commercialize an innovation but 
is unable to do so because of infringement.  Damage quantification in the form of lost profits or 
an account of profits becomes more complicated depending on the stage of commercialization.  
The lost profits suffered during the initial commercialization attempts will be small but as the 
patent owner becomes better able to produce and sell goods and services that use the innovation, 
the lost profits will increase.  An account of profits has generally been unavailable to non-
practicing entities.  Nonetheless, it is a desirable and substantial remedy.  Whether a patentee 
will be able to convince a court of a sufficient degree of innovation practice, to qualify for the 
remedy, will likely be fact determinative.  Thus it is possible that a court will grant lost profits 
based on the ill-gotten gains theory; but, depending on a company’s progress towards 
commercialization, a reasonable royalty and an injunction may be awarded instead.  
The problem lies in situations where the patent owner is non-practicing.  While the laws 
in each of the three jurisdictions provide for compensation upon infringement, the question of 
whether the remedy is to compensate for the wrong should be asked by the court before 
proceeding with the remedy.  Proportion is a hallmark of the commonwealth remedy system and 
compensation is a motivation of the remedy system in all three jurisdictions.  Despite the 
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availability of multiple remedies in each patent system, courts should be examining proportion 
when a non-practicing entity is involved.  Compensation is, after all, a stated policy in each 
jurisdiction.  A further consideration is the impact granting an injunction has on the other 
interested parties versus granting an alternative remedy in lieu of an injunction. 
An injunction would remove the infringing good or process from the marketplace. It is 
likely that an infringer would agree to a license before the good is removed from the 
marketplace, but that is only if the negotiated royalty makes using the infringing good feasible.  
It may be hard to argue that this is a holdup, especially since a valid patent is being infringed; but 
this reasoning merely looks at the patent owner and infringer.  If the patent owner and the 
infringer are the only ones considered, an injunction would be the most effective remedy.  But 
the patent system has other stakeholders.  Even if one argues that other stakeholders have 
implicitly agreed through the laws to award property rights to patent owners, each of the three 
systems has limits on those rights.  These rights are limited either directly through the statutes or 
indirectly through the courts.  An absolute right to an injunction in all circumstances is 
questionable given the limited nature of the patent right.   
If one examines patent disputes through the Calabresi/Melamed economic model, the 
transaction costs may be enormous.  However, in applying their method, transactions costs must 
be defined.  If transaction costs include the legal costs of defining boundaries, validity, and 
infringement, it will be extremely high.  Such high costs entail a liability remedy.  However, if 
the transaction costs are calculated once the court decides the dispute, they will be relatively 
small.  If transaction costs do not include the cost of litigation then a property remedy will 
clearly be more suitable. 
Removing the innovation from the marketplace will have a negative impact on 
consumers.  Even if the innovation remains in the marketplace, consumers will have to pay 
increased prices for the good or service, regardless of whether a royalty is negotiated in the face 
of an injunction or in lieu of an injunction.  It is assumed that a royalty rate negotiated with an 
injunction looming will be greater than one granted by a court.  However, despite the fears of 
Golden and Sidak, a reasonable royalty does not mean a negligible royalty.  A downward royalty 
spiral is far from certain.  The dearth of non-practicing entities receiving a final decision, 
including damages, in English and Canadian courts indicates that parties are far more willing to 
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negotiate a royalty than to let the courts decide their royalty rate.  This behavior is also evident in 
the U.S. where there have been court decisions involving non-practicing entities.  There are very 
few relative to the total number of infringement suits.  Canadian courts have also shown a 
willingness to grant a royalty premium when awarding a royalty in lieu of an injunction, even in 
the case where one company was a non-practicing entity.
697
  In England, the dearth of cases 
would indicate that parties are agreeing to a royalty outside the courts or courts are granting 
injunctions.  There is also no indication that court-awarded royalties involving non-practicing 
entities in the U.S. have been lower than what could have been achieved through negotiations.   
It is clear in cases like eBay v. MercExchange or RIM v. NTP, that a patent owner would 
have received a greater royalty payment with a looming injunction than through pre-decision 
negotiations or possibly even through court awards; but these are exceptional situations where a 
very large company would face complete business shutdown.  A holdup may not be the case if 
smaller companies are involved or a complete business shutdown is not imminent.  However, 
these two U.S. court decisions also show that court discretion can play a significant role in 
deciding whether to grant an injunction, especially if other interests are involved.  In RIM v. 
NTP, the impact on consumers did nothing to sway the judge’s injunction decision.  In eBay v. 
MercExchange, the court, however, took into account the enormous potential impact a complete 
business shutdown would have on consumers.  In both cases, the patent owner was looking to 
maximize royalty payments.  Neither case was a moral issue over subject matter or a desire to 
compete.    
The issue comes down to whether a patent owner should be entitled to a court-decided 
award that may amount to a lot of money or to an award that is for a negotiated sum of money.  
The court should ask the question of whether an injunction is justified, especially given that the 
patent owner is generally looking for monetary compensation.  As stated, the negotiated award 
for more money is far from certain. An argument could be made that a patent owner should 
receive every possible cent of compensation for his innovation. But this argument becomes less 
compelling when consumers will be greatly affected or when a patent is purchased with the 
intent of squeezing every penny of royalty payments from an unwitting infringer.  Arguments for 
compensating patent owners for the expense of innovation or research to purchase a patent to the 
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full value of the patent ignore the fact that development costs have little or no bearing on the full 
value of a patent.  Furthermore, when the goals of the patent system are considered, will such 
compensation encourage innovation or commercialization?  As was pointed out by Landers, 
Landes, and Posner, a system that encourages injunctions provides encouragement to innovation 
but not necessarily the incentive to commercialize.  Should a patent owner prevent an 
independent inventor from using an innovation merely because the owner holds a patent?  
The difficulties faced by an inventor in creating an innovation which can be patented 
were documented earlier, as were difficulties in commercializing the innovation.  The protection 
granted by a patent was intended as a means of compensation and even of reward for R&D 
efforts.  The purpose of a patent system is to encourage innovation by providing a limited 
monopoly.  However, the Berkeley Study has shown that there are several other reasons why 
someone would seek a patent.  Furthermore, the study found that the incentive to innovate and 
commercialize was found to actually be quite small.  This is not encouraging when 
commercialization is a stated goal of the patent system.  This also considerably blunts the 
arguments of Golden and Sidak who claim that innovation will be decimated unless patent 
owners are granted an injunction.   
The Berkeley Study was made in the U.S. with the U.S. patentee in mind, but the reasons 
for making a patent application are likely to apply as well in Canada and the U.K.  Furthermore, 
the strategic aspect of patent use is likely to increase because firms with patents in multiple 
jurisdictions have a greater number of fora for litigation.
698
  There has actually been a decrease in 
the number patent applications and grants in the U.K. Patent Office but that is likely because of 
the increase in applications through the European Patent office and the increased integration of 
the European patent market.
699
  That has not necessarily decreased enforcement or court activity 
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in England because of the nature of the European market.
700
  In Canada, there has been a steady 
increase in both patent applications and grants.
701
  Both the U.K. and Canadian patent Office 
applications and grants are few compared to patent application and grants in the U.S Patent and 
Trademark Office.
702
  The general increase in patents issued in Canada and the potential ability 
for a patentee to sue U.K. companies in U.K. court for infringement in other E.U. jurisdictions 
(assuming there is no validity dispute) make Canada and England potentially susceptible to 
strategic behavior.  Other reasons to seek a patent, as indicated by the study, would also seem to 
apply in Canada and the U.K.  The scale may be smaller than in the U.S. but each of the reasons 
are likely to remain valid in Canada and the U.K.  Alleged trolls have already tested the courts.   
Since neither jurisdiction has yet accumulated a significant number of final decisions 
involving non-practicing entities, it is still difficult to examine how courts would manage the 
remedy.  It is likely that both courts would grant a reasonable royalty for damages, but it is not 
clear that an injunction would be denied by either court.  Both jurisdictions have indicated that 
there is a presumption to award one.  There is a clear judicial analysis which must be performed 
when deciding on an injunction, and there is a clear burden shifting between each step.  In 
England, the test can be adjusted by the court based on the facts; but there are no clear examples 
that would involve trolls or troll-like behavior.  Canadian courts have a less clear test to follow, 
but they have a lot of flexibility when it comes to awarding an injunction.  Unilever v. Proctor & 
Gamble involved two competitors; but, for the purposes of that particular case, Unilever was a 
non-practicing entity.  Unilever’s move was clearly strategic; and, while the court granted 
damages in lieu of an injunction, they also highlighted the exceptional circumstances that led to 
the decision.  The court was quite clear that, without the exceptional circumstances, they would 
have granted an injunction.   
Economic analysis of patent remedies brings some insights but there are severe flaws in 
models proposed by several scholars.  Whether the economic analysis includes a benchmark and 
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a call to eliminate injunctions or an absolute property view that demands injunctions, neither 
reflects the current reality.  These models clearly do not account for the variety of NPE business 
models operating today.  These economic models are incapable of supporting an absolute 
justification for either a property or liability based solution.  Without more examples involving 
non-practicing entities using the courts, it is mere speculation how courts should approach 
injunction grants.  However, these incomplete economic results can also be an opportunity for 
law-makers to be proactive in limiting some of patent system issues.   
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Conclusion 
The goals of the patent system include encouraging innovation, investment, 
commercialization, and follow-on inventions.  These goals are pursued through a balancing of 
social benefits and social costs.  In attempts to balance benefits and costs, innovators are granted 
certain rights with a patent grant that entail legal protection.  The protection given to inventors 
comes in the form of a property right to exclude other users for a limited period.  Property rights 
in a patent granted to an innovator are part of the patent laws of Canada, the U.K., and the U.S.A. 
Recently, the balance of costs and benefits of the granted rights has been questioned as 
transactions involving just the patents, separate from the underlying innovation, have been 
multiplying.  There has been an increase in non-practicing entities using patent rights not only as 
a means of excluding competition while commercializing an innovation but also for strategic 
reasons designed to maximize profits.  Maximizing profits is a perfectly legitimate pursuit but 
not when the spirit of the patent laws and the goals of the system are being undermined in the 
process.   
Non-practicing entities have proliferated, and in their wake nuisance suits, cross-
licensing, and other offensive and defensive business strategies used by all sizes and manners of 
companies.  None of these practices are illegal, but they do pose concerns for future innovation 
as they tend to involve patent-only transactions without concern for the underlying innovation.  
With the increase in patent applications and grants, obtaining the rights associated with a patent 
grant has become an increasing reason for transactions rather than the innovation.  In fact, it is 
questionable whether these transactions actually do anything to encourage innovation.  These 
transactions also do not necessarily involve either innovation or commercialization and may 
actually stifle efforts to market goods and services.  
Trade in patents for patent rights has led to an increase in litigation, nuisance suits, and 
licensing fees.  Again, these may not necessarily be detrimental to the system, but a connection 
between litigation costs and nuisance settlements exists.  High litigation costs are also a 
consideration because these costs only exist if parties to a patent infringement suit want courts to 
settle a dispute.  While it may seem self-evident, a legal remedy will not exist unless parties are 
willing to go through the legal process.  However, parties may be willing to settle disputes if the 
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licensing costs are lower than the potential legal costs of protracted litigation to determine patent 
validity and infringement.   
Patent quality has only been mentioned insofar as it related to patent troll strategies.  
Fischer and Henkel noted that business strategies where companies purchase patents for 
enforcement purposes require higher quality patents.  However, there is enough anecdotal 
evidence in the U.S. to suggest that more questionable patents, or paper patents, are being 
obtained by companies who use the threat of lawsuits to obtain nuisance settlements.  Patent 
office grants are presumed valid, but validity is not conclusively determined until the patent has 
been examined by the courts.  Both quality patents and questionable patents are accumulated 
strategically by companies in both an offensive and a defensive manner. This is in addition to 
strategies used by alleged patent trolls.  There is also evidence that large companies are 
accumulating patents in various jurisdictions for strategic use against competitors.   
In the U.S., the volume of patent-only transactions has raised questions about treating all 
patent owners equally and about the power of remedies available to owners enforcing their 
patents.  Scholars have attempted to justify remedy approaches through a law and economics 
analysis of remedy impact.  While the conclusions and slippery slope arguments raised by such 
scholars may be questionable, their investigations helped pave the way towards a re-evaluation 
of how remedies have been awarded to patent owners.  This remedy analysis has also raised 
questions about how incentives created through patent rights and subsequent remedies help 
achieve the goals of the patent system. 
In Canada and the U.K., there has been less evidence and less concern about patent trolls.  
While trolls have entered the marketplace and have attempted to use the legal system to develop 
their business models, it is still not clear whether they have entered the marketplace in numbers 
comparable to the U.S. figures.  It is also not clear what impact such a small number of trolls will 
have.  However, the U.K. is a potential forum for lawsuits over the increasing number of patents 
issued by the European Patent Office.  In Canada the sharp increase both in patent application 
filings and in patent grants creates a potential forum for nuisance suits and for strategic suits by 
multinational corporations in strategic battles with competitors.   
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Legal scholars in the U.S. have turned to remedy analysis in an effort to make 
suggestions within the existing patent framework which may curb patent trolling behavior.  Such 
work has had an influence on the Supreme Court in its eBay v. MercExchange decision.  The 
eBay v. MercExchange case has been much discussed because it potentially limited remedies 
available to non-practicing entities.  However, while the decision may have caused a stir in the 
U.S., it merely reasserted the equitable nature of an injunction grant in a patent case.  The 
decision forced courts to perform a legal analysis balancing the remedy impact on the parties in 
dispute before granting an injunction.  Rather than grant an injunction upon a finding of 
infringement, courts were instructed to balance the harms to the parties and the public to see 
whether an injunction should be awarded. 
Current remedies available in Canada, the U.K., and the U.S. include injunctions and 
likely damages, in an effort to compensate the infringed party.  In lieu of damages, patent owners 
in Canada and the U.K. may seek an account of profits to recover wrongfully obtained profits 
from the infringer.  An account of profits is considered a property rule remedy in these two 
jurisdictions while damages are considered liability rule remedies.  Injunctions and an account of 
profits are considered equitable remedies, with discretion to award either one or both lying with 
the courts.  In the vast majority of disputes in all three jurisdictions, courts will likely grant an 
injunction because there is a clear policy reason for it, but the court must nonetheless perform a 
fact-dependent, balancing of convenience examination.  There has been some debate about 
presumptions when deciding whether to award an injunction, but the court is nevertheless 
required to determine whether the remedy is appropriate.  Despite the equitable nature of an 
account for profits, English courts view it as an extraordinary remedy while Canadian courts still 
seem to favor it.  Nonetheless, an account for profits, like an injunction, requires courts to see 
whether the remedy is appropriate.  While injunctions and an account for profits may be 
preferred by patent owners, and many legal scholars, these remedies still lie within judicial 
discretion and depend on the facts facing the court.   
Injunctions have been a standard remedy for all types of patent owners in all three 
jurisdictions once courts found infringement. However, damages have been calculated differently 
based on whether the patent owner was practicing the innovation.  In Canada and the U.K. an 
account of profits is generally not available for NPEs or, if granted, the remedy is calculated 
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differently.  Thus monetary compensation for patent holders depends on whether an innovation is 
practiced.  In all three jurisdictions, if a patent owner was practicing her patent, she would be 
entitled to lost profits as compensation for damages.  However, this remedy is not available to 
non-practicing entities.  NPEs are eligible to receive a royalty instead.  Even if a practicing entity 
claims lost profit damages, the patent holder would have to show that she could have made the 
sales tied to the lost profits claim before she would be entitled to the remedy.  Otherwise the 
patent holder would only be entitled to a royalty for those sales.  While an account for profits is 
not part of damages, it is a remedy which English and Canadian courts have not made available 
to NPEs.  English courts have stated that the profits an NPE would have made were royalties, 
and thus the account for profits becomes a reasonable royalty assessment.  Courts already have 
created distinctions in the type of remedy available for different types of entities, adjusting 
remedies with the facts presented.     
Courts in all three jurisdictions generally separate damages from validity and 
infringement hearings, indicating a preference to give the parties a chance to agree on their own 
terms rather than to have the court decide the remedy.  Allowing the parties to come to their own 
agreement concerning patent boundaries and infringement eliminates considerable uncertainty.  
Courts step in to award remedies if the parties cannot agree.  A judicial remedy will likely 
include an injunction along with damages for prior infringement.  Future compensation for 
continued innovation use will rely on an agreement between the parties and may actually be 
independent of any court decision.  While the injunction tends to be a standard part of the 
remedy process, with little regard for the type of patent holder, monetary compensation will vary 
according to whether the holder practices the patented innovation or not.  Monetary 
compensation will also vary with the holder’s production capabilities.  Whereas the court creates 
a distinction in compensation between practicing and non-practicing entities, an injunction 
greatly skews compensation in favor of the patent holder.  This is especially true if the infringer 
would like to continue using the innovation.  An infringer who is faced with a complete business 
shutdown due to an injunction is likely to agree to a patent holder’s demands for future royalties.  
Some commentators have indicated that an injunction can amount to a holdup or 
blackmail.  Other commentators have countered that since the right to exclude comes with a 
patent grant, the holder of a valid patent should be able to enforce that right, regardless of the 
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business reasons for enforcing that right.  While this second group of commentators rightly 
indicates that an injunction is a valid remedy which has traditionally been awarded, there are 
many considerations beyond tradition which a court can take into account when making its 
decision.  The discretionary nature of equitable remedies allows the court to examine several 
factors before granting an injunction.  This is not to say that an injunction should be abandoned 
as a remedy but that courts are perfectly capable of discerning business models, motives, and 
intentions when it is necessary to tailor compensatory remedies.  Furthermore, the Patent Acts of 
all three jurisdictions indicate that injunctions are just one remedy and not the only remedy.   
Economic analysis has put forward several propositions to attempt to discern whether 
injunctions are an essential component of the patent system or whether alternative remedies are 
better suited.  While the current scholarly economic analysis of patent remedies has shown itself 
to be either incomplete or tied to an ideological perspective, the debate still illustrates some 
issues which exist when establishing a patent system and what goals are addressed by the current 
system.  Innovation and efficiency are two major assumptions of economic scholars.  The 
efficiency aspect depends on transaction costs involved in a general property transaction, but 
some analysts have adapted this to intellectual property.  Given the complexities of a patent (and 
the necessity of having courts determine validity, boundaries, and infringement), efficient 
remedies will depend on what point of the dispute process is used to start examining transaction 
costs.  If boundaries, validity, and infringement are part of the transaction costs that need to be 
determined by a court, then it may be more efficient to impose a liability rule, or damages in lieu 
of an injunction.  However, if boundaries, validity, and infringement are not considered part of 
the transaction cost in determining patent value but are merely a precursor to a transaction cost 
that involves value determination, then a property rule in the form of an injunction is a more 
suitable remedy.  The innovation aspect relies on the incentives given to an innovator.  It is 
unclear, despite various models, whether an inventor requires an absolute right to exclude as 
incentive to invest in the innovation process.  It is also unclear whether rights that would allow 
an inventor to obtain full economic value for a patent are necessary to encourage innovation; and 
it is far from certain that profit falling short of full economic value would discourage innovation.  
Limited empirical data indicates that startups do not depend on patent protections for their 
incentive to innovate, but there is also an indication that there are multiple reasons to patent.  It is 
not clear whether larger companies would require the right to exclude, through patent protection, 
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before they would invest in R&D.  The only conclusion is that current economic models ignore 
several goals of a patent system, focusing on only certain aspects that often support ideological 
positions.  These economic models provide conflicting legal justifications.  For a more accurate 
economic analysis, the other goals of the system need to be included, as do inventor motivations 
to patent.  
As stated previously, the goals of a patent system are to benefit society through 
encouraging innovation, commercialization, follow-on invention, and investment by providing 
incentives to inventors while limiting the social costs of inventor encouragements and system 
administration.  Injunctions are a valid but not necessary remedy according to the laws of all 
three jurisdictions.  Given the power of the injunction, it is questionable whether the goals of the 
patent system are furthered every time an injunction is granted.  The laws also provide for 
damages or an account for profits to provide additional compensation to the patent owner, if 
necessary, or even to provide compensation in lieu of an injunction.  This gives the courts 
considerable leeway to adjust remedies as needed, based on the facts.  Courts can also make 
decisions in line with the goals of the system.  In all three systems, the remedies are intended to 
compensate the patent owner and not to punish the infringer.  Analysis that suggests patent 
owners are being overcompensated by patent remedies is questionable, but it is also clear that 
compensation determined by the court rather than through an agreement between the parties in 
dispute is far from the undercompensation predicted by critics of liability rules.  The current 
remedies which the courts in all three jurisdictions apply are easily balanced in light of the 
system goals.  
Another reason for allowing courts leeway is because the right held by a patentee is not 
necessarily tied to a particular remedy.  Entities have different motivations to obtain a patent, not 
all of which involve practicing the innovation.  These motivations will vary with the size of the 
patent-owning company, the technology involved, and the business model.  Offensive and 
defensive strategies, as well as investment gathering strategies, may be used to prevent 
competition while marketing an innovation.  Other business models often involve gathering 
licensing revenue from companies that are currently practicing the innovation or plan to practice 
the underlying innovation.  However, there are business models that involve gathering licensing 
revenues even though the underlying innovation will not be practiced by either the licensor or 
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licensee.  There is also a growing patent trade among both big and small companies, involving 
patents being purchased for enforcement purposes against others.  However, just because a 
business model is viable does not mean that a company using that model should receive all 
possible remedies when only some remedies will suffice to compensate the party.  If a patent 
owner is looking for monetary compensation, the nature of the compensation in a patent dispute 
may become very fact dependent and will require court intervention to protect the public.  It does 
not follow that just because a right exists a particular remedy will be necessary to support that 
right.  Courts are generally able to handle remedies for complicated sales calculations.  If parties 
resort to the courts to determine a patent dispute, then courts should be allowed to award an 
appropriate remedy.   
The call to require that courts award an injunction in all disputes because the property 
right allows it becomes difficult to justify in all situations.  In the case of eBay or RIM, the 
patent holder may have the right to exclude; but a remedy involving an injunction becomes 
difficult to justify if the parties genuinely disagreed on infringement and an injunction award will 
result in a potential remedy completely out of proportion with initial licensing demands.  In both 
the eBay and RIM decisions, a system-wide exclusion of infringing technology would have 
effectively shut down multi-billion dollar businesses heavily relied on by the public.  Some will 
argue that these companies should just have paid the initial licensing demands.  Others will point 
out that a valid patent holder is entitled to an injunction, specifically because a patent is property 
that entitles the holder to a property remedy.  Others note that all three jurisdictions have voiced 
great objections to compulsory licenses.  These are all valid points.  But is difficult to justify a 
property remedy in all situations, particularly when the remedy is an equitable one and other 
equitable or legal remedies exist.  The courts in all three jurisdictions have been reluctant to 
grant windfalls to patent owners as well.   
While there has been a general reluctance to move away from granting an injunction as a 
standard patent remedy, in all three jurisdictions there have been situations where courts have 
exercised their discretion.  U.K. courts have shown a willingness to consider alternatives to an 
injunction in exceptional situations, even if competing companies are involved.  Canadian courts 
have awarded damages in lieu of an injunction for an NPE.  U.S. courts have been more willing 
to grant damages in lieu of an injunction, but it has been in situations where the patent holder is 
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an NPE.  While NPEs are not a new phenomenon, unforeseen business models have begun to 
take shape, using patents in unforeseen manners.  The rise in alternative business models that use 
patents in ways similar to tradable commodities in the U.S. has caused great concern, particularly 
because of the separation of patent from its underlying innovation.  There are companies which 
accumulate patents as part of a patent-enforcement business.  The nascent auction markets have 
facilitated these practices.  Large companies have created subsidiaries whose assets consist of the 
parent company’s patent portfolio and whose sole purpose is to aggressively enforce its patents.  
These business practices may not have moved to Canada and the U.K. in significant numbers but 
attempts have been made.  Whether NPE practices grow is another question, but the courts 
should be prepared to deal with some of the issues faced by U.S. courts.  
It has been argued that given the search tools available in all three jurisdictions, there is 
no excuse to be unaware of the existence of a patent.  There is some merit to this argument but it 
is also not feasible to expect every potential inventor, product user, or developer to perform an 
in-depth search before moving towards a new area of research.  The sheer volume of research 
and innovation being performed in each of the three jurisdictions makes it very difficult to 
perform a search every time.  Even if a search is performed, it is often difficult for inventors to 
determine whether their area of research actually falls within the language claimed by a patent.  
RIM and eBay had genuine disputes with NTP and MercExchange respectively, over 
infringement.  Furthermore, not all inventors have the luxury of receiving legal opinions prior to 
commencing research and development.  Small companies and sole inventors can easily fail to 
find an infringing patent given the esoteric language used to draft a patent.  Large companies 
with dedicated patent departments may have a greater ability to perform a search; but it may not 
be practicable for even dedicated patent departments to search for infringement for every 
possible area of research, design, or method within a large company.  This is not to say that 
companies, big or small, should not make an attempt to search for a patent: but given the 
proliferation of patent applications and grants, it may be difficult to effectively determine 
whether a technology infringes before making R&D investments.  Furthermore, even upon notice 
from a patent holder about infringement, it is possible that there will be a difference of opinion 
about infringement.   
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Non-practicing entities are here to stay and the variety of business models will continue 
to grow as long as there is a potential for profit from patent ownership and as long as there are 
demands for services provided by many non-practicing entities.  While courts should have 
flexibility to award remedies to patent holders and courts should consider the goals of the patent 
system when granting remedies, there are limitations to the effectiveness of a court’s ability to 
grant remedies that encourage the goals of the patent system.  If a right is infringed, the remedy 
for the infringement can only be awarded by agreement between the parties or through access to 
the courts.  If there is no agreement, then the parties will resort to the courts.  For a court to be 
able to award a remedy there must be access to the courts.  It is the cost of court access which 
has given rise to business methods exploiting high litigation costs.  Nuisance settlements are 
outside the power of the courts since settlements are reached long before the full dispute reaches 
the court.   
The high cost of enforcing a patent through the courts is why business models such as 
patent trolling have managed to find patents to enforce relatively cheaply.  The high costs are 
also a reason for their business success.  These high litigation costs and the ultimate uncertainty 
of a court decision have often encouraged parties to settle before a final decision has been made.  
Many companies will often perform either a formal or informal cost-benefit analysis to 
determine whether it is cheaper to pay royalty demands or go to court.  Such analyses have also 
encouraged aggressive patent enforcement by companies with large portfolios, particularly 
against smaller companies, because the cost of defending a suit, whether valid or not, against a 
portfolio consisting of thousands of patents is cost-prohibitive relative to a settlement payment.  
Success through the nuisance model has encouraged large companies to spin-off their portfolios 
into patent enforcement companies or subsidiaries.  While businesses are finding success using 
such tactics, these practices are not necessarily encouraging innovation and are certainly not 
helping to commercialize the innovation.  Given that patent rights have not necessarily been the 
encouraging force behind many startup companies, there is some question regarding the 
effectiveness of the current systems and even the ability of remedies to influence such practices.  
There is also a question of whether patents act as an encouraging force for large companies. 
Patent troll profitability is greatest if a temporary injunction is awarded during the trial.  
Infringer business disruption is maximized and the infringers are most willing to meet the 
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demands in this situation.  However it is rare that courts in all three jurisdictions will grant 
injunctions to non-practicing entities prior to determining validity and infringement.  Once courts 
have decided that infringement exists, infringers are almost always willing to meet the demands 
of a patent holder if a permanent injunction threatens.  If an infringer faces damages in lieu of an 
injunction, the willingness to settle will depend on the uncertainty of the court award for 
damages and the desire for parties to avoid a perceived compulsory license.  Arguments that 
suggest that non-practicing entities will die away if injunctions are removed as a potential award 
are speculative.  Business models will continue as long as there are profits to be made.  That is, 
as long as royalty awards to non-practicing entities are not nominal or insignificant, allowing for 
sizeable profits above and beyond the amounts paid for the invention.  The search for 
profitability through trolling tactics will encourage greater patent search expertise to find 
unexploited patents.  It may also lead to patent troll business strategies that attempt to gauge 
profitability potential, by taking into account litigation risk in relation to the spread between the 
patent sale price and potential remedy awards.  In situations where a patent is unexploited and 
owned by a sole inventor or small company, such patents may actually be obtained relatively 
cheaply and can result in large profits regardless of whether royalties have been calculated by the 
courts or through negotiations under pressure of a looming injunction.  
A business strategy which has not been examined but which also exploits high litigation 
costs is one in which a large company fails to perform searches, relying on high litigation costs 
to minimize patent infringement suits.  Such a strategy, combined with a settlement pool 
calculated into operating costs, may actually be a cheaper solution to litigation.  However, such a 
strategy will still require a team of patent lawyers who can evaluate infringement claims and still 
use the threat of a court battle to minimize nuisance claims.  This strategy will still require 
vigilance when it comes to patent infringement disputes with competitors and other large 
companies.  More empirical studies should be conducted to determine the viability of strategies 
and the use of patents. 
Judicial remedies have their limitations, particularly when limited access to the courts 
precludes many disputes from actually reaching judges.  It has been shown that changes to 
remedies can have an impact on certain business strategies but those changes seem to have 
limited only certain extreme behavior.  Since there are profits to be made even if judges award 
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damages in lieu of an injunction, patent trolling practices continue.  Other business models have 
also sprouted to take advantage of high litigation costs and patent accumulation.  These business 
models seem to be achieving profits, but there are still questions about whether these businesses 
are resulting in a net social benefit.   
Several factors which were not considered in this work should be examined in future 
studies involving patent systems in Canada and the U.S.  In the U.K., study of its ties to the 
European Union should include an examination of factors that are Europe wide.  Increases in 
patent application volume and patent grant volume have led to a race for patents between 
competitors for cross-licensing royalty supremacy and for strategic supremacy.  This volume has 
led to questions about patent quality due to patent office resource limitations.  The limited ability 
of patent examiners to thoroughly examine patent applications raises questions about whether a 
patent is actually valid and whether a patented innovation is obvious in light of existing 
innovations.  Furthermore, the volume has raised questions about patentable subject matter 
related to business methods, software, bio-chemistry and other areas.  A deeper examination of 
patent business strategies also raises questions about the system.  All of these factors may 
actually lead to greater patent exploitation but less actual innovation exploitation. 
In Canada and the U.K., only a limited number of cases involving non-practicing entities 
have come before the courts.  However, there are indications that non-practicing business models 
are testing the marketplace in both countries.  Non-practicing entities include sole inventors, 
trolls, patent holding companies, and even large companies.  The situation in the U.S. should be 
closely watched by Canadian and U.K. courts and legislators so that the intended goals of the 
patent system can be maintained in light of changing business strategies and models. 
In the U.S. non-practicing entities have been active market participants for some time.  It 
seems that all manner and sizes of companies are finding new ways to exploit patents and the 
patent system rather than exploiting the innovations on which the patents are based.  Clearly 
there are profits to be made through the patents themselves.  However, given that such profits 
were not necessarily anticipated by those who created the current U.S. Patent Act, especially in 
light of the goals which a patent system is supposed to achieve, it may be time to reconsider the 
system goals or to reconsider the system itself in light of current goals.  
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